Category: General Rules of Interpretation

ISSUE:

Whether the butter prepared from curd comes under the definition of “butter” in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955?

Whether selling butter below the prescribed standard, even when no foreign articles are added, amounts to adulteration?

RULE:

In the Indian Act, selling butter below the prescribed standard is deemed to be adulteration.

A dealer in such butter cannot adduce evidence to prove that notwithstanding the deficiency in the standard, it is not adulterated.

The butter which is prepared from curd is legally considered butter, and deviations from the prescribed purity standards in food constitute adulteration under strict liability.

Broad interpretation of the food safety laws to protect public health, with legislative amendments clarifying the statutory definitions retrospectively aiding in interpreting the legislative intent.

ISSUE:

Whether the Minister in making the first Order was acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity and was under a duty to observe the rules of natural justice?

Whether the Minister acted in excess of his jurisdiction, in that he failed to consider the right questions and failed to make the decisions which were the requisite foundations for an Order under section 11?

Whether there was an error of law on the face of the record?

RULE:

An order cannot be passed without giving a fair opportunity of being heard to the person or entity against whom such order is passed.

The rules of natural justice must be followed in every case.

ISSUE:

Whether the right to an individual’s personal service be treated as a transferable property right under section 154?

What are the implications for the employees when their employer company is dissolved, and its assets and liabilities are transferred to another company?

Whether Section 154 of the Companies Act permit “statutory novation” of the employment contracts, thus binding employees to the new employer without their agreement?

Whether the statutory exception within section 154 that overrides the common law principle that personal service contracts cannot be transferred without the consent of the employees?

RULE:

The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.

It was emphasized that there is a need to adhere to the literal meaning of the statutory language, unless explicitly stated by the legislature.

One must not shrink from an interpretation which will reverse the previous law, for the purpose of a large part of our statute law is to make lawful that which would not be lawful without the statute, or, conversely, to prohibit results which would otherwise follow.

ISSUE:

Whether the justices had a jurisdiction to remove a lunatic pauper (Harriet Ellis) to a licensed asylum in Surrey instead of the Middlesex County asylum, which was full?

Whether the relocation to a different county for treatment was lawful under statute 9 G. 4, c. 40, s. 38?

RULE:

Statutes are not to be expounded according to strict propriety of construction, or even in the usual grammatical sense, if that mode of interpreting would lead to manifest inconvenience, and be inconsistent with the subject and occasion, and the object contemplated by the Legislature.

Justices must act within the limits of their statutory authority and cannot extend powers beyond what is explicitly stated in the law.

ISSUE:

Whether a general word should include a specific item even when such specific item is/was separately mentioned?

Whether betel leaves should be considered "vegetables" under the Central Province and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947?

Whether the legislature wanted to make betel leaves taxable or not?

RULE:

Words not defined in the Act itself and being words of everyday use must be construed in its popular sense, meaning which people conversant with subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it.

If the legislature has classified two items separately than then it, clearly indicates that they belong to different categories.

ISSUE:

Whether the first Respondent (a non-graduate) was qualified to stand for election to the Graduates Constituency on all or any of the grounds set out by the petitioner or not?

Whether it is inconsistent or undermines representative principles if the elected candidate lacks the essential qualifications possessed by the electors?

Whether the Constitution, being an organic instrument, requires broad interpretation to uphold the intent of functional representation?

Whether Courts should rely on literal interpretation in the absence of ambiguity and avoid assuming unexpressed qualification?

RULE:

Methods other than literal construction of extracting the meaning can be resorted to only if the language used is contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results.

It may be possible to look for legislative intention in materials outside the four-corners of a statute where its language is really ambiguous or conflicting.

Where no such difficulty arises, the mere fact that the intentions of the law makers, sought to be demonstrated by what was said by some of them or by those advising them when the Constitution was on the anvil, were really different from the result which clearly follows from language used in the Legislative provisions under consideration, could not authorize the use of such an exceptional mode of construction.

ISSUE:

Whether green ginger qualifies as a “vegetable” within the common understanding of the term as per the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, despite it being primarily used as a flavouring agent rather than a primary food item?

Whether the terms “sabji,” “tarkari,” and “sak,” used in the Act to describe vegetables should influence the classification of green ginger as a vegetable, given the High Court’s findings based on local language nuances?

Whether the term “vegetable” under item (6) intended to cover the everyday use of vegetables, as understood by common people, or should it be understood in its strict scientific sense?

RULE:

In taxing statutes, terms not specifically defined in the Act, should be interpreted in their ordinary, common sense as understood by the general public, not in technical or scientific terms.

Local language usage is a valid interpretative aid for determining the intended meaning of terms in legislation.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents to the suit have immunity for the statements made on the floor of the Parliament under clause (2) of Article 105 of the Constitution of India?

Whether the said immunity is against an alleged irregularity of procedure only and not against illegality?

What is the scope of the term “anything said” in Parliament as used in Article 105(2)? Does it encompass all statements, even if irrelevant to the topic under discussion?

What are the limitations of judicial oversight about parliamentary privileges, particularly in cases where individuals feel aggrieved by statements made in Parliament?

RULE:

Once it is proved that Parliament was sitting and its business was being transacted, anything said during that business is immune from proceedings in any court.

Judicial interference in parliamentary proceedings is not permissible. The role of courts is limited when it comes to matters of parliamentary privileges, as MPs should have the freedom to express themselves without fair litigation.

The term “anything said” in Parliament includes everything said during the transaction of parliamentary business. Irrelevant, undignified, or even unparliamentary statements are also covered by this immunity.

ISSUE:

Whether sandalwood oil is considered a “wood oil” and hence, “forest produce” under Section 2(f)(i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961?

Whether the process of collecting the oil should have relevance in considering the character of the oil so collected?

RULE:

Section 2(f)(i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961: “Forest Produce” includes the following when found in or brought from, a forest, that is to say- (i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce of trees, and charcoal.

Doctrine of Purposive Interpretation: This doctrine considers the purpose of the law when the language is unclear or ambiguous, or when the legislative intent of a provision of a statute isn’t immediately clear. A statute consists of two parts- the letter and the sense. This doctrine involves considering both parts- the objective and subjective purposes of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents can claim to have become the transferees of the decree by operation of law within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 16, or otherwise be entitled to its benefit?

RULE:

The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If such a reading leads in absurdity and an alternative interpretation is possible, the Court may adopt it. Failing that, the ordinary rule of literal interpretation must be applied.