Trace Your Case

Author: TYC

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Territory and Reorganisation

In Re Mangal Singh, AIR 1967 SC 944

MANGAL SINGH V. UNION OF INDIA

In Re Mangal Singh, AIR 1967 SC 944

ISSUE:

  • What is the validity of the formation of a new State under Article 2 to 4 of the Indian Constitution?

RULE:

  • Powers invested in the Parliament by Arts. 2 and 3, is power to admit, establish, or form new States which conform to the democratic pattern envisaged by the Constitution; and the power which the Parliament may exercise by law is supplemental, incidental or consequential to the admission, establishment or formation of a State as contemplated by the Constitution, and is not power to override the constitutional scheme under Article 4.

FACTS:

  • The Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 was enacted with the object of reorganizing the State of Punjab.
  • The Act was challenged as “illegal and ultra vires of the Constitution” on diverse grounds in a writ petition filed in the High Court of Punjab.
  • It was contended that the Act violates the mandatory provisions of Art. 170(1) of the Constitution and on grounds of denial of equality.
  • The High Court rejected the petition.
  • In appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that (i) Constitution of the Legislative Assembly of Haryana by s. 13(1) of the Act which departs from the minimum membership prescribed to the State Legislative Assembly violates the mandatory provisions of the Art 170(1) of the Constitution; and (ii) by enacting members of the Legislative Council of the old State residing in the Union Territory of Chandigarh shall continue to sit in the Legislative Council in the new State of Punjab and by enacting that the members elected to the Legislative Council from the Haryana area shall be unseated, there was denial of equality.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
  • The Supreme Court held that no state can be formed, admitted or set up by law under Article 4 by Parliament which does not have effective legislative, executive or judicial organs. Thus before creating such a State the legislative, executive, and judicial organs for that state should be set up.
  • Power to reduce the total number of members of the
    Legislative Assembly below the minimum prescribed by Art. 170(1) is implicit in the authority to make laws under Art. 4 of Constitution. Such a provision is undoubtedly
    an amendment of the Constitution, but by the express provision provided in Art. 4(2),no such law which amends the First and the Fourth Schedule or which makes supplemental, incidental and consequential provision is to be deemed an amendment of the Constitution for, purposes of Art. 368. The Constitution also contemplates by Art. 4 that in the enactment of laws for giving effect to the admission, establishment or formation of new States or alteration of areas and the boundaries of those States power to modify provisions of the Constitution in order to tide, over a temporary difficulty may be exercised by the Parliament.
Categories
Federalism - History and Typologies

R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1804

ISSUE:

Whether a legislative assembly seat can be reserved for a religious minority after a State enters the Indian Union?

Whether the legislature has the authority to enact legislation that reserve a greater number of seats than what is necessary given the size of the community in the State?

RULE:

Since the Parliament has the authority to admit states under certain conditions as it sees fit, it is established that newly admitted states cannot be completely equal to the existing states of the Union under Article 2 of the Constitution. However, these conditions cannot not establish a system that is incompatible with the traditional institution that the Constitution envisions.

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Federalism - History and Typologies

Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501

ISSUE:

If the Government of NCTD is given the necessary resources, is it then competent to exercise this function, or must posting orders of public services be approved by the President of India?

Does the GNCTD have the authority to issue executive orders in accordance with the Delhi Electricity Reforms Act of 2011 and the Delhi Electricity Reforms (Transfer Schemes) Rules of 2001 without first seeking the Lieutenant Governor's opinion or approval?

Whether the Lieutenant Governor has the authority to do so under Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), to the exclusion of the GNCTD?

RULE:

If a provision of a legislation approved by the Legislative Assembly conflicts with a provision of a law passed by Parliament regarding a certain issue, the latter will take precedence and the former will be repealed. This applies to any subject, regardless of whether it was passed before, after, or in accordance with a law passed by the Legislative Assembly or a prior law that was not a law passed by the Legislative Assembly.

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Federalism - History and Typologies

State of Karnataka v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 69

ISSUE:

Whether the suit under Art.131 is maintainable?

Whether the notification issued by the Central Government is ultra vires the power of the government under s.3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952?

If the same is within the ambit of s.3 and whether s.3 is unconstitutional?

RULE:

The Supreme Court's initial jurisdiction over issues affecting the scope or existence of a legal right is addressed in Article 131. Such authority shall be exercised in issues involving the Central Government and one or more States, between States, or between the Government of a State and another State. Only when an issue of law or fact arises can the Court take up a dispute under Article 131 of the Constitution. Additionally, it depends on how much of a legal right is at stake.

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Categories
Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Administrative Discretion

Kesavan Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1961 Ker 23

KESAVAN BHASKARAN V. STATE OF KERALA

Kesavan Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1961 Ker 23

ISSUE:

  • Whether by the administrative discretion given to the Director there is a duty casted by law?
  • Whether the discretionary power under the rule can be controlled by self-created rules of Policy?

