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Trade Unionism

Quinn v. Leatham [1901] UKHL 2

QUINN V. LEATHAM

Quinn v. Leatham [1901] UKHL 2

ISSUE:

  • Whether the defendants had wrongfully conspired to injure the plaintiff’s business by inducing his customers not to do business with him?

RULE:

  • It is unlawful to conspire to injure another person’s business, even if the means used to achieve that end are not unlawful in themselves.

FACTS:

  • The plaintiff, Henry Leatham, was a butcher in Lisburn, Ireland.
  • The defendants, Joseph Quinn and others, were members of the Belfast Journeymen Butchers and Union Assistants’ Association (the BBA).
  • The BBA was a trade union that represented butchers in Belfast.
  • Leatham had refused to employ a butcher who was a member of the BBA.
  • In response, the BBA called a strike of all its members who were working in Lisburn.
  • The BBA also induced Leatham’s customers not to do business with him.
  • As a result of the BBA’s actions, Leatham suffered a significant loss of business.

HELD:

  • It is unlawful to conspire to injure another person’s business, even if the means used to achieve that end are not unlawful in themselves.
  • The right of workers to strike is not unlimited and unions could be held liable for conspiracy to injure another person’s business if they used unlawful means to achieve that end.
  • Unlawful means that could be used to injure another person’s business include:
  • Threats of violence or intimidation
  • Blacklisting
  • Inducing a breach of contract
  • Passing off
  • Misleading advertising
  • If a person or group of people conspire to use unlawful means to injure another person’s business, they may be liable for the tort of conspiracy.
  • The victim of the conspiracy may be able to sue for damages, including lost profits and reputational damage
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Trade Unionism

Balmer Lawrie Workers Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie and Company Ltd (1985) I LLJ 314

BALMER LAWRIE WORKERS UNION V. BALMER LAWRIE

Balmer Lawrie Workers Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie and Company Ltd (1985) I LLJ 314

ISSUE:

  • Whether a recognized trade union has the exclusive right to represent all workmen in an industry, including those who are not members of the union?

RULE:

  • Forming an association is entirely independent and different from its recognition. Recognition of a union confers rights, duties and obligations. Non-conferring of such rights, duties and obligations on a union other than the recognised union does not put it in an inferior position nor the charge of discrimination can be entertained. The members of a non-recognised association can fully enjoy their fundamental freedom of speech and expression as also to form the association.

FACTS:

  • The Balmer Lawrie Workers Union, Bombay, was a recognized trade union representing the workmen of Balmer Lawrie and Company Ltd.
  •  The union had a settlement with the company, which resolved a number of industrial disputes pending between them.
  • The appellant, a non-recognized union challenged in a writ petition before the High Court the constitutional validity of Clause 17 of the Settlement on the grounds, inter alia.
  • (i) that Clause 17 permits a compulsory exaction not parented by the Payment of Wages Act from the arrears payable to the workmen who are not the members of the recognised union; (ii) that section 20 of the 1971 Act is unconstitutional, since:
  • (a) it 1 unquestionably denies to the workman who are not members of a recognised union, the fundamental freedom guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) and(e) in as much as it inheres the pernicious tendency to compel the Workmen to join the union which has acquired the status of a recognised union even if it followed a socio- economic or socio-political philosophy contrary to the philosophy of non members;
  • (b) it denies to the unrecognized union, the right to effectively participate in any proceeding concerning the workmen of an industrial
    undertaking, some of whom have formed a separate trade union and (c) it does not treat all the unions at par as the members of non-recognised union are compelled to be bound by the action of the recognised union.
  • The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition and the same was affirmed in appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court.
  • Hence this appeal.

