Whether the party has filed a complaint with the proper High Court?
Whether an arbitration agreement exists for the arbitrator to resolve? - Whether the party, who has applied for reference and is a party to such agreement, be entitled to a more thorough assessment?
The scope of judicial intervention in the determination of the validity of an arbitration agreement is limited.
Whether the Supreme Court's explanation of the meaning of "public policy" under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as amended by the 2015 Act, result in a more predictable and constrained application of this ground for setting aside arbitration awards?
Whether the Supreme Court's decision on the prospective applicability of the 2015 Act to Section 34 applications effectively prevents the use of "public policy" and "patent illegality" as grounds for challenging domestic and foreign arbitration awards initiated prior to the 2015 Act's enactment?
The Supreme Court's clarification of the scope of "public policy" under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as amended by the 2015 Act, seeks to limit the broad interpretation of "fundamental policy of Indian law" and establishes specific criteria for assessing public policy challenges in arbitration. This rule aims to make the "public policy" justification for setting aside awards more predictable and restricted. The Supreme Court's decision on the future applicability of the 2015 Act to Section 34 applications establishes that the 2015 Act's modifications apply only to applications for setting aside awards filed on or after the 2015 Act's start date. This rule is meant to prevent "public policy" from being abused.
Whether the arbitral tribunal's interpretation of Clause 23 as involving a price increase in high-speed diesel (HSD) due to an Executive Order was a reasonable construction of the contract provisions, given that the contract appeared to envisage a fixed rate for the contractor?
Whether the arbitral tribunal's interpretation, while based on the principle of harmonious interpretation, was so implausible and contrary to the overall terms of the contract that it could be considered against Indian public policy, justifying the High Court's overturning of the arbitral award?
The rule established in this case is that, while courts and tribunals should normally use a harmonic interpretation of contract words to determine the parties' intent, such interpretation must nevertheless be consistent with the contract's overall terms and conditions. An interpretation that is not plausible in the context of the contract may be rejected, particularly if it contradicts the contract's plain stipulations and is contrary to Indian public policy.
Whether the petitioner's challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to the arbitral award dated 15.10.2019, which allowed the respondent's claims with costs and interest, justified in light of contractual disagreements concerning CENVAT credit and tax reimbursement?
Whether the learned Arbitrator correctly interpret the contract terms regarding the deduction of CENVAT credit and reimbursement of Central Sales Tax, and were the awarded claims, costs, and interest reasonable and in accordance with the petitioner-respondent contract?
The case, which involves a challenge to an arbitral ruling, is governed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996. Sections 34 and 33 of the Act, which deal with appealing awards and correction/interpretation, are fundamental to the legal rules. Contract law considerations also apply when interpreting CENVAT credit and tax reimbursement contract conditions.
Whether the Panel of Arbitrators by DMRC is in violation of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996?
Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 holds that a person would be rendered ineligible to be appointed arbitrator or part of an Arbitral Tribunal if he/she stands to hold a relationship with either of the disputing parties.
Whether there are similarities between the two contended marks and do they create confusion
Whether the Defendant's mark violates the copyright of the Plaintiff?
Whether there was a misuse of confidential information or not?
The Principle of Confidentiality, ensued in Article 21 of the Constitution under the Right to Privacy, and under the Information Technology Act 2000, states that when information is disclosed to a third party or used without the data owner's permission, he is entitled to take legal action on the account of loss or damage incurred as a result of the same.
Section 51 and Section 13 of the Copyright Act 1957 also state that an idea is not protected by a copyright, it only becomes a copyright when the idea is embodied in a tangible form.
Did the reproduction of sections in the course packs constitute copyright infringement?
Section 52(1)(i), in particular, stated that the reproduction of any work by a teacher or a pupil in the course of instruction or as part of the question to be answered in an examination or answers to such questions all constituted fair dealing of that work.
Whether the mark “DICLOMOL” being used by the Plaintiff and “DICAMOL” being used by the Defendant, for the manufacture of their products, are so similar that confusion is likely to be created amongst consumers, the public and those who are dealing with the Plaintiff Company?
Whether the Plaintiffs have a legal right to prevent the Defendants from using the mark “DICAMOL” to carry on their business, manufacturing, and marketing of the product?
Rules 1 & 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 empower Courts to grant an injunction on the basis that it is just and convenient to do so to prevent injury or breach from arising, and Rule 2 specifically lays down the conditions that must be fulfilled; a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss or injury.
Whether the applicant's use of the trademark "TATA," even with evidence of use since 1981, is an honest concurrent user or an attempt to trespass on the petitioner's well-established mark, "THE HOUSE OF TATAS"?
Is the rejection of the petitioner's evidence based on a lack of pleading on the registered status of the "TATA" trademark, as well as the failure to consider a prior court order against respondent No. 2, a fair basis for dismissing the opposition to the trademark registration?
To be eligible for registration, a trademark must not be likely to deceive or cause confusion, and it must not be a colourable imitation of an existing brand. Evidence of repute and earlier use can be important elements in assessing whether or not a trademark registration should be permitted. Furthermore, when evaluating opposition to trademark registration, it is critical to evaluate the legitimacy of any concerns stated, even if they are not explicitly pled, and not to discard pertinent evidence without adequate justification.
Whether is it trademark infringement when an Internet search engine recommends and sells a trademark to advertisers, including the trademark owner's competitors, for the purpose of triggering the appearance of their adverts and links?
Whether an Internet search engine's use of a trademark qualifies as a "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act, even if the trademark is not visibly displayed in the search results but is used to suggest and sell keywords to advertisers, potentially leading to consumer confusion?
A trademark owner may have a valid cause of action for trademark infringement when the owner of an Internet search engine recommends and sells the trademark to advertisers, including the trademark owner's competitors, to trigger the appearance of their advertisements and links, causing potential consumer confusion when users search using the trademark as a keyword.