Trace Your Case

Author: TYC

Categories
Trade Unionism

Central Machine Tool Institute v. Assistant Labour Commissioner, 1978 SCC OnLine Kar 219

ISSUE:

Whether the word “industry,” as used in Section 2(g) of the Trade Unions Act, carries the same meaning as the word “industry” as defined in Section 2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act?

Whether employees of a research and development organization are entitled to form a trade union under the Trade Unions Act, even if the organization claims to have no profit motive.

Whether the definition of the word “Industry” contained in the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, which is a later enactment, can be read into the provisions of the Trade Unions Act?

Whether the absence of a profit motive affects the classification of an establishment as an “industry” under labor laws.

RULE:

When two statutes are in pari materia (covering the same subject matter), the definition of an ambiguous term in one statute can be interpreted using the definition from the other statute.

The profit motive is not necessary for an organization to be classified as an “industry” if it involves organized activity providing material services, regardless of its commercial intent.

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Categories
Industrial Disputes

Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Ashok Harikuni (2000) 8 SCC 61

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE V. ASHOK HARIKUNI

Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Ashok Harikuni (2000) 8 SCC 61

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Committee (APMC) created under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, qualifies as an “industry” as defined by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA)?
  • Whether the Karnataka Act, having acquired the President’s assent, supersedes the IDA relevant to the employees controlled by the State Act?

RULE:

  • A statutory body like the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) can be classified as an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 if its functions are not sovereign in nature.
  • Regulatory functions that serve the public interest and involve systematic, organized activities (such as market regulation), even if non-profit, do not qualify as sovereign functions and thus fall within the scope of the IDA.

FACTS:

  • Seven employees of APMC were terminated.
  • The employees challenged their terminations in the Labour Court.
  • The Labour Court ruled in their favor, overturning their dismissals and ordering reinstatement.
  • The APMC filed a writ petition challenging the Labour Court’s ruling, claiming that because the APMC is not an “industry,” the Labour Court lacked authority to consider the cases.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that APMC’s functions, though for public benefit, do not qualify as sovereign functions.
  • The APMC regulates the marketing of agricultural produce and is engaged in organized, systematic activity with a predominant focus on providing services to the community. These are not inherently sovereign functions.
  • The Court ruled that the APMC qualifies as an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, the employees fall under the definition of “workmen” as per the Central Act, and the Labour Court has jurisdiction. The Karnataka Act does not exclude APMC employees from the IDA’s application, and the dismissal of the employees was rightly set aside.
  • The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s judgment that APMC is an industry, and confirmed the employees’ reinstatement.
Categories
Industrial Disputes

All India Radio v. Santosh Kumar, (1998) 3 SCC 237

ALL INDIA RADIO V. SANTOSH KUMAR

All India Radio v. Santosh Kumar, (1998) 3 SCC 237

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Appellants are “industries” as defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947(“the Act”)?
  • Whether the Appellants discharge sovereign functions?

RULE:

  • All activities of an employer, except those strictly related to sovereign functions, are considered to fall within the definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  • If an organization, even if run by the government, engages in commercial activities or generates revenue through services like advertisements, it is classified as an industry under the Act.

FACTS:

  • The Respondents (clerks/watchmen) employed at the Appellant (All India Radio) office, set forth and challenged orders of termination and non-regularization before the authorities constituted under the Act.
  • The Respondent’s terminations were set aside, and they were granted regularization, and the Appellants filed writ petitions against the same in the High Court, which were duly dismissed, and the Appellants then set forth the appeals before the Supreme Court.

HELD:

  • The Appellants would come under Section 2(j) and be considered “industries,” and held that the functions discharged by the Appellants could not be considered sovereign state functions since they were carrying out commercial activities and gaining profit through their business.
  • The Supreme Court held that the termination orders were violative of Section 25-F of the Act.
  • The reinstatement will be on the same post in which the respondents were working prior to the impugned termination orders.
Categories
Industrial Disputes

Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213

BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND SEWAGE BOARD V. RAJAPPA

Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213

ISSUE:

  • Whether a statutory body engaged in activities essential for the provision of basic amenities to citizens can be classified as an “industry” under the definition in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947?

RULE:

  • Dominant nature test, which applies when an entity performs both industrial and non-industrial functions. The dominant or predominant nature of the entity’s activities determines whether the organization qualifies as an industry. Only strictly sovereign functions, such as defense and law enforcement, are excluded from the definition of “industry.”

