Trace Your Case

Author: TYC

Categories
Survivorship

LIC of India v. Anuradha AIR 2004 SC 2070

LIC OF INDIA V. ANURADHA

LIC of India v. Anuradha AIR 2004 SC 2070

ISSUE:

  • Whether, under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, the exact date of death can be determined when a person has not been heard from for a period of seven years?

RULE:

  • If a person’s life or death at a specific date is in question, it must be decided based on all evidence available at the time of the hearing.
  • Under Section 108, while the presumption of death applies after seven years of absence, there is no presumption as to the exact date or time of death; these must be established through evidence.

FACTS:

  • In 1986, Sham Prakash Sharma, husband of Anuradha, took a life insurance policy from Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), effective from February 8, 1986, with premiums payable biannually.
  • Premium payments were maintained for two years. On July 17, 1988, Sharma disappeared from Bombay and was not traced thereafter.
  • Anuradha filed a police report regarding Sharma’s disappearance. LIC notified Sharma’s residence on July 11, 1988, that the policy had lapsed due to non-payment of premium.
  • On June 29, 1996, Anuradha approached LIC for insurance benefits, asserting Sharma’s death, citing Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act (presumption of death after seven years of absence).
  • LIC rejected the claim based on Rule 14 of its Insurance Manual, stating that premiums must continue unless a court decree declares the insured deceased.
  • Anuradha filed a complaint with the State Consumer Commission in Jammu & Kashmir, alleging LIC’s deficiency in service.
  • The State Commission ruled in favor of Anuradha, asserting that the statutory presumption under Section 108 overruled LIC’s manual rule.
  • LIC appealed to the Jammu & Kashmir High Court, which upheld the State Commission’s decision, ruling that LIC failed to prove Sharma was alive at the time of claim submission.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court ruled in favor of LIC, reversing the High Court’s decision, stating that the presumption of death under Section 108 does not specify the time of death.
  • The Court clarified that death is presumed only after seven years without news from the individual, and there is no presumption as to the exact date or time of death.
  • The Court held that LIC was justified in rejecting the claim, as premiums were not paid post-disappearance, and policy benefits could not be claimed without proof that the insured was deceased at the relevant time.
  • The Court appreciated LIC’s offer to release the benefits ex gratia, even though the policies had technically lapsed.
Categories
Confessions

State of Maharashtra v. Mohammad Aabed Mohammad Ajmir Shaikh Criminal Confirmation case No. 2 of 2019

ISSUE:

Whether the extra-judicial confession made by the accused is admissible as evidence?

RULE:

Extra-judicial confession, if found to be voluntary, truthful, and reliable, can be crucial evidence in a criminal trial.

However, the court must ensure the confession was not obtained under duress, coercion, or inducement.

The confession should inspire confidence and be supported by other corroborative evidence.

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Categories
Judicial Notice

Onkar Nath & Ors. v. The Delhi Administration AIR 1977 SC 1108

ONKAR NATH & ORS. V. THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION

Onkar Nath & Ors. v. The Delhi Administration AIR 1977 SC 1108

ISSUE:

  • Whether the lower courts were justified in considering specific facts without needing formal evidence?

RULE:

  • Under Section 57 of the Evidence Act, courts can take judicial notice of widely known facts without requiring formal proof.
  • This allows the judicial system to recognize and rely on facts of public knowledge—such as notable events—without evidence, thereby ensuring efficiency and preventing undue formalism in the judicial process.

FACTS:

  • The appellants were leaders of the Northern Railwaymen’s Union, and on May 5, 1974, a speech was made at a meeting, inciting workers to go on strike from May 8th.
  • Under Rule 118(1) of Defense of India Rules, 1971, the Central Government had previously issued an order on November 26, 1973, prohibiting strikes connected to industrial disputes within railway services. This prohibition aimed to maintain essential supplies and services for public welfare.
  • The government accused the appellants of violating this rule by inciting a strike tied to an industrial dispute.
  • They were convicted by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and sentenced to six months of rigorous imprisonment.
  • The order of conviction was upheld in appeal by the sessions court, but in revision, the Delhi High Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone.
  • On appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the courts below were not justified in taking judicial notice that on the date they delivered their speeches, a railway strike was ready to take place, but such a strike was launched on May 8th, 1974.

