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Jurisdiction

Hiralal v. kalinath [1962] 2SCR 747

HIRALAL V. KALINATH

Hiralal v. kalinath [1962] 2SCR 747

ISSUE:

  • Whether the leave obtained had been rightly obtained or wrongly obtained is not a matter which can be agitated at the execution stage?

RULE:

  • The objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a Court to try a case. The competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction and where it is lacking it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court can be waived and this principle has been given statutory recognition by enactments like S. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

FACTS:

  • The appellant wished to acquire shares in certain mills, popularly known as ‘John Mills’, at Agra. He engaged the services of the respondent to negotiate the deal on certain terms.
  • The bargain was concluded, and the appellant, together with another person, purchased the entire interest of one Major A. U. John by an indenture of sale dated July 10, 1946.
  • The respondent instituted a suit, being suit No. 3718 of 1947, on the original side of the High Court of judicature at Bombay for recovery of his commission, amounting to one lakh of rupees, in respect of the transaction aforesaid. The suit was eventually referred to the arbitration of one Mr. W. E. Pereira, administrator of the estate of the aforesaid Major A. U. John, deceased.
  • One of the defences taken by the appellant, as defendant in the action, was that the suit filed in the Bombay High Court, as aforesaid, after obtaining leave of that Court, under clause 12 of the Letters Patent was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court on the original side, in as much as the entire cause of action, if any, had arisen at Agra.
  • The arbitrator gave an award in favour of the respondent to the extent of decreeing his claim for only seventy five thousand rupees as commission, with interest at 6% per annum pendente lite. Proceedings were taken in the High Court of Bombay for setting aside the award on certain grounds, not necessary to be stated here.
  • The Bombay High Court found that there was no defect in the award and that there was no legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. The High Court further held that the petition was frivolous, and dismissed it with costs.
  • The appellant preferred an appeal which was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay on January 21, 1952. The award was, thus, incorporated in a decree of the High Court.
  • That decree was transferred to the court of the District Judge Agra, for execution. On February 5, 1952 the execution proceedings were instituted by the decree-holder in the Court of the Civil Judge, Agra, to realize the sum of one lakh ten thousand rupees, approximately, on the basis of the decree passed as aforesaid by the Bombay High Court.

HELD:

  • In that case, the suit had been instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, who was incompetent to try it. By consent of the parties, the case was transferred to the Court of the District Judge for convenience of trial. It was laid down by the Privy Council that as the Court in which the suit had been originally instituted was entirely lacking in the jurisdiction, in the sense that it was incompetent to try it, whatever happened subsequently was null and void because the consent of parties could not operate to confer jurisdiction on a Court which was incompetent to try the suit.
  • That decision has no relevance to a case like the present where there could be no question of inherent lack of jurisdiction in the sense that the Bombay High Court was incompetent to try a suit of that kind. The objection to its territorial jurisdiction is one that does not go to the competence of the Court and can, therefore, be waived.
  • In the instant case, when the plaintiff obtained the leave of the Bombay High Court on the original side, under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the correctness of the procedure or of the order granting the leave could be questioned by the defendant or the objection could be waived by him.
  • When he agreed to refer the matter to arbitration through Court, he would be deemed to have waived his objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, raised by him in his written statement. It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a Court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a Court to try a case.
  • The competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court can be waived and this principle has been given statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Having consented to have the controversy between the parties resolved by reference to arbitration through Court, the defendant deprived himself of the right to question the authority of the Court to refer the matter to arbitration or of the arbitrator to render the award.
  • It is clear, therefore, that the defendant is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to entertain the suit and to make the reference to the arbitrator.
  • He is equally estopped from challenging the authority of the arbitrator to render the award. In our opinion this conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. It is not, therefore, necessary to determine the other points in controversy, including the question of whether The Decrees and Orders Validating Act, 1936 (Act V of 1936) had the effect of validating what otherwise may have been invalid.
  • Appeal Dismissed.
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Jurisdiction

Aspi Jal v. Khusboo Rustom, (2013) 4 SCC 333

ASPI JAL AND ORS. V. KHUSHROO RUSTOM DADYBURJOR

Aspi Jal v. Khusboo Rustom, (2013) 4 SCC 333

ISSUE:

  • Whether on the final decision being reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res-judicata in the subsequent suit?