Triple test to determine whether an entity qualifies as an industry:

a) Systematic Activity: The entity must engage in an organized and systematic activity.

b) Employer-Employee Cooperation: The activity should involve the cooperation of employers and employees.

c) Production of Goods or Services for Human Needs: The activity must produce goods or services intended for human consumption or use, whether or not for profit.

FACTS:

  • The employees of the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board challenged penalties imposed on them by the Board, leading to a claim under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • The Board argued it was not an industry under Section 2(j), as it was a statutory body performing “regal” functions (sovereign in nature).
  • Both the Karnataka High Court and Supreme Court rejected this argument, ruling that the Board was an industry under the Act.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the Bangalore water supply and sewage board would fall under the ambit of the definition of section 2(j) under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and that the organization, whether it was profit-oriented or not, was to be considered an industry.
  • The Court also held that the word “industry” is required to be given a broad and clear interpretation under section 2(j), and every factor, especially the Triple Test, must be applied in order to do the same. The Court held that even though the term must be interpreted broadly, it must not overstep the bounds.
Categories
State Prescriptions and Standards

Anand Bihari and others v. RSRTC and another 1991 Lab IC 494

ANAND BIHARI AND OTHERS V. RSRTC AND ANR.

Anand Bihari and others v. RSRTC and another 1991 Lab IC 494

ISSUE:

  • Whether the termination of the driver’s services amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
  • Whether the termination was in compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act?

RULE:

  • Even if an illness does not affect general health or capacity but hampers the efficient working of the assigned duties, it falls under the purview of “ill health.”

FACTS:

  • Drivers of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation developed sub-normal or defective eyesight due to prolonged exposure to harsh driving conditions, including bright sunlight and blinding vehicle lights.
  • Upon being found medically unfit to drive, their services were terminated.
  • The drivers challenged this termination, arguing that it amounted to retrenchment without compliance with Section 25-F and that they should have been provided alternative employment.

HELD:

  • The court held that the termination of services due to defective eyesight falls under “ill-health” and, therefore, does not amount to retrenchment. Hence, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 do not apply.
  • The court found the termination unjustified due to the occupational hazards involved. It directed the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation to offer alternative jobs to the affected drivers where possible or provide them with compensation proportional to their length of service if no alternative jobs were available.
  • The court also ruled that the termination of a driver who had been reassigned as a helper was unjustified and illegal, entitling him to reinstatement and back wages.
Categories
State Prescriptions and Standards

Associated Cement Companies v. Their Workmen AIR 1960 SC 777

ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES V. THEIR WORKMEN

Associated Cement Companies v. Their Workmen AIR 1960 SC 777

ISSUE:

  • Whether a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award can give notice to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

RULE:

  • A notice to terminate an award can be issued by a group of workmen acting collectively, even if that group represents a minority of the workmen bound by the award.

FACTS:

  • The appellant’s workmen were initially represented by the Kamdar Mandal Cement Works union, which was later deregistered.
  • Following the cancellation of this union’s registration, two new unions emerged: the Cement Kamdar Mandal and the Cement Employees Union.
  • The Cement Kamdar Mandal issued two notices to the appellant, intending to terminate two awards previously established under the defunct union.
  • Subsequently, the Cement Kamdar Mandal presented fresh demands, leading to the dispute being referred to the Tribunal.
  • The Cement Employees Union, representing the majority of workmen at Porbandar, was included in the proceedings.
  • The Tribunal issued an interlocutory judgment against the appellant, prompting a legal examination of who is authorized to issue a notice terminating an award on behalf of workmen bound by it under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that it is open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate the award.
  • The court observed that on a fair and reasonable reading of s. 19(6) of Industrial Disputes Act, the true position is that, though the expression “any party bound by the award” refers to all workmen bound by the award and the notice to terminate the said award can be given not by an individual workman but by a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise.
  • The court also observed that it is not necessary that such a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise, should represent the majority of workmen bound by the award.
Categories
State Prescriptions and Standards

Hariprasad Shiv Shankar Shukla v. A.D. Divelkar AIR 1957 SC 121

HARIPRASAD SHIV SHANKAR SHUKLA V. A.D. DIVELKAR

Hariprasad Shiv Shankar Shukla v. A.D. Divelkar AIR 1957 SC 121

ISSUE:

  • Whether the erstwhile workmen were entitled to claim compensation under clause (b) of Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947?
  • Whether the workmen had been retrenched within the meaning of the expression ‘retrenchment’ in the Industrial Dispute Act of 1947?