HELD:

  • A recognized trade union does not have the exclusive right to represent all workmen in an industry, including those who are not members of the union.
  • The right of a workman to form an association and to be represented by that association is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India.
  • This right cannot be denied to a workman simply because he is not a member of a recognized trade union.
  •  A recognized trade union has a special status and certain privileges, such as the right to negotiate with the employer on behalf of all workmen in the industry.
  • However, these privileges do not give the recognized trade union the exclusive right to represent all workmen in the industry.
  • The court reasoned that the right of a workman to form an association and to be represented by that association is a fundamental right that cannot be denied simply because the workman is not a member of the recognized trade union.
  • If under a settlement with the representative union some benefits accrue to the workmen, and upon a true
    interpretation of Sec. 20(2)(b), it is held all-encompassing and therefore binding on all workmen employers alike, all the
    benefits would be available to the workmen who are not members of the  representative union and who may have formed
    a rival union.
  • If these workmen could not be denied the benefits, they would enjoy an unfair advantage if from the
    package deal covered by the settlement, they draw benefits and accrue liabilities.
  • Therefore, a clause like Clause 17 of the Settlement has to be understood in the context of strengthening the trade union movement and to free it from financial constraints. Workmen who are members of a union may pay fee for membership and enjoy the advantage or
    membership put if by the action of the representative union all workmen acquire benefit or monetary advantage, the members and non-members alike can be made to make common sacrifice in the large interest of trade union movement and to strengthen the trade union which by its activities acquired the benefits for all workmen.
  • Payment to trade union fund in these circumstances can be styled as quid pro quo for benefits acquired.
  • It can neither be said to be compulsory exaction nor a tax.
  • Therefore, there is nothing objectionable in Clause 17 of the Settlement which directs the employer to deduct 15% of the gross arrears payable to each employee under the settlement as contribution to the trade union funds.
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Trade Unionism

Unit Prasad Singh v. State of Jharkhand 2007 (1) JCR 194 Jhr

UNIT PRASAD SINGH V. STATE OF JHARKHAND

Unit Prasad Singh v. State of Jharkhand 2007 (1) JCR 194 Jhr

ISSUE:

  • What is the power and jurisdiction of the Registrar of Trade Unions to adjudicate the grievances of the rival parties?

RULE:

  • The Registrar of Trade Unions does not have the authority to determine the legality or propriety of an election or to order a fresh election. Disputes regarding the legitimacy of office bearers in a Trade Union should be resolved through civil suits in a court of competent jurisdiction, as the Trade Unions Act does not grant the Registrar jurisdiction for such matters.

FACTS:

  • Unit Prasad Singh was elected as General Secretary in a union election in October 2000.
  • Alleging illegal practices in the 2003 election, he reported irregularities to the Registrar of Trade Unions.
  • The Assistant Labour Commissioner was ordered to conduct an inquiry into the alleged election irregularities.
  • After a Single Judge directed Unit Prasad Singh to approach the Registrar with his grievances, the Registrar declared the 2003 election invalid and ordered a fresh one in November 2005.
  • Respondent No. 4, Koyla Ispat Mazdoor Panchyat, challenged the Registrar’s order through a writ petition.
  • In June 2006, the court set aside the Registrar’s order, stating that the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to decide election legality and order a fresh election.
  • Unit Prasad Singh appealed this decision.

HELD:

  • The Single Judge, in an order dated June 28, 2006, set aside the Registrar’s order, ruling that the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to determine the legality and propriety of any election and to direct a fresh election.
  • The appellant cited a previous case (Mukund Ram Tanti v. Registrar of Trade Unions and Ors., 1963 (1) LLJ 60) to support the validity of the Registrar’s order.
  • In response, the respondents argued that the Single Judge’s order was justified.
  • The judgment highlights that the previous case (Mukund Ram Tanti) did not support the appellant’s position, as it did not grant the Registrar authority to decide the legality of an election or to order a fresh election.
  • It emphasizes that the Trade Unions Act, 1926, lacks provisions for adjudicating such disputes, and such disputes should be resolved through civil suits in the appropriate court.
  • The judgment cites decisions from the Patna and Calcutta High Courts, which state that the Registrar has limited administrative powers and cannot make quasi-judicial decisions.
  • It notes that civil proceedings had already been initiated by two individuals challenging the election in a civil court in Dhanbad, and these proceedings were ongoing.
  • Consequently, the court found no error in the Single Judge’s order and dismissed the appeal without costs
Categories
Trade Unionism

ACC Rajanka Lime Stone Quarries Mazdoor Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions AIR 1958 Pat 470

ACC RAJANKA LIME STONE QUARRIES V. REGISTRAR

ACC Rajanka Lime Stone Quarries Mazdoor Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions AIR 1958 Pat 470

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Registrar of Trade Unions had a duty to register a trade union within a reasonable time frame?