HELD:

  • The Court held that lower courts correctly took judicial notice of the imminent strike on May 5 and the actual strike on May 8, given its significant impact on public life.
  • To convict under Rule 118(1), the prosecution needed to establish that the strike was related to an industrial dispute. The Court found no sufficient evidence that the alleged incitement was tied to an industrial dispute, as required under the rule.
  • The only prosecution witness, Jasbir Singh, provided a general summary of the alleged incitement rather than quoting specific statements. The Court ruled that the prosecution’s reliance on summaries, without specific statements, was inadequate for conviction.
  • The court clarified that the rule restricts government orders to strikes connected to industrial disputes. Strikes without such connections fall outside the rule’s purview.
  • Based on these findings, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the conviction and acquitting the appellants.
Categories
Evidence

Piara Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 2274

PIARA SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF PUNJAB

Piara Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 2274

ISSUE:

  • Whether the High Court correctly prioritized the medical opinion of Dr. Jatinder Singh, who performed the post-mortem, over Dr. Paramjit Singh’s conflicting expert testimony?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Sessions Court’s acquittal based on the available evidence?
  • Whether the evidence of an extra-judicial confession be corroborated?

RULE:

  • Expert Testimony and Conflicting Medical Evidence: When two expert medical opinions conflict, the court generally prefers the testimony that aligns with direct evidence if it is reliable. Medical opinion serves to corroborate rather than supersede direct eyewitness accounts.

FACTS:

  • On November 14, 1967, Surjit Singh was attacked by four appellants who had broken into his home with weapons.
  • One of them, namely Piara Singh, was armed with a rifle and fired it, as a result of which the deceased fell and died soon after.
  • The appellants were charged when a chargesheet was filed against them; they were brought before the court of sessions, put on trial, and ultimately found not guilty by the Learned Trial Judge.
  • The appellant made an extra-judicial confession to one of the witnesses, admitting having murdered the deceased.
  • On appeal to the High Court, they were of the view that the judgment of the Learned Sessions Judge was wrong and convicted the appellants.
  • The injury’s nature made it very evident that it was a firearm injury that a rifle may have caused, along with positive evidence that Piara Singh had shot the rifle
  • The High Court noted that, given the differences in opinion between the two experts, the doctor who had the initial benefit of being able to examine the deceased, perform a postmortem, and determine the type of injury viewpoint is more valuable than the Sessions Court doctor who did not have this privilege.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s conviction, noting:
  • The High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal based on credible evidence that included eyewitness testimonies, corroborative medical evidence, ballistic expert findings, and an extra-judicial confession by Piara Singh.
  • The medical testimony by Dr. Jatinder Singh, who conducted the post-mortem, was preferred over the conflicting opinion of Dr. Paramjit Singh, who had not seen the body.
  • It was reasonable to accept evidence from interested or inimical witnesses, as they were credible eyewitnesses due to their proximity and immediate reporting.
  • The extra-judicial confession, corroborated by other evidence, was admissible without needing further corroboration.
  • Overall, the Court found the evidence against the accused sufficient to support the charge of murder. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court’s decision.
Categories
Section 27

Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor MANU/MH/0125/1946

PULUKURI KOTTAYA V. KING-EMPEROR

Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor MANU/MH/0125/1946

ISSUE:

  • Whether a confession made before police while in custody revealing the discovery of a weapon admissible as evidence against the accused?

RULE:

  • Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 allows for an exception to the general rule barring confessions made to police officers. It permits the admissibility of statements from an accused if they lead to the “discovery of a fact.”
  • Only the portion of the statement that directly relates to the fact discovered, such as the location or presence of an object, is admissible. Any additional incriminating statements, such as linking the discovered object to the crime, are not admissible.

FACTS:

  • A violent altercation occurred between two factions in a village on December 29, 1944 during which Sivayya and Subayya were killed. This altercation was part of an ongoing factional dispute.
  • The police sub-inspector held an inquest on one of the bodies and recorded statements from five witnesses, including four alleged eyewitnesses.
  • The Circle Inspector took over the investigation, re-examining all alleged eyewitnesses and other witnesses. These statements were recorded in the case diary by the Circle Inspector.
  • Before the Magistrate, the accused applied under Section 162 of the CrPC for copies of the statements made during the investigation. They received statements recorded by the Circle Inspector but were informed that those made to the Sub-Inspector were unavailable.
  • During trial proceedings, the defense counsel highlighted the absence of the Sub-Inspector’s initial statements, requesting them for cross-examination. Although the prosecution initially denied having these records, the Sub-Inspector’s notebook was eventually produced after key prosecution witnesses had been discharged, and a copy was supplied to the defense.
  • Based on the evidence presented, the Sessions Judge found the six hostile eyewitnesses credible and convicted the accused of rioting and murder. Some of the appellants were sentenced to death.
  • The accused appealed, but the Madras High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions.
  • The appellants filed a special leave petition challenging the High Court’s judgment and the evidentiary irregularities under Sections 162 of the CrPC and Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.

