Category: General Rules of Interpretation

ISSUE:

Whether the expert evidence supporting the argument that the publication of obscene material could be beneficial for certain individuals' psychological health was admissible under section 4(2) of the Obscene Publications Act, which allows for the "public good" defense based on science, literature, art, or other objects of general concern?

RULE:

The "public good" defense is limited to interests in science, literature, art, learning, or similar domains, not all benefits.

Broad interpretations of “general concern” make specified categories redundant, so only certain benefits are considered for public good.

Determining public policy on obscene materials is Parliament’s role; juries cannot establish local obscenity standards.

ISSUE:

Whether the Prize Competitions Act of 1955 (“Act”) includes competitions based on skill within the definition of "prize competition"?

Whether the inclusion of games based on substantial skill infringes petitioners' right to conduct business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution?

Whether the principle of severability is applicable if Sections 4 and 5 are held to be void?

RULE:

To ascertain the real meaning of words used in a statute, Courts should determine the aim, scope, object and intent of the Act.

This requires consideration of what the law was before the Act was passed, what was the mischief, what remedy was appointed by the Parliament and the reason of the remedy, as laid down in Heydon’s Case.

The doctrine of severability severs the unconstitutional provisions from the rest of the Statute giving effect to the other constitutional provisions.

ISSUE:

Whether soliciting for prostitution from a balcony or a window that faces a public street constitutes an offense under Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959 (“Act”), which prohibits soliciting "in a street or public place"?

RULE:

The Mischief Rule of statutory interpretation directs the court to consider the intent behind the statute and the "mischief" that the statute was meant to address.

Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, makes it an offense for a "common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution."

ISSUE:

Whether the copyhold estate granted to Ware and his son was valid under the Suppression of Religious Houses Act 1535?

RULE:

When interpreting statutes, judges should consider:

The state of common law before the statute,

The "mischief" or defect for which the common law did not provide,

The remedy Parliament provided to address the mischief and

The true reason for the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents were entitled to receive a notice regarding the land acquisition award.

Whether the application for a reference was filed within the stipulated time frame under the relevant legal provisions.

The effect of the absence of notice on the respondents' ability to challenge the award.

RULE:

The concepts of fair notification and the right to be informed about legal actions affecting one's property, emphasizing that knowledge of the award must encompass its essential contents.

ISSUE:

Whether the butter prepared from curd comes under the definition of “butter” in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955?

Whether selling butter below the prescribed standard, even when no foreign articles are added, amounts to adulteration?

RULE:

In the Indian Act, selling butter below the prescribed standard is deemed to be adulteration.

A dealer in such butter cannot adduce evidence to prove that notwithstanding the deficiency in the standard, it is not adulterated.

The butter which is prepared from curd is legally considered butter, and deviations from the prescribed purity standards in food constitute adulteration under strict liability.

Broad interpretation of the food safety laws to protect public health, with legislative amendments clarifying the statutory definitions retrospectively aiding in interpreting the legislative intent.

ISSUE:

Whether the Minister in making the first Order was acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity and was under a duty to observe the rules of natural justice?

Whether the Minister acted in excess of his jurisdiction, in that he failed to consider the right questions and failed to make the decisions which were the requisite foundations for an Order under section 11?

Whether there was an error of law on the face of the record?

RULE:

An order cannot be passed without giving a fair opportunity of being heard to the person or entity against whom such order is passed.

The rules of natural justice must be followed in every case.

ISSUE:

Whether the right to an individual’s personal service be treated as a transferable property right under section 154?

What are the implications for the employees when their employer company is dissolved, and its assets and liabilities are transferred to another company?

Whether Section 154 of the Companies Act permit “statutory novation” of the employment contracts, thus binding employees to the new employer without their agreement?

Whether the statutory exception within section 154 that overrides the common law principle that personal service contracts cannot be transferred without the consent of the employees?

RULE:

The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.

It was emphasized that there is a need to adhere to the literal meaning of the statutory language, unless explicitly stated by the legislature.

One must not shrink from an interpretation which will reverse the previous law, for the purpose of a large part of our statute law is to make lawful that which would not be lawful without the statute, or, conversely, to prohibit results which would otherwise follow.

ISSUE:

Whether the justices had a jurisdiction to remove a lunatic pauper (Harriet Ellis) to a licensed asylum in Surrey instead of the Middlesex County asylum, which was full?

Whether the relocation to a different county for treatment was lawful under statute 9 G. 4, c. 40, s. 38?

RULE:

Statutes are not to be expounded according to strict propriety of construction, or even in the usual grammatical sense, if that mode of interpreting would lead to manifest inconvenience, and be inconsistent with the subject and occasion, and the object contemplated by the Legislature.

Justices must act within the limits of their statutory authority and cannot extend powers beyond what is explicitly stated in the law.

ISSUE:

Whether a general word should include a specific item even when such specific item is/was separately mentioned?

Whether betel leaves should be considered "vegetables" under the Central Province and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947?

Whether the legislature wanted to make betel leaves taxable or not?

RULE:

Words not defined in the Act itself and being words of everyday use must be construed in its popular sense, meaning which people conversant with subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it.

If the legislature has classified two items separately than then it, clearly indicates that they belong to different categories.