RULE:

  • Where the Registrar takes no action on an application for more than 3 months, a writ under Art. 226 can be issued commanding the Registrar to deal with the application”.

FACTS:

  • The ACC Rajanka Lime Stone Quarries Mazdoor Union (the Union) was formed by workers employed at the ACC Rajanka Lime Stone Quarries in Jhinkpani, Bihar.
  • On July 31, 1957, the Union applied for registration under the Trade Unions Act, 1926.
  • The Registrar of Trade Unions (the Registrar) did not take any action on the application for over two months.On September 23, 1957, the Union sent a reminder to the Registrar.
  • On October 15, 1957, the Union filed a petition with the High Court of Bihar, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Registrar to register the Union or to refuse to register it within a reasonable time frame.

HELD:

  • The Registrar of Trade Unions has a duty to register a trade union within a reasonable time frame.
  • The court reasoned that the right to form trade unions is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India.
  • The court also noted that the Trade Unions Act, 1926, does not specify a time frame for the Registrar to register a trade union.
  • The court held that the delay of over two months by the Registrar in taking any action on the Union’s application was unreasonable.
  • The court ordered the Registrar to register the Union within two weeks of the receipt of the court’s order.
  • The Registrar complied with the court’s order and registered the Union on October 15, 1957.
Categories
Trade Unionism

G.S. Dhara Singh v. E.K. Thomas AIR 1988 SC 1829

G.S. DHARA SINGH V. E.K. THOMAS

G.S. Dhara Singh v. E.K. Thomas AIR 1988 SC 1829

ISSUE:

  • Whether a member of a trade union is entitled to ask for an account and to claim refund of the sums received by the trade union from the management for and on his behalf on his ceasing to be a member of the said trade union?

RULE:

  • There was no agreement between the trade union and its members that the amount received towards gratuity and accident benefit should form part of funds of the trade union. Any amount received for and on behalf of the members is liable to be refunded to the workmen concerned.

FACTS:

  • Respondents 1 and 2 were working as head load workers.
  • Some of the employees working under the management concerned were members of a trade union called Cochin Port Thozhilali Union (hereinafter referred to as “the trade union”) whose General Secretary is impleaded as Respondent 3 in this petition.
  •  Under an agreement entered into in October, l973 an amount equivalent to 10 paise out of every rupee earned by the workers was deducted by the management towards the gratuity fund and transferred to the trade union for and on behalf of the workers.
  • Under another agreement a sum equivalent to 10 paise per rupee in the wages of the workers was paid by the management to the trade union towards accident benefit fund of which the workers were the beneficiaries.
  • The amounts so collected were entrusted to the petitioner, who was also the treasurer and custodian of the funds of the trade union.
  • Each of the plaintiffs in the said suits estimated the amount payable to him at Rs 3000.
  • The petitioner, who was the President and Treasurer of the trade union took up various pleas denying his liability to render account and to refund the amount.
  • One of the pleas raised by the petitioner was that since the plaintiffs had resigned and ceased to be the members of the trade union they had no right to claim the refund of the sums due to them from out of the funds of the trade union and that if they rejoined the trade union they would be entitled for payment of gratuity and accident benefit when occasion arose for payment of the same.
  • The petitioner filed an appeal and the Additional Sub-Judge found that the petitioner and respondent No. 3 had received from the management amounts on behalf of the workmen, but held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any decree at
    the hands of the Civil Court since the suits were not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, l972 and the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.
  • Second Appeals were filed in the High Court by respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and the High Court by a common judgment set aside the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court and restored the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition.
  • It held that there was no scheme drawn up by the trade union regarding the payment of the gratuity amount and the accident benefit fund received on behalf of the Workmen to the workmen concerned.
  • There was no agreement between the trade union and its members that the amount received towards gratuity and accident benefit should form part of funds of the trade union.
  • Any amount received for and on behalf of the members is liable to he refunded to the workmen concerned.
  • In the instant case the amount which had been received on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 1 by the petitioner and Respondent No. 3 had, therefore, to be refunded to them on their resignation from the membership of the trade union. We do not find any tenable defence which the trade union could put forward in the circumstances of the case.
Categories
Trade Unionism

Bokajan Cement Corpn. Employees’ Union v Cement Corpn. of India Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 142

BOKAJAN CEMENT CORPN. EMPLOYEES UNION V. CEMENT CORP.

