Whether the Minister of Agriculture’s refusal to refer a complaint to a committee of investigation, as required by the statute, was lawful?
Discretion in exercising statutory power is subject to the restriction that it cannot frustrate the purpose of the Act.
Whether an "economic emergency" can be equated with a "public emergency" to justify the invocation of statutory powers under Section 5(1) of the Indian Telegraphs Act, 1885?
Whether administrative action taken without adhering to statutory procedural safeguards, such as independent satisfaction of conditions and prior notice, is valid under law?
The term "public emergency" requires an actual and proximate connection to public safety, sovereignty, state security, or public order, and cannot be expanded to include general economic concerns.
When a statute prescribes a specific procedure for exercising discretionary or drastic powers, adherence to those procedural requirements is mandatory, and non-compliance renders the action invalid and arbitrary.
Whether the Government of Bombay had the authority to cancel the cinema construction license issued by the Commissioner of Police?
Whether the Commissioner of Police exercised his independent discretion when granting and subsequently canceling the license?
Whether Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, could compel the Commissioner of Police to reconsider and exercise his discretion regarding the cancellation of the license?
The authority to cancel a license granted for public amusement under the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902, lies solely with the Commissioner of Police, not the Government. The Commissioner must exercise his discretion independently and cannot act as a mere agent of the government.
Public officials are required to exercise their discretionary powers independently when authorized by law, and failure to do so constitutes a failure of duty that may be corrected through legal remedies such as mandamus under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act.
Whether the detention order issued under Rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules was valid, given that it cited “law and order” instead of “public order” as the basis for detention?
Whether the President’s order under Article 359(1) completely barred judicial review of detention orders issued during an emergency?
The terms “public order” and “law and order” are distinct; detention under a provision requiring “public order” must address severe disruptions affecting society at large, not minor or localized disturbances.
Courts retain the authority to review whether detention orders comply with legal provisions, even during an emergency when certain fundamental rights are suspended.
Whether the detaining authority’s failure to consider vital facts, such as the denial of legal counsel during interrogation, render the detention order invalid?
Whether the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is vitiated when material facts that could influence its decision are not placed before it?
Whether the procedural safeguards, such as the right to legal representation during interrogation, were violated, and whether such violations affect the legality of the detention order?
The detaining authority must consider all material facts that could influence its decision to issue a detention order. Failure to do so vitiates its subjective satisfaction and renders the order illegal.
Procedural safeguards, including the right to legal representation during interrogation, must be strictly adhered to. Violations of these safeguards undermine the fairness of the detention process and can invalidate the detention order.
Whether by the administrative discretion given to the Director there is a duty casted by law?
Whether the discretionary power under the rule can be controlled by self-created rules of Policy?
Rule 127E of the Travancore Education Code provided that no English School Leaving Certificate would be granted to any person unless he has been a pupil on the rolls of Form VI of a recognised English High School during the whole school year in which he had applied for a certificate. Moreover, he should have completed fifteen years of age on or before the first day of July of the year in which he had applied for the certificate.