RULE:

  • Rule 127E of the Travancore Education Code provided that no English School Leaving Certificate would be granted to any person unless he has been a pupil on the rolls of Form VI of a recognised English High School during the whole school year in which he had applied for a certificate. Moreover, he should have completed fifteen years of age on or before the first day of July of the year in which he had applied for the certificate.

FACTS:

  • The mother of Saigal had requested the Director of Public Instruction on October 8, 1959, for exemption under Rule 127E of the Travancore Education Code to be given to the son.
  • The Headmaster of the School also wrote to the Director of Text Books and Examinations recommending Saigal be given exemption.
  • In March 1957, Saigal was allowed to sit for the Public examination for III form and passed the examination obtaining a certificate. Afterwards, he joined Kottapuram High School, and by promotion, he reached the School Final Class, which is XIth standard.
  • The Director of the Text Books and Examinations refused to grant him the exemption.
  • His father thereafter filed a petition, praying at the same time for interim relief.

HELD:

  • The court held that administrative direction, in this case, created a duty to be observed and which would have been enforced by the proper courts under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act.
  • The court further stated that a Tribunal vested with the discretion is authorised to follow a policy, but that should not be used as an invariable rule and to preclude exceptional circumstances of a particular case being decided on merits.
  • The Director’s order of January 29, 1960, rejecting the request for exemption, was cancelled by the court, and he was directed to determine the request for exemption on its merits unfettered by the earlier rule of Policy.
Categories
Control on Executive Law Making

Himmat Lal v. Commissioner of Police AIR 1973 SC 87

HIMMAT LAL V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

Himmat Lal v. Commissioner of Police AIR 1973 SC 87

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Powers of the Police Commissioner under Bombay Police Act, 1951 violative of the Fundamental Rights of the citizens to hold public meetings under Article 19(1)(b) of the Indian Constitution?

RULE:

  • The State cannot by law abridge or take away the right of assembly by prohibiting assembly on every public street or public place. The State can only make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of each citizen and can only impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order.

FACTS:

  • The appellant made an application to the Police Commissioner. Ahmedabad, for permission to hold a public meeting near Panch Kuva Darwaja, Ahmedabad in connection with the All India students’ strike sponsored by the All India Students Federation.
  • This permission was refused because the application was not sent 5 days before the day of the meeting as required by notification of the Commissioner of Police. The appellant was also informed that “holding a meeting with or without a loudspeaker, without the permission, amounts to an offense.”
  • After a few days, the appellant also applied for permission to hold another public meeting well before time.
  • The Deputy Police Commissioner informed him that the permission “cannot be granted since a meeting was held earlier under similar permission whereafter certain elements had indulged in pioneering and caused mischief to private and public properties.
  • He was also informed that “given the present position, it is not possible to grant such permission to maintain law and order.”
  • Therefore, the Appellant filed a writ petition praying for the quashing of the orders of the police, declaring section 33(O) read with section 33 (Y) of the Bombay Police Act Void, declaring Rule 7 to 11, 14, and 15 of the Rules for Procession and Public Meetings void and to declare that Appellant should be allowed to conduct public meetings without obtaining the permission from the authorities.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that Section 33(1)(o) is not in violation of Article 19(1)(b). It enables the Commissioner to make rules to regulate the assemblies and processions. Without such rules, in crowded public streets, it would be impossible for citizens to enjoy their various rights. Indeed Section 33(1)(o) may be said to have been enacted in aid of the rights under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(d) of the Indian Constitution.
  • It also held that Rule 7 of the Rules framed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, is void as it infringes Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution.
Categories
Control on Executive Law Making

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala AIR 1987 SC 748 

BIJOE EMMANUEL V. STATE OF KERALA

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala AIR 1987 SC 748

ISSUE:

  • Is the expulsion of the 3 students from a school in Kerala justified under Kerala Education Act (Section 36), Kerala Education Rules(Rule 6 and 9), and Section 3 of Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act 1971?
  • Whether the expulsion of the children from the school is consistent with the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) and Article 25 of the Indian Constitution?

RULE:

  • There was no legal provision that obligates anyone to sing the National Anthem, and it is not disrespectful to the Anthem. The court ordered that the students be permitted to study in the school without any hindrance.
  • Further, the court had observed that our traditions taught us tolerance, our philosophy preaches tolerance, and our Constitution practices tolerance hence we should not dilute it.