HELD:

  • Bombay High Court held that the confessional statements of accused were improperly admitted as evidence and remitted the case back to the High Court of Madras to determine if there is sufficient admissible evidence, apart from the confessions, to justify the convictions.
  • The court held that if the Madras High Court is satisfied that there is sufficient admissible evidence to justify the convictions, they will uphold them. If, on the other hand, they consider that the admissible evidence is not sufficient to justify the convictions, they will take such course, whether by discharging the accused or by ordering a new trial, as may be open to them.
  • The court discussed the purpose and scope of Section 27, which allows for the admissibility of information provided by an accused that leads to the discovery of a fact.
  • The court emphasized that the information provided by the accused must relate distinctly to the fact discovered. It argues against a broad interpretation that would allow any information related to the discovered object to be admissible, as this would undermine the ban on confessions made to the police.
  • The court also criticized a previous decision (Athappa Goundar’s case) for allowing a confession to be admitted based on information about objects produced, which it considers a misinterpretation of the section and observed that such an interpretation would render the ban on confessions made to the police ineffective.
Categories
Communication during Marriage

Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 704

RAM BHAROSEY V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 704

ISSUE:

  • Whether the deposition made by the wife be admissible if it was communication made during marriage under Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act?
  • Whether the circumstantial evidence in the case is sufficient to sustain the conviction?

RULE:

  • For a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, the evidence must be strong enough to exclude any reasonable hypothesis of innocence and must point conclusively to the accused’s guilt.

FACTS:

  • Ram Bharosey was convicted of murdering his father, Manna, and stepmother, Kailasha, on the night of May 26, 1952, following a longstanding family dispute.
  • The bodies, found with multiple injuries, were discovered on May 27, 1952, by the village chaukidar, who reported the incident.
  • When police investigated, they found Bharosey missing, but he was soon arrested while en route to another village.
  • At the time of arrest, he wore a blood-stained dhoti. During interrogation, Bharosey led officers to his house and produced blood-stained silver ornaments and a gandasa (sharp weapon).
  • All items except one tested positive for human blood. His wife testified seeing him descend from the roof on the morning of the murders and behaving suspiciously.
  • The trial court convicted him of murder based on circumstantial evidence.
  • The Allahabad High Court upheld this decision, and the Supreme Court, upon appeal, confirmed the conviction and death sentence, finding the cumulative evidence sufficient for a murder conviction.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the wife’s deposition was not inadmissible under Section 122 of the Evidence Act, as it referred to the appellant’s acts and conduct rather than any communication made by him to his wife.
  • The Court held that if no other circumstances connected the accused with the murder, it would examine the facts and circumstances of the case to determine if they sufficiently fixed the appellant with the guilt of murder.
  • The presence of blood stains on the jewelry, along with the appellant being seen descending from the roof in the early hours and the recovery of a blood-stained gandasa (weapon) from him, was sufficient, in the Court’s opinion, to connect him to the offense of murder.
  • The Court further noted ample evidence that the appellant’s relationship with his father was strained, with frequent quarrels leading to a partition and ongoing differences, which the lower courts had accepted as establishing a motive for the crime.
  • Consequently, the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and upheld the sentence of death.
Categories
Expert Witness

Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 86

RAM NARAIN V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 86

ISSUE:

  • Whether the legality and propriety of the Appellant’s conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of the hand-writing expert valid?

RULE:

  • The opinion of a handwriting expert is not conclusive evidence; however, it may be deemed acceptable if supported by internal or external evidence related to the document in question that corroborates the expert’s conclusions.
  • The court may also conduct its own comparison of handwriting to verify the expert’s findings, provided the presiding officer is familiar with the language and writing style involved.

FACTS:

  • On August 15, 1964, a five-year-old boy named Mannu went missing from the home of his relative, Gajendra Natth, in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh.
  • A report was filed at the Sisamau police station, and a reward of Rs. 501 was announced for information leading to the child’s recovery.
  • Two anonymous letters were received by Gajendra Natth; the first demanded a ransom of Rs. 1,000, and the second demanded Rs. 5,000 for the return of Mannu.
  • In December 1964, Yashpal Singh, a trainee from a local ITI, provided information leading to Mannu’s recovery on January 11, 1965.
  • The investigation implicated Ram Narain as responsible for the kidnapping and sending the ransom letters.
  • Ram Narain was charged under Sections 363 (kidnapping), 468 (forgery), and 384/511 (attempt to commit robbery) of the Indian Penal Code.
  • The trial court convicted Ram Narain under Section 384/511 IPC based solely on handwriting analysis that linked him to the ransom letters.
  • The conviction was upheld by the Temporary Sessions Judge of Kanpur on appeal.
  • Ram Narain’s revision petition was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court on October 6, 1969.
  • The case reached the Supreme Court of India via a special leave petition.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court examined whether Ram Narain’s conviction based solely on handwriting expert testimony was legally sound.
  • It acknowledged that while handwriting expert opinions are fallible and should be treated with caution, they can be accepted if corroborated by other evidence or if the court itself verifies similarities through comparison.
  • The court found that all three lower courts had compared the disputed writings with known samples and concluded they matched Ram Narain’s handwriting.
  • The Supreme Court upheld the conviction due to sufficient corroboration from both expert testimony and judicial comparison.
  • The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year was deemed appropriate but was reduced to the time already served due to significant delays in proceedings since the crime occurred.
Categories
Communication during Marriage

M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan & Anr. AIR 1970 SC 1876

M.C. VERGHESE V. T.J. PONNAN & ANR

M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan & Anr. AIR 1970 SC 1876

ISSUE:

  • Whether the letters sent to the wife admissible in evidence per Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act?
  • Whether uttering a libel by a husband to his wife amount to “publication”?

RULE:

  • Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act prohibits disclosing in Court communications made between spouses during marriage. Still, it does not prevent such communications from being introduced as evidence by a third party, such as a non-spouse recipient.

FACTS:

  • In the above case, the first respondent wrote letters to his wife, the appellant’s daughter. The letters contained defamatory imputations concerning the appellant.
  • The letters were handed over to the appellant, who filed a complaint for defamation against the first respondent.
  • The Magistrate held that communication between spouses of a matter defamatory of another did not amount to publication and that no evidence could be given of it under Section 122 of the Evidence Act, 1872, against the first respondent and discharged him.
  • The Court of Session believed that the English common law doctrine that communication by one spouse to another of a matter defamatory of another person does not amount to publication did not apply in India and that Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not prevent the complainant from proving the letters written by Ponnan to his wife before the Court and set aside the order of Magistrate.
  • After that, the matter was appealed to the Kerala High Court. The High Court overturned the Court of Session’s decision and reinstated the District Magistrate’s decision.
  • While the appeal against the order of discharge was pending in this Court, a decree of nullity of marriage was passed against the first respondent on the grounds of his impotence.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the accused, T.J. Ponnan, should not have been discharged by the lower courts.
  • The Court noted that if the appellant, M.C. Verghese, were to rely solely on the testimony of Ponnan’s wife (Rathi) to support his defamation claim, Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act would bar her from disclosing marital communications without Ponnan’s consent.
  • Additionally, the Court emphasized that the timing of the marriage and the proceedings for nullity were crucial, as the Indian Divorce Act does not render such a marriage void ab initio; the marriage remains valid until a decree of nullity is pronounced.
  • Therefore, if the defamation proceedings were to continue and the wife was called as a witness to testify about the communications with her husband, she would be barred from doing so under Section 122 without his consent since the marriage was subsisting when the communications were made.
  • However, the Court pointed out that the letters containing the alleged defamatory content were in the appellant’s possession and could be introduced as evidence through other means. Hence, the discharge of the accused was unwarranted, and the matter required further trial.
Categories
Evidence

Aminul Islam v. State of West Bengal, 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 1272

AMINUL ISLAM V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Aminul Islam v. State of West Bengal, 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 1272

ISSUE:

  • Whether ocular evidence takes precedence over medical evidence in cases of contradiction?

RULE:

  • When there is a discrepancy between ocular and medical evidence, ocular testimony shall prevail because the medical evidence is in the nature of an expert’s opinion.

FACTS:

  • Aminul Islam was accused for assault under Section 324 IPC for assaulting Serajuddin Ahmed on 6th August 2016.
  • A complaint by Serajuddin’s brother alleged that Aminul and others wrongfully restrained and assaulted him with a Hasua and iron rods, causing serious injuries.
  • Eyewitnesses testified that Aminul attacked Serajuddin with a Hasua.
  • Aminul argued that the medical report, showing a lacerated wound (4 cm), contradicted the claim of an incised wound from a Hasua.
  • The Trial Court convicted Aminul, leading him to appeal.

HELD:

  • Calcutta High Court acquitted the appellant and set aside trial court’s judgment.
  • The Court also observed that the medical report’s lacerated wound did not match the incised wound expected from a Hasua.
  • Therefore, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish a direct link between the appellant and the injury sustained by the victim.