Trace Your Case

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Harla v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1951 SC 467

HARLA V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Harla v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1951 SC 467

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Jaipur Opium Act, 1923, enacted by a resolution of the Council of Ministers, without promulgation or publication, constituted valid law?
  • Whether the retrospective amendment of the Jaipur Opium Act in 1938 could validate the law retroactively without original compliance with promulgation or publication requirements?

RULE:

  • A law cannot become operative unless it is promulgated or published in a recognisable manner, ensuring the public can reasonably access and understand it.
  • In the absence of specific legal provisions or customary rules, the principles of natural justice require that laws affecting rights and liberties must be brought to public notice through adequate publication.

FACTS:

  • In 1922, the Maharaja of Jaipur passed away, leaving a minor successor to the throne. To manage the administration of the Jaipur State during the minority of the Maharaja, the Crown Representative appointed a Council of Ministers to govern and legislate on behalf of the State.
  • On December 11, 1923, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution enacting the Jaipur Opium Act, 1923. However, the Act was not promulgated or published in the Gazette or through any other means of public notification, leaving its existence unknown to the general public.
  • Around the same time, the Jaipur Laws Act, 1923, was also enacted by the Council of Ministers. This Act specified in Section 3(b) that laws to be administered by the courts in Jaipur State must be “published in the Official Gazette.” The Jaipur Laws Act came into force on November 1, 1924.
  • The Jaipur Opium Act remained unpublished and unpromulgated, yet in 1938, the Act was amended to include a provision stating that it would retroactively come into force from September 1, 1924. However, even after this amendment, the Act was not published or made accessible to the public.
  • On October 8, 1948, Harla, the appellant, was accused of violating Section 7 of the Jaipur Opium Act, 1923. He was convicted in a trial court and fined ₹50 for the offence.
  • Harla appealed his conviction, arguing that the Jaipur Opium Act was invalid because it was neither promulgated nor published, and thus, could not be considered enforceable law.
  • The High Court of Rajasthan dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. The High Court held that the resolution of the Council of Ministers was sufficient to make the law enforceable, even without promulgation or publication.
  • Dissatisfied with this ruling, Harla appealed to the Supreme Court of India, which granted special leave to address the legal issue of whether a law passed without promulgation or publication could have binding legal force.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court ruled that a law cannot be considered valid or enforceable unless it is promulgated or published in a manner that makes it accessible to the public. Without such publication, it is impossible for citizens to have knowledge of the law, violating principles of natural justice.
  • The Court emphasized that laws must be publicized to ensure fairness and transparency. It stated that subjects cannot be penalized under laws they could not reasonably know about or access, as doing so would be “abhorrent to civilized society.”
  • The Jaipur Opium Act, 1923, was declared invalid because it was neither promulgated nor published at the time of its passage or thereafter, as required by the Jaipur Laws Act, 1923. The retroactive amendment in 1938 could not cure the invalidity, as a law that was invalid at inception cannot be made valid through retrospective measures.
  • The Court also noted that the Council of Ministers was not a sovereign body but derived its authority from the Crown Representative. Therefore, its resolutions required promulgation or publication to attain legal validity.
  • The Court held that the appellant, Harla, could not be convicted under an unenforceable law. It set aside the conviction and fine, ruling in favor of Harla. The appeal was allowed, and the Court reaffirmed the fundamental principle that laws must be made known to those they govern.
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Ultra Vires

Govindlal Chhaggan Lal Patel v. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra and Others, 1976 AIR 263.

GOVINDLAL CHHAGGAN LAL PATEL V. THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, GODHRA AND OTHERS

Govindlal Chhaggan Lal Patel v. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee 1976 AIR 263.

ISSUE:

  • Whether the notification issued under Section 6(5) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1964, was invalid due to non-publication in Gujarati in a local newspaper?
  • Whether the procedural requirements of publication under Section 6(5), as read with Section 5, are mandatory or directory?

RULE:

  • Procedural safeguards