FACTS:

  • The case pertains to 3 students – Bijou, Binu Mol, and Bindu Emmanuel who studied in a school in Kerala. They attended school every day and even participated in the school assembly.
  • However, when the National Anthem was sung, they didn’t sing the National Anthem along with the other students but stood at attention.
  • Their two elder sisters also studied in the same school and followed the same practice and nobody ever objected to it.
  • One day in July 1985, a member of the legislative assembly attended the assembly and noticed that the 3 children were not singing the National Anthem and he thought that this behaviour of theirs was unpatriotic.
  • He raised this question in the Assembly and a commission was set up to investigate the matter. The commission reported that the children were well-behaved and law-abiding and did not ever show any disrespect to the National Anthem.
  • However, the Head Mistress expelled the students from the school under the instructions of the Deputy Inspector of Schools.
  • The father of the children requested the headmistress to allow the children to attend their classes in school till they received a government order/decision in the matter. The Headmistress expressed her inability to do so.
  • The objection of the Emmanuel children was not the language or the sentiments of the National Anthem. They did not sing the National Anthem, but they always stood in when the National Anthem was sung to show their respect for it. They did not sing only because of their belief and conviction that their religion did not permit them to join any rituals except it be in their prayers to Jehovah, their God.
  • Since the appellants were prevented from attending the school, they sought a restraining order passed by the authorities. However, their writ petition was first rejected by a single learned judge and then the division bench also rejected the prayer of the children.
  • After this, the case was appealed by the father, in the Supreme Court through a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the three students were not guilty of disrespect to the National Anthem just because they refused to sing it. Moreover, they did stand in respect whenever the National Anthem was being sung.
Categories
Control on Executive Law Making

Kumari Regina v. St. Aloysius Higher Elementary School and Another, AIR 1971 SC 1920

KUMARI REGINA V. ST. ALOYSIUS HIGHER ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

Kumari Regina v. St. Aloysius Higher Elementary School and Another AIR 1971 SC 1920

ISSUE:

  • Whether the rules under which the appeal was filed and the order was made were only administrative instructions by the Government to its educational officers?

RULE:

  • Section 56 of the Madras Elementary Education Act, 1920 was emphasized in the ruling by the Supreme Court.

FACTS:

  • The appellant, who was working as the Headmistress in the respondent school was reduced to the position of an Assistant Teacher.
  • Her appeal to the District Educational Officer under Section 13(2)(vi) of Part 11 of the rules published by the State Government in the Gazette on August 29, 1939, was rejected, but on a further appeal by her to the Divisional Inspector of Schools, the management of the school was directed to restore her to the position of Headmistress.
  • As the management did not do so, she filed a suit for the issue of a mandatory injunction to the respondent and damages.

HELD:

  • It was held by the Supreme Court that mandamus cannot be used against the management of private institutions. The court can also not intervene the in decisions of the Governor with the writ of Mandamus.
Categories
Control on Executive Law Making

K. M. Shanmugam v. S. R. V. S. Private Limited and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1626

K.M. SHANMUGAM V. S.R.V.S PRIVATE LIMITED AND OTHERS

K. M. Shanmugam v. S. R. V. S. Private Limited and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1626

ISSUE:

  • Whether the High Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, as the error, if any, was one of fact and that the directions issued by the Government under s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act?

RULE:

  • Section 43 and 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India

FACTS:

  • On applications for permits made to it the Regional Transport Authority, applying the marking system prescribed by the Government order issued under Sec 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act granted the permit to the appellant.
  • On appeal by the respondent, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal recast the marks but in doing so did not allot any mark to the first respondent under the head of “residence or place of business” thereby treating the appellant and the first respondent as equal, gave the appellant the further advantage of four marks under the head “viable unit”.
  • The respondent challenged the order of the Appellate Tribunal before the High Court under Art. 226 on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal had failed to allot him any mark in respect of his admitted residential qualification and had thereby committed a breach of Sec 47 (1) (a) and (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the question was whether there was an error apparent on the face of the record to enable the High Court to interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution was one to be determined in each case and no particular test can or need be laid down as a general rule.
Categories
Control on Executive Law Making

Union of India v. K. P. Joseph and Others, AIR 1973 SC 303

UNION OF INDIA V. K.P. JOSEPH AND OTHERS

Union of India v. K. P. Joseph and Others, AIR 1973 SC 303

ISSUE:

  • Whether the order applied to the first respondent as he was reemployed before 25/11/1958?
  • Whether the order was justifiable and writ lay?

RULE:

  • There are administrative rights that confer rights and impose duties. it is because an administrative order can abridge take away rights that the Court imported the principle of natural justice of audi altram partem into this area.

FACTS:

  • The appellant was discharged from the post of combatant Clerk in the Indian Army on 9th June, 1953, and was re-employed shortly thereafter.
  • His pay was re-fixed in the scale applicable. On 15th July, 1960, the Government of India issued a general Order relating to re-employed ex-military personnel.
  • Under the Order those entitled to its benefits would get fixed in the scale applicable to them by adding to the bottom of their scales increments equal to the total number of completed years of military service.
  • The first respondent having exercised the option provided for in the Order, claimed that he was entitled to the benefit of the Order.
  • The claim was rejected by the Government the first respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the general rule under the Order was that past cases of persons re-employed before 25-11-1958 would not be reopened. 
  • But the effect of clause (3) of paragraph (3) is to create an exception to the general rule in the case of persons re-employed before 25-11-1958 for an unspecified period or for a period that extends to the date of order and who have exercised their option in writing to be brought under the Order.
  • Therefore, it was held that the respondent having exercised his option was therefore entitled to the benefit of the order.