ISSUE:
What was the offense that the accused had committed as a result of his acts?
RULE:
The sufficiency of injury, and its linkage to intention is not based on what the accused actually foresaw, but what was foreseeable by a reasonable man.
What was the offense that the accused had committed as a result of his acts?
The sufficiency of injury, and its linkage to intention is not based on what the accused actually foresaw, but what was foreseeable by a reasonable man.
Whether the offense committed by the appellant was murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
Clause thirdly of section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Intention and knowledge are different things. In order to possess and to form an intention, there must be a capacity for reason. And when by some extraneous force the capacity for reason has been ousted, it seems that the capacity to form an intention must have been unseated too. But to the minds of the judges, knowledge stands upon a different footing. Some degree of knowledge must, we think, be attributed to every sane person.
Bodies like LIC and ONGC were created by statutes and had the statutory power to make binding rules and regulations, and were under the pervasive control of the Government. In light of these facts, and the combination of State aid and furnishing of an important public service by these corporations, made these corporations to be State under Art 12.
Whether the appellant in committing the murder of her children had the knowledge that her act was so dangerous, as to cause in all probability, the death of her children and further whether her act was ‘without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such bodily injury as aforesaid” as to amount to murder under Section 302?
Whether, in jumping into the well with her children, she committed the act of suicide under Section 309?
If the evil can be avoided without doing the act, then there can be no valid justification for doing the act which is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such injury as is likely to cause death.
Whether the accused can be held liable for the offense under Section 304-A of the IPC?
The mere fact that the person entering a land is a trespasser does not entitle the owner or occupier to inflict on him personal injury by direct violence and the same principle would govern the infliction of injury by indirectly doing something on the land the effect of which he must know was likely to cause serious injury to the trespasser.
Whether the accused can be held liable for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code?
Exception 1 of Section 330 of IPC states that Culpable Homicide is not murder if the following conditions are complied with:
(1) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused.
(2) The provocation must be grave.
(3) The provocation must be sudden.
(4) The offender, by reason of the said provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control.
Whether the appellant could be entitled to the benefit of Exception 1 to section 300 of IPC?
Could the assault mitigate the murder that took place?
To prove a case under exception 1 following ingredient should be satisfied:
The deceased gave provocation to the accused.
The provocation was grave.
The provocation was sudden
The accused, as a result of provocation, was deprived of self-control.
In continuance of the deprivation, he killed the deceased or any 3rd person by mistake or accident.
Whether the act amounted to murder under section 302 or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304?
Whether the act fell under Exception 4 or 1 of section 300?
Whether he was liable under part 1 or part 2 of section 304?
Ingredients of Exception 1 and 4 under section 300 of the IPC
Exception 1:
The deceased gave provocation to the offend
The provocation was grave and sudden
The offender, by reason of provocation, was deprived of the power of self-control
Whether the doctor can be held liable for the death of the patient?
To prosecute a medical professional for negligence under Section 304 (a), it must be proved that he did or failed to do something, which under the circumstances, no medical professional in his ordinary senses would have done or failed to do and the injury that resulted was imminent.
R V. AHLUWALIA R. v. Ahluwalia (1993) 96 Cr App Reports 133 ISSUE: Whether the appellant’s actions fall under the meaning of the phrase “sudden and temporary loss of self-control”, and if the defense of provocation can be successfully availed?Whether the appellant’s characteristics (in this case, suffering from “battered woman’s syndrome” or having been accustomed...