RULE:

  • Retrenchment refers to the discharge of surplus labor in a continuing business and does not include termination due to a bona fide closure or transfer of ownership.

FACTS:

  • Two appeals were filed regarding retrenchment compensation.
  • Barsi Light Railway Company built and operated a railway under an agreement allowing the government to take over after twelve months’ notice.
  • In 1952, the government gave notice and took over in 1953, leading to the termination of all workmen. Some were re-employed, while others sought retrenchment compensation. Initially dismissed, the High Court later ruled in favor of the workers.
  • Dinesh Mills Ltd., facing financial losses, closed its woollen mill in 1953, terminating 450 workmen and 20 clerks. The workers sought retrenchment compensation.
  • Initially dismissed, the High Court ruled that the authority had jurisdiction to hear the claim. Both employers appealed to the Supreme Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the Bombay High Court and held that the appellants were not liable to pay any compensation under section 25F.
  • The court considered whether termination of service due to the closure of a business constitutes retrenchment under the Act and noted that while certain sections of the Act apply to a running or continuing business, they do not definitively determine what is included in the definition of retrenchment.
  • The court highlighted that the Act primarily focuses on existing or continuing industries, not on closed or dead industries.
  • The court clarified that retrenchment refers to the discharge of surplus workers in an existing or continuing business, and does not include discharge due to bona fide closure of business.
  • The court found that its construction of the definition clause and section 25F, which excludes closure of a business from the scope of retrenchment, negates the need to rule on the constitutional question.
  • The court held that since section 25F does not apply to closed or dead industries, and the cases in question involved genuine closures, the court held that no compensation was payable to the former employees.
Categories
Industrial Disputes

Coir Board, Ernakulam v. Indira Devi P.S., (1998) 3 SCC 259

COIR BOARD, ERNAKULAM V. INDIRA DEVI

Coir Board, Ernakulam v. Indira Devi P.S., (1998) 3 SCC 259

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Appellant can be classified as an industry under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947?

RULE:

  • An ‘industry’ under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 refers to any systematic activity involving cooperation between employers and employees for the production of goods or services, regardless of whether the activity is profit-oriented.
  • The presence of an employer-employee relationship and organized functioning are the key determinants of an ‘industry’ under the Act.

FACTS:

  • The Appellants (Coir Board) had been set up in 1953 under the Choir Industry Act, and employed clerks as well as typists, who were suddenly discharged. The employees stated that their termination would only be valid if done so under provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947.
  • The Kerala High Court considered the question and ruled that the Appellants were an industry as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, and thus the termination was applicable. The matter was then appealed before the Supreme Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court upheld the Kerala High Court’s decision, concluding that the Coir Board does qualify as an ‘industry’ under the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • The court reasoned that under the expansive interpretation of the term ‘industry’ as established in the Bangalore Water Supply case, the Coir Board, despite being a statutory body for promoting the coir industry, employs workers and performs organized activities akin to an industry.
  • The court suggested that the broad interpretation of ‘industry’ should be reconsidered by a larger bench in the future but applied the existing law to hold that the Coir Board is subject to the Industrial Disputes Act.
Categories
Trade Unionism

MRF United Workers Union v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu Writ Petition No. 17991 of 2008

ISSUE:

Whether the Registrar of Trade Unions has jurisdiction to decide the legality and propriety of an election held by a trade union?

RULE:

The powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions are limited to registering the names of elected office bearers, as outlined in Sections 8 and 28 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926.

The Registrar’s role is administrative, not quasi-judicial, meaning they cannot adjudicate disputes over elections or decide disputed legal and factual issues.

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Categories
General Rules of Interpretation

Forest Range Officer v. Khushboo Enterprises, AIR 1989 SC 1011

ISSUE:

Whether sandalwood oil is considered a “wood oil” and hence, “forest produce” under Section 2(f)(i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961?

Whether the process of collecting the oil should have relevance in considering the character of the oil so collected?

RULE:

Section 2(f)(i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961: “Forest Produce” includes the following when found in or brought from, a forest, that is to say- (i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce of trees, and charcoal.

Doctrine of Purposive Interpretation: This doctrine considers the purpose of the law when the language is unclear or ambiguous, or when the legislative intent of a provision of a statute isn’t immediately clear. A statute consists of two parts- the letter and the sense. This doctrine involves considering both parts- the objective and subjective purposes of the law.

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