Bokajan Cement Corpn. Employees’ Union v. Cement Corpn. of India Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 142

ISSUE:

  • Whether an employee loses his right to continue as a member of a trade union upon cessation of employment?

RULE:

  • The membership of a trade union is not a benefit that accrues to the employee so as to claim its continuance even after he ceases to be in employment; his right continues so long as he remains employed and on cessation of employment, membership of trade union ceases.

FACTS:

  • The Bokajan Cement Corporation Employees’ Union (the Union) was a trade union representing the employees of the Cement Corporation of India Ltd. (the Company).
  • One of the members of the Union, Mr. X, ceased to be an employee of the Company upon retirement.
  • The Company then informed the Union that Mr. X was no longer a member of the Union, as his membership was terminated upon cessation of employment.
  • The Union challenged the Company’s decision in the Supreme Court of India.
  • The Union argued that the Company’s decision to terminate Mr. X’s membership was illegal, as it violated his fundamental right to freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India.
  • The Union also argued that the Trade Unions Act, 1926, does not contain any provision which specifically states that membership of a trade union ceases upon cessation of employment.
  • The Company argued that Mr. X’s membership in the Union automatically ceased upon his retirement, as he was no longer an employee of the Company. The Company also argued that the Union’s constitution does not allow for membership by non-employees.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court of India held that an employee does not lose his right to continue as a member of a trade union upon cessation of employment.
  • The Court reasoned that the right to freedom of association, which includes the right to form and join trade unions, is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India.
  • This right is not limited to the period of employment, and it continues even after an employee ceases to be employed.
  • The Court also held that the Trade Unions Act, 1926, does not contain any provision that specifically states that membership of a trade union ceases upon cessation of employment.
  • The Supreme Court’s decision in the Bokajan Cement Corporation case affirms the right of workers to continue as members of trade unions even after they cease to be employed.
  • This right is important for workers, as it allows them to remain active in the trade union movement and to continue to advocate for their rights.
Categories
Approvers Testimony

Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54

RAMESHWAR V. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54

ISSUE:

  • Whether when a statement made at or around the time of the crime occurred is admissible as evidence, does corroboration have to be provided when the child is under the age of 12 years?

RULE:

  • The main test as to whether a previous statement was made “at or about the time when the fact took place”, within the meaning of sec. 157, Evidence Act, is whether the statement was made as early as can reasonably be expected in the circumstances of the case and before there was an opportunity for tutoring or concoction.

FACTS:

