Trace Your Case

Author: TYC

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Judicially Noticeable Fact

Onkar Nath & Ors. v. The Delhi Administration AIR 1977 SC 1108

ONKAR NATH & ORS V. THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION

Onkar Nath & Ors. v. The Delhi Administration AIR 1977 SC 1108

ISSUE:

  • Whether the lower courts were justified in considering specific facts without needing formal evidence?

RULE:

  • Under Section 57 of the Evidence Act, courts can take judicial notice of widely known facts without requiring formal proof.
  • This allows the judicial system to recognize and rely on facts of public knowledge—such as notable events—without evidence, thereby ensuring efficiency and preventing undue formalism in the judicial process.

FACTS:

  • The appellants were leaders of the Northern Railwaymen’s Union, and on May 5, 1974, a speech was made at a meeting, inciting workers to go on strike from May 8th.
  • Under Rule 118(1) of Defense of India Rules, 1971, the Central Government had previously issued an order on November 26, 1973, prohibiting strikes connected to industrial disputes within railway services. This prohibition aimed to maintain essential supplies and services for public welfare.
  • The government accused the appellants of violating this rule by inciting a strike tied to an industrial dispute.
  • They were convicted by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and sentenced to six months of rigorous imprisonment.
  • The order of conviction was upheld in appeal by the sessions court, but in revision, the Delhi High Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone.
  • On appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the courts below were not justified in taking judicial notice that on the date they delivered their speeches, a railway strike was ready to take place, but such a strike was launched on May 8th, 1974.

HELD:

  • The Delhi High Court ruled that as the statute of limitations automatically renews with each succeeding default, it is immaterial to determine whether the statute of limitations should be computed from the date of repudiation because the application is timely and can be brought to arbitration.
  • The court decided that the arbitrator might address any limitations within a specific area of the claim. The court determined that there was no legislative necessity to present the agreement to the general body of the corporation and that the directors revealed their interests and acted within the parameters of the Articles of Association.
  • Therefore, Section 299 was not violated. There is no Section 294 mandate to bring this to a general body meeting of shareholders because the arrangement does not establish an agreement to name a sole selling agent.
  • The fundamental query is whether the directors’ behaviour passes muster in light of their fiduciary duty to the corporation.
  • The Court determined that the provisions of the agreement from June 1, 1967 were bad for the company and that the directors used them for their own gain without completing any work.
  • As a result, the agreement is null and void, and the appellants are entitled to the recession remedy. Directors have a responsibility to put their best efforts into serving the interests of those who have entrusted them with that responsibility, and they are required to put those interests ahead of their own if doing so would be improper.
Categories
General Rules of Interpretation

M.V. Joshi v. M.U. Shimpi, AIR 1961 SC 1494

ISSUE:

Whether the butter prepared from curd comes under the definition of “butter” in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955?

Whether selling butter below the prescribed standard, even when no foreign articles are added, amounts to adulteration?

RULE:

In the Indian Act, selling butter below the prescribed standard is deemed to be adulteration.

A dealer in such butter cannot adduce evidence to prove that notwithstanding the deficiency in the standard, it is not adulterated.

The butter which is prepared from curd is legally considered butter, and deviations from the prescribed purity standards in food constitute adulteration under strict liability.

Broad interpretation of the food safety laws to protect public health, with legislative amendments clarifying the statutory definitions retrospectively aiding in interpreting the legislative intent.

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General Rules of Interpretation

Maradana Mosque v. Badiuddin Mahmud and Anr. [1967] 1 A.C. 13

ISSUE:

Whether the Minister in making the first Order was acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity and was under a duty to observe the rules of natural justice?

Whether the Minister acted in excess of his jurisdiction, in that he failed to consider the right questions and failed to make the decisions which were the requisite foundations for an Order under section 11?

Whether there was an error of law on the face of the record?

RULE:

An order cannot be passed without giving a fair opportunity of being heard to the person or entity against whom such order is passed.

The rules of natural justice must be followed in every case.

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General Rules of Interpretation

Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Limited (1940) AC 1014

ISSUE:

Whether the right to an individual’s personal service be treated as a transferable property right under section 154?

