Whether the suit property is the self-acquired property of the father or it is the ancestral property has to be decided before granting any relief?
Specific Relief Act –
Section 38: Perpetual injunction
Section 41: Injunction when refused
Whether Savoy Ranganna died as a divided member of the Joint Family?
Whether the complaint filed on 13th January was validly executed by Savoy Ranganna?
Specific Relief Act –
Section 38: Perpetual injunction
Section 41: Injunction when refused
Whether adoption after the death of sole surviving coparcener, makes any difference in determining the rights of adopting son in relation to the family properties?
The Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1968.
Whether a suit is instituted by an adult or a minor they stand on the same footing?
Under the Mitakshara law, the right, of a coparcener to share in the joint family properties arises on his birth, and that right carries with it the right to be maintained out of those properties suitably to the status of the family so long as the family is joint and to have a partition and separate possession of his share, should he make a demand for it.
Do plaintiffs prove that the suit Properties are the joint family Properties?
Do defendants prove that there Was already partition on 22.4.85 And all shares holders are in Possession of their respective Shares?
Do they further prove that suit Property mention at Sr.No.5 is self-acquired property of deceased Eknath?
Whether suit is maintainable?
Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
Whether plaintiffs are entitled to partition and possession of half share in the suit properties?
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to future mesne profit?
General presumption is that a Hindu family is joint and properties are joint family properties but once a partition takes place in a family, presumption would be that all properties stood partitioned. Burden of proof of exclusion of certain property from partition would be on party who asserts same to be joint.
Is judicial review possible of the President's Proclamation made in accordance with Article 356 of the Constitution ?
If so, what does judicial review entail in this case?
What does the phrase mean in Art. 356(1)- "A situation has arisen where the Government of the State cannot be carried on in line with the provisions of this Constitution"?
Until the Proclamation is accepted by both Houses of Parliament in accordance with clause (3) of the aforementioned article, the President is not permitted to dissolve the State's Legislative Assembly using his authority under Article 356(1). Under subclause (c) of clause (1) of the aforementioned article, he may only have the authority to suspend the Legislative Assembly.
Does the Parliament have the power to pass laws that would allow it to purchase land and other assets owned and vested in the State?
Whether or not India's states have sovereign power?
Whether the Act or any of its provisions exceeds the legislative authority of the Parliament?
Whether or not the plaintiff is eligible for relief?
Article 131 grants the Supreme Court exclusive and original jurisdiction over any legal disputes that may arise between different states or between states and the Union. The court upholds the fundamental rights that are guaranteed to all Indian citizens, and any infringement on those rights may be brought before the State's High Court directly under Article 226 or the Supreme Court indirectly under Article 32 via writs granted by the Constitution.
Whether the appellant violated Section 12A(d) and (e) of the Act by trading on behalf of his wife in Ranbaxy scrip based on UPSI in his possession while he was a connected person of Ranbaxy under Regulation 2(c)(i) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992.
With regard to a firm's securities, a connected person of "the company" has a "reasonable expectation" of access to UPSI under section 2 (e).
In this appeal under section 15T of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (the Act or simply the Act) against the order dated August 30, 2011 issued by the adjudicating officer of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (the Board) holding the appellant guilty of violating regulations 3(i) and 4 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the short question that arises for our consideration is whether the appellant is guilty of "insider trading."
When an insider trades or deals in securities on the basis of unpublished price sensitive information, the restriction specified in rule 3 of the regulations applies, and not otherwise. It indicates that the transactions made by the insider should be based on the knowledge they have. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may be assumed that an insider who trades or deals in the securities of a publicly traded firm did so on the basis of previously released price sensitive information. The onus is on the insider to provide evidence that contradicts the aforementioned inference. Regulation 3 of the rules does not apply if an insider demonstrates that he/she did not trade on the basis of unpublished price sensitive information and instead traded on some other basis.
Whether Mr. Rakesh Agrawal is guilty of Insider trading?
To improve the present regulatory framework for the capital market, SEBI amended the 1992 rules with the 2015 SEBI PIT Regulations. Regulations 3 and 4 of the 2015 PIT Regulations govern the disclosure of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information ("UPSI") and trading while in possession of UPSI, respectively. UPSI refers to any non-public information on a firm or its securities, such as financial statements, dividends, changes in capital structure, mergers, de-mergers, acquisitions, delisting, etc., that, upon becoming public, is expected to substantially alter the price of the shares.