  • The alleged victim of the rape committed by the appellant Rameshwar was an eight-year-old girl.
  • He was brought before the Assistant Sessions Judge, who found him guilty and sentenced him to a year of strict incarceration as well as a fine.
  • Following an appeal, the learned Sessions Judge determined that the evidence was adequate for moral conviction but fell short of legal proof because the law requires corroboration of the story in such cases as a matter of precaution, and the corroborative evidence, which attempted to link the appellant with the crime, was legally insufficient though morally sufficient.
  • Nevertheless, the learned Sessions Judge was satisfied that the girl had been raped by someone. In doing so, he gave the accused the benefit of the doubt and exonerated him.
  • The learned High Court Judges stated that the girl’s statement to her mother was legally admissible as corroboration and that they considered that sufficient, despite the fact that the law requires corroboration in such cases.
  • As a result, they set aside the acquittal and reinstated the conviction and sentence. Following that, the High Court granted permission to appeal under Article 134 (1)(c) of the Constitution because the case presented important legal issues.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court had rejected the appeal and ordered the petitioner to appear for his scheduled bail hearing in line with the conditions of the bond, complete the required jail time, and make the required fine payment.
  • The judge ruled that a victim of rape is not an accomplice. As far as the crime of rape is concerned, a girl’s permission will not matter if she is underage; yet, if she was, her testimony would be just as questionable as that of an accomplice.
  • The rule, which has become more rigid as cases have gone by, is not that corroboration is required before a conviction can stand, but rather that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of caution, must be on the judge’s mind and, in jury cases, must be included in the charge before a conviction without corroboration can be upheld, except when the circumstances make it safe to do so.
  • The young age of the child may make corroboration unnecessary, but that is a matter of fact in every case. Other factors that may come into play include the child’s behavior, the likelihood of tutoring, and other factors.
  • The only requirement of the law is that the judge or jury, depending on the circumstances, must be aware of and understand this rule of prudence. It is not standard procedure to require corroboration in every instance before a conviction can stand.
  • In addition to supporting the allegation that the crime was done, independent evidence must also properly link or tend to link the accused to it by correlating the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that the accused committed the crime. This does not imply that all of the circumstances required to link the accused to the crime must be included in the confirmation of identity.
  • It is only necessary that there be independent proof that supports the witness’s account that the accused committed the crime, or was at least one of those responsible.
  • The supreme court ruled that independent sources must be used for corroboration, thus typically one accomplice’s evidence would not be enough to support that of another. However, under some unique conditions, it may be permissible to do away with the need for corroboration, and in those instances, a conviction based on such evidence would not be unlawful. This is because it was argued that the mother in this case was not an independent source.
  • According to Section 157, any prior statements a witness made about the same fact at or around the time the fact occurred or before any authority legally qualified to investigate the fact may be proven in order to corroborate the witness’ testimony.
  • There can be no doubt that such a statement is legally admissible in India as corroboration provided the requirement stipulated, namely, “at or about the time etc.,” are fulfilled. The provision offers no exceptions. Corroboration evidence must be weighed as it is presented, and in some circumstances, even though it is legally admissible for the relevant purpose, its weight may be zero.
  • The key question is whether the statement was made as soon as was practically possible given the facts of the situation and before there was a chance for instruction or concoction. The child could have complained to some women who worked in the area, but that would not be natural for a child because she would be terrified and her first instinct would be to run home to her mother, according to the court. As a result, the matter is covered by section 157 read with section 8, Illustration (j).
Categories
Environmental Ethics

Animal Welfare Board Of India vs A. Nagaraja & Ors, (2014) 7 SCC 547

ISSUE:

Whether bullock-cart races and Jallikattu taking place in the states of Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra are violative of the provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (hereinafter PCA Act)?

Whether the Animal welfare board has the authority to exclude and include any animal in the list?

Did the practice of Jallikattu and Bollock-cart races violate the international principles on violation of rights of animals?

RULE:

Section 3 has two limbs, namely:
a. Duty cast on persons-in-charge or care to take all reasonable measures to ensure the well-being of the animal
b. Duty to take reasonable measures to prevent the infliction upon such animal of unnecessary pain and suffering.

To interpret the phrase “unnecessary suffering”, one must look at whether the suffering could have been reasonable avoided or reduced, whether the conduct causing suffering was in compliance with the Act and whether the conduct causing suffering was for a legitimate purpose.

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Categories
Introduction

Guru Nanak Foundation v. Rattan Singh & Sons, (1981) 4 SCC 634

ISSUE:

Whether the High Court has jurisdiction over the arbitration proceeding? Pursuant to the procedural history, which is the court having jurisdiction in which the Award should be filed by the arbitrator?

RULE:

Section 31(4) not only confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court to which an application is made in any reference but simultaneously ousts the jurisdiction of any other court which may as well have jurisdiction in this behalf.

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Copyright

Baker v. Selden 101 U.S. 99 (1879)

ISSUE:

Whether Baker had infringed copyrights held by Selden?

Whether Selden had an exclusive right to the use of the system explained in his book?

RULE:

Idea-Expression Dichotomy: A copyright can be obtained only over a particular expression of an idea, it does not protect the idea that underlies that expression and this is what limits copyrights and differentiates it from patents. An idea/art/method can be patented whereas the expression of an idea/art/method can be copyrighted.

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