Category: Confessions

ISSUE:

Whether the testimony of a witness regarding incriminating circumstances is credible if the witness remained silent for over two months without cogent reason?

Whether the confession contained in the letter allegedly sent by the accused to the Deputy Commissioner is reliable evidence?

Whether a letter narrating the accused's extrajudicial confession, sent to police during investigation, is admissible under Section 162 Cr.P.C.?

Whether the oral extrajudicial confession made by the accused can be relied upon for conviction?

RULE:

A witness who claims to have knowledge of a gravely incriminating circumstance against an accused but remains silent for an extended period without a valid reason significantly diminishes the credibility of their testimony. Prolonged unexplained inaction makes such testimony unreliable and unsafe for conviction, particularly in cases involving serious offenses like murder.

A written confession allegedly made by the accused, if found to contain inconsistencies or is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, cannot be safely relied upon. If the handling of the confession lacks procedural integrity, has potential for manipulation, or does not align with the overall context of the communication, it is unsafe to act upon it for proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner, Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal, was involved in a conspiracy to murder Sankararaman?
Whether the confessions of co-accused recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. had sufficient evidentiary value to implicate the petitioner?

Whether Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act applied, allowing acts/statements of alleged conspirators to be used against the petitioner?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail considering the seriousness of the offense and the available evidence?

RULE:

A confession of a co-accused is not substantive evidence and cannot form the sole basis of conviction. It can only be used to lend assurance to other independent evidence.

For Section 10 of the Evidence Act to apply, there must be prima facie proof of conspiracy. Statements made after the conspiracy has ended or by an accused who has not been independently connected to the conspiracy cannot be admitted under this provision.

A dying declaration must pertain to the cause of death or circumstances leading to it. A general statement expressing fear or apprehension does not qualify as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused were rightly convicted of murder under Sections 201 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code?Whether the confession made by Kali Charan was self-exculpatory and could not be used against the co-accused?

RULE:

Section 30 of the Evidence Act states that when more than one person is being tried jointly for the same offence, then a confession made by one can be used against any other person as well.

ISSUE:

Whether the extra-judicial confession made by the accused is admissible as evidence?

RULE:

Extra-judicial confession, if found to be voluntary, truthful, and reliable, can be crucial evidence in a criminal trial.

However, the court must ensure the confession was not obtained under duress, coercion, or inducement.

The confession should inspire confidence and be supported by other corroborative evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether techniques for gathering evidence, such as collecting DNA, fingerprint, and handwriting samples, are constitutionally acceptable techniques?

What does "witness" mean under Article 20(3), and what is included by its scope?
Does being in police custody automatically imply that the witness was coerced or not?

RULE:

It is not sufficient to claim that an accused person was forced to testify against himself because he gave a statement while being held by the police. In other words, the mere fact that the accused was being held by the police at the time the disputed statement was made would not, by itself, give rise to the legal conclusion that the accused was forced to make the statement.

ISSUE:

Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques violated the ‘right against self-incrimination’ enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution?

Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques was a reasonable restriction on ‘personal liberty’ as understood in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution?

RULE:

Utilizing such neuroscientific investigative methods constituted testimonial compulsion, infringed upon the accused's right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, as well as their right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3).

ISSUE:

Whether a Customs Officer either under the Land Customs Act 1924 (Act XIX of 1924) or under the Sea Customs Act. 1878 (Act VIII of 1878), is a police officer within the meaning of that expression in Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act?

RULE:

When someone occupies a position under one of the Acts governing the police, they are a member of the force. The definition of "police officers" under section 25 does not just refer to those employed by police agencies registered under the Police Act of 1861. All individuals who must be enlisted under the Act are stated to fall under the definition of "police." only when customs officials are using restricted authority that is comparable to that of police officers can they be recognized to be police officers.

ISSUE:

Whether the requirements of S. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 render an admission made by the appellant and recorded by the Excise Inspector who was conducting the investigation inadmissible?

RULE:

Section 25 offers a sound defense against police agents torturing suspects to extract confessions. Thus, this section is broadly interpreted and applied to every police officer who has the authority to not only conduct investigations into crimes but also to file reports against offenders and bring them to justice. Any person who has been given the authority of a police officer is included in the term "police officer," which should not be construed in a restrictive manner.