RULE:

  • The Apex Court concluded that since the causes of action would be distinct in each case as they pertain to different periods of non-user, the applicability of Section 10 of the CPC was turned down.

FACTS:

  • The Plaintiffs-Petitioners, aggrieved by the order dated 9 th February, 2012 passed by the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 7653 of 2011, affirming the order dated 6 th July, 2011 passed by the Court of Small Causes at Mumbai, in R.A.E.
  • Suit No. 173/256 of 2010 whereby it has stayed the proceedings in R.A.E. No. 173/256 of 2010 till the decision in R.A.E. Suit No. 1103/1976 of 2004 and R.A.E. Suit No. 1104/1977 of 2004, have preferred this Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
  • The Plaintiffs claim to be the owner of the building known as ” Hanoo Manor” situate at Dadyseth 2 nd Cross Lane in Chawpatty area of the city of Mumbai. According to the Plaintiffs, in one of the flats of the said building admeasuring 1856.75 sq.ft. situate on the second floor, Defendant’s father, Rustom Dady Burjor (since deceased)was inducted as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 355/-.
  • The Plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction from the tenanted premises against the Defendant being R.A.E. Suit No. 1103/1976 of 2004(hereinafter to be referred to as the “First Suit”) before the Small Causes Court on 6 th November, 2004 on the ground of bona fide requirement for self occupation and acquisition of alternate accommodation by the Defendant. The Plaintiffs thereafter filed another suit being R.A.E. Suit No. 1104/1977 of 2004 (hereinafter to be referred to as the “Second Suit”) on the same day in the Small Causes Court for eviction of the Defendant on the ground of nonuser for several years before the institution of the suit.
  • The Plaintiffs during the pendency of the aforesaid two suits, chose to file yet another suit bearing R.A.E. Suit No. 173/256 of 2010 (hereinafter to be referred to as the “Third Suit”) on 22 nd February, 2010 for eviction of the Defendant on the ground of non-user for a continuous period of not less than six months immediately prior to the institution of the suit.

HELD:

  • The court observed the orders passed by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court are vulnerable and therefore, cannot be allowed to stand.
  • Mr. Divan prays that direction may be issued to the trial court to hear all the suits together. The court restrains ourselves from issuing such direction but gives liberty to the parties if they so choose to make such a prayer before the trial court. Needless to state that in case such a prayer is made, the trial court shall consider the same in accordance with the law.
  • As the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the trial court as affirmed by the High Court is set aside but without any order as to costs.
Categories
Jurisdiction

Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-Operative Marketing Federation Ltd. (1985) 5 SCC 69

INDIAN BANK V. MAHARASTRA STATE BANK COOPERATION

Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-Operative Marketing Federation Ltd. (1985) 5 SCC 69

ISSUE:

  • Whether the bar to proceed with the trial of the subsequently instituted suit, contained in section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is applicable to the summary suit filed under Order 37 of the Code?

RULE:

  • The Supreme Court’s opinion, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was in error in taking a different view. It had relied upon the decision of this Court in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh (AIR 1957 SC 444). That was a case arising under the Representation of People’s Act and, therefore, it was not proper to apply the interpretation of the word ‘trial’ in that case while interpreting section 10 in the context of Order 37 of the Code.

FACTS:

  • The respondent Federation applied to the appellant bank on 5.6.1989 to open an Irrevocable Letter of Credit for a sum of Rs. 3,78,90,000/- in favour of M/s. Shankar Rice Mills. Pursuant to that request to Bank opened an Irrevocable Letter of Credit on leave on the Federation to defend the suit conditionally upon the Federation depositing Rs.4 crores in the Court. The summons for the judgment was disposed of accordingly and the Notice of Motion was dismissed.
  • Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge in summons for judgment Federation filed Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court, and against the order passed on Notice of Motion, it preferred Appeal.
  • The Division Bench was of the view that the word ‘trial’ in section 10 has not been used in a narrow sense and would mean entire proceedings after enters his appearance, held that section 10 of the Code applies to a summary suit also.
  • It also held that the summary suit filed by the Bank being a subsequently instituted suit was required to stay. It allowed both the appeals; set aside the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and stayed the summary suit till the disposal of the prior suit filed by the Federation.