What are the implications for the employees when their employer company is dissolved, and its assets and liabilities are transferred to another company?

Whether Section 154 of the Companies Act permit “statutory novation” of the employment contracts, thus binding employees to the new employer without their agreement?

Whether the statutory exception within section 154 that overrides the common law principle that personal service contracts cannot be transferred without the consent of the employees?

RULE:

The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.

It was emphasized that there is a need to adhere to the literal meaning of the statutory language, unless explicitly stated by the legislature.

One must not shrink from an interpretation which will reverse the previous law, for the purpose of a large part of our statute law is to make lawful that which would not be lawful without the statute, or, conversely, to prohibit results which would otherwise follow.

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Categories
Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

P.C. Gulati v. Lajya Ram Kapur AIR 1967 Punj. 79

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant can seek a transfer of the case to a competent Magistrate under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code?

Whether the High Court have the power to transfer or recall a case from the Additional Sessions Judge based on a potential jurisdictional error in the initial order?

RULE:

The penal Statutes must be construed in such a manner as to carefully guard the rights of the accused and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the Legislature, but whenever there exists an ambiguity, it must be resolved in favor of protection of rights and safeguards rather than their destruction.

The High Court has the authority to transfer case across the subordinate criminal courts for just and efficient adjudication, despite procedural nuances in commitment and cognizance requirements U/S 193 and 526 of CrPC.

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Categories
General Rules of Interpretation

The Queen v. Charles Arthur Hill Heaten Ellis (1844) 6 Q.B. 499

ISSUE:

Whether the justices had a jurisdiction to remove a lunatic pauper (Harriet Ellis) to a licensed asylum in Surrey instead of the Middlesex County asylum, which was full?

Whether the relocation to a different county for treatment was lawful under statute 9 G. 4, c. 40, s. 38?

RULE:

Statutes are not to be expounded according to strict propriety of construction, or even in the usual grammatical sense, if that mode of interpreting would lead to manifest inconvenience, and be inconsistent with the subject and occasion, and the object contemplated by the Legislature.

Justices must act within the limits of their statutory authority and cannot extend powers beyond what is explicitly stated in the law.

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Categories
Dying Declarations

Dhanraj And Others, Smt. Venubai v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2002 SC 3302

ISSUE:

Whether the dying declaration recorded in the absence of a medical certificate certifying the mental fitness of the declarant is admissible as evidence?

RULE:

When the circumstances itself indicate the declarant's mental state, it may be possible to draw a legitimate inference regarding the mental condition of the declarant, even without a medical certificate.

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Categories
Section 27

Earabhadrappa Alias Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka AIR 1983 SC 446

EARABHADRAPPA ALIAS KRISHNAPPA V. STATE OF KARNATAKA

Earabhadrappa Alias Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka AIR 1983 SC 446

ISSUE:

  • Whether the statement made by the accused was admissible in evidence by virtue of Section 27 of the Evidence Act?
  • Whether the presumption arising under illustration (a) to s. 114 of the Evidence Act valid?

RULE:

  • For the applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, two conditions are pre-requisite, viz:
  • (1) Information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact, and
  • (2) The information must “relate distinctly” to the fact discovered.”

FACTS:

  • The appellant, Earabhadrappa hailing from village Mattakur, under the false name of Krishnappa and with a false address obtained employment of service as a domestic servant under Makrappa.
  • Makrappa, the husband of the deceased Bachamma, who was found murdered by strangulation on the night after having been robbed of her jewellery, clothes, etc.
  • Based on circumstantial evidence, the appellant, who was found missing right from the early hours and who was apprehended a year later, was charged with and convicted for the offences under Sections 302, 392 IPC respectively.
  • He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10 years under section 392 IPC and to death under Section 302.
  • In appeal, the Karnataka High Court confirmed both the conviction and sentences imposed upon him. Hence the appeal by special leave was filed.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that to sustain a charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, the mere fact that the accused made a statement leading to the discovery of the stolen articles under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, by itself is not sufficient.
  • The court observed that there must be something more to connect the accused with the commission of the offence. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution in the instant case led to no other inference than that of guilt of the accused as murder and robbery are proved. The prosecution had led sufficient evidence to connect the accused with the commission of the crime.
  • For the applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, two conditions are pre-requisite, viz: (1) Information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact, and (2) The information must “relate distinctly” to the fact discovered.”
  • The court emphasized that the nature of presumption under illustration (a) to s. 114 must depend upon the nature of the evidence adduced. No fixed time limit can be laid down to determine whether possession is recent or otherwise and each case must be judged on its own facts.
  • If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be too long particulary when the appellant had been absconding during that period. There was no lapse of time between the date of his arrest and the recovery of the stolen property.
  • Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and modified the sentence to imprisonment for life.
Categories
Expert Witness

Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P 2008, 10 SCC 450

GHUREY LAL V. STATE OF U.P

Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P 2008, 10 SCC 450

ISSUE:

  • Whether the injuries caused to Brij Raj Singh be caused by the same shot that killed the deceased?
  • Whether the trial court judgement was perverse and High Court was justified in setting aside the same?

RULE:

  • When two possible and plausible explanations co-exist, the explanation favorable to the accused should be adopted.

FACTS:

  • On 14.03.1979, the deceased and others had taken the customary gur (Jaggery) during the Holi festival.
  • On their way home, they crossed the accused’s house who began to verbally abuse the deceased. He had a shot gun, fired it, killing the deceased and causing injuries to the Brij Rai Singh (one of the witnesses) with pellets. The accused then fled from the scene.
  • The accused was charged for murder of the deceased and attempting to murder Brij Raj Singh. He denied the charges and asked to be tried.
  • The trial court examined the report of the Ballistic expert who was of the opinion that the injuries to Brij Raj Singh were from a different shot than the one that killed the deceased. Therefore, the trial court concluded that both the injuries were not possible by a single firearm and that two weapons were used.
  • The trial court believed the accused cannot be convicted for the charges framed against him and was entitled to get a benefit of doubt as some serious infirmities were found in the prosecution version and was virtually left with no choice. The State appealed before the High Court.
  • The High Court concluded that the Trial Court’s judgement was unsustainable and was of the opinion that both their injuries were caused from the same weapon in a single shot. It convicted the accused and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The accused appealed to this court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court is clearly of the opinion that-
  • The deceased died of a bullet injury and Brij Raj Singh received Pellet injuries. Two shots were fired from two different firearms, hence, disagreeing with the High Court.
  • The trial court carefully scrutinized the entire evidence and documents on record and arrived at the correct conclusion. The view taken by them was plausible and certainly possible. While the court took great pain in discussing all aspects and to record its opinion on every material point, the learned judges of the High Court reversed the judgment of the trial court without any substantial reasons in support of its conclusion. The reasoning given by them for overturning the judgment was wholly unsustainable and contrary to settled principles of law.
  • The appeal filed by the appellant was allowed and the judgment passed by the High Court was set aside.
Categories
Testimony

Israr v. State of U.P. AIR 2005 SC 249

ISRAR V. STATE OF U.P.

Israr v. State of U.P. AIR 2005 SC 249

ISSUE:

  • Is the testimony of interested witness admissible under Indian Evidence Act?

RULE:

  • An interested witness, being a friend or relative of the deceased does not automatically make a witness unreliable.

FACTS:

  • In the present case, the deceased had a grocery shop and was threatened by the accused(Israr) over money. On the night of the incident, the accused intercepted the deceased and attacked him with a knife, causing injuries.
  • The injured Zamil Ahmad was taken to the hospital, where a report was filed with the police. His condition worsened, and he was transferred to All India Institute of Medical Sciences, where he died. The postmortem report confirmed the cause of death as peritonitis and bronchopneumonia due to injuries sustained in the attack.
  • The accused was found guilty by the trial court.
  • The appeal was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court, affirming their conviction and sentence.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court, in its judgment, emphasized the importance of carefully evaluating the testimony of interested witnesses.
  • While acknowledging that interested witnesses can provide valuable evidence, the court cautioned that their testimony should be subjected to thorough scrutiny.
  • In this particular case, the court assessed the reliability of the interested witnesses testimony in light of other evidence presented.
  • After a detailed examination, the court concluded that the interested witnesses testimony was credible and corroborated by other evidence, leading to Israr’s conviction for the offense of murder.