HELD:

  • Leave granted.
  • Therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, and restore the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
Categories
Jurisdiction

Daryao v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1457

DARYAO V. STATE OF UP

Daryao v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1457

ISSUE:

  • Whether the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a party creates a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed in the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same or similar facts and praying for the same or similar writ?

RULE:

  • Whether or not a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is issued in its place, the substance of the order will determine whether or not the dismissal is a bar.
  • If the decision is on the merits, it will be a bar. On the other hand, if the decision was based on the petitioner’s laches or because of an alternative remedy or if a dismissal in limine is without a spoken order, it will not be a bar.

FACTS:

  • The Supreme Court heard together six writ petitions all of which dealt with a common question of law.
  • The petitioners and their ancestors were the tenants of a piece of land for the past 50 years and respondents 3 to 5 were the proprietors of the piece of land.
  • Due to communal disturbances in 1947, the petitioners had to leave their land.
  • When they returned after four months, they found that respondents 3 to 5 had entered in unlawful possession of the land.
  • The petitioners filed for ejectment under Section 180 of the UP Tenancy Act and the same was granted.
  • The respondents appealed to the Board of Revenue under Section 267 of the Tenancy Act. the appeal was allowed and the respondents were granted ownership of the land.
  • The petitioners then moved the Allahabad High Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the Revenue Board’s judgement. The petition was dismissed.
  • In the present case, the petitioners seek to raise the same petition on the same grounds and thus, the respondents contend that it should be barred by res judicata.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that a change in the form of attack against an impugned statute would make no difference to the legal position and that both writ petitions in the present case are directed against the same statute and further, the grounds raised are substantially the same.
  • The Court ruled that the decision of the High Court is a bar to the present petition under Article 32.
Categories
Jurisdiction

Modi Entertainment v. WSG Cricket, (2003) 4 SCC 341

MODI ENTERTAINMENT V. WSG CRICKET

Modi Entertainment v. WSG Cricket, (2003) 4 SCC 341

ISSUE:

  • What is an anti-suit injunction and when can it be granted by a court of natural jurisdiction?

RULE:

  • Courts in India and England are courts of both law and equity. It is common ground that a court in India has the power to issue anti-suit injunctions to a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction in an appropriate case as courts of equity exercise jurisdiction in personam.
  • Parties cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists on a court to which the CPC applies. However, in cases where parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, the foreign court does not permit the invoking of its jurisdiction.

FACTS:

  • The ICC organised an event in Kenya in October 2000.
  • WSG Cricket had the exclusive right to grant commercial rights relating to the event.
  • An agreement was entered into between the second appellant and WSG Cricket granting exclusive license to telecast the event on Doordarshan and sell advertisement slots thereon.
  • The satellite broadcast license for India was granted to ESPN Star Sports.
  • The appellants were to pay a minimum of INR 15 crore to WSG Cricket. Any excess amount was to be divided between the two per the terms of the agreement.
  • Soon after the commencement of the telecast, the respondent registered a complaint that the signal was being received in the Middle East and this was a violation of the contract between the parties as well as the license granted to the Middle Eastern licensee. The appellants were told to rectify the same or risk discontinuation of the feed to Doordarshan.
  • It is claimed by the appellants that advertisers began pulling out on the basis of the respondent’s threats and switching to ESPN, allowing the respondent to benefit from the revenue-sharing agreement they had with ESPN.
  • The appellants then received a notice from the solicitors of the respondent demanding the full minimum guaranteed amount. The appellants filed a suit in the Bombay High Court claiming damages for the loss of advertising revenue due to the threats of the respondent.
  • The respondent further filed an action before the High Court of Justice praying for a money decree for the minimum guaranteed amount and took out a writ of summons and the appellant appeared before the English Court seeking time.
  • The appellants then took out a motion in the Bombay High Court seeking an anti-suit injunction in regard to the action in the English Court on the grounds that the Indian Court was a natural forum for the adjudication of the dispute.
  • A single judge of the Bombay HC granted an ad-hoc interim injunction and ordered notice of motion returnable within six weeks. The respondents appealed to the HC and a division bench disposed of the notice of motion itself, setting aside the order of the single judge and allowing the appeal.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that in order to grant an anti-suit injunction, a court must be satisfied of certain criteria:
  • Firstly, that the defendant against whom an injunction is sought is amenable to the personal jurisdiction of the Indian court.
  • Secondly that if the injunction is declined, the ends of justice will be defeated.
  • Thirdly that the principle of comity-respect for the court which is sought to be restrained must be borne in mind.
  • It was further held that a court must examine the appropriate forum having regard to the convenience of the parties and may grant an anti-suit injunction in cases where proceedings are oppressive, vexatious o in a forum non-conveniens.
  • The court ruled that where the jurisdiction of a court is invoked on the basis of a jurisdiction clause in a contract, the terms of the contract are relevant factors and when a question of jurisdiction arises, the court must decide the same on a true interpretation of the contract.
  • It was held that a court of natural jurisdiction will not grant an anti-suit injunction when parties have agreed to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of any court save in exceptional cases for good and sufficient reasons.
  • Furthermore, in cases where parties have agreed to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of any court, ordinarily no anti-suit injunction will be granted as it shall be presumed that parties have done their due diligence before entering into such agreement.
  • Proceedings in a court of choice where exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction is created cannot per se be treated as vexatious or oppressive.
  • The appeal ultimately failed.
Categories
Introduction

Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549

ISSUE:

Regardless of whether there was an infringement of the Fundamental Rights of the applicants in the creation of a restraining infrastructure occupied with publishing and distributing reading material for schools was ultra vires their powers?

Even if the State could create a monopoly in its favour, whether it could have been done by an executive act, or did it necessarily require specific legislation?

RULE:

With the rising need for a change of paradigm of functions of the State, there needs to be some intrinsic change in the understanding and constituent of the executive powers.

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Introduction

Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla & Others (1976) 2 SCC 521

ISSUE:

Maintainability of any writ petition under Article 226 for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus, to ensure personal liberty, on the ground that the order of detention is not valid according to the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (also known as MISA) read with the orders issued by the President under Article 359(1).

If yes, then what is the extent of judicial scrutiny concerning the aforesaid mentioned Presidential orders?

RULE:

The Supreme Court made the inherent and inalienable Right of Life under Article 21 dependent on the provisions of the Constitution.

It reduced its power and scope of functioning while dealing with cases relating to Fundamental Rights during Emergency, giving the Executive full reign of managing affairs of the country, which is arbitrary.

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Categories
Dying Declarations

Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116

ISSUE:

Does the burden of proof lie on the accused or the prosecution?

Can conviction only be given on the ground of circumstantial evidence?

RULE:

Burden of Proof: In the Criminal Justice of India, evidence is to be proved before a court of law to prove the guilt of the accused. As per the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, some standards set that the evidence of the case will be substantially proved and the burden of proof lies on the prosecution.

Circumstantial Evidence: In many cases, the evidence is not directed which creates difficulty to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove the case, the circumstantial evidence is put along with the general evidence to strengthen the case. The chain of the circumstantial events put together like the last appearance of a person, dying declaration or letters, etc. It also establishes the probability of the chain of events and it should be highly reliable.

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Dying Declarations

Pakala Narayana Swami V King Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47

ISSUE:

Whether the statement of the accused can be considered a confession?

Whether the statement of the deceased to his wife that he is going to Berhampur to take back his loan was considered a dying declaration?

RULE:

Dying declarations are exceptions to the hearsay rule where it is believed that a person who makes a statement in expectation of his/her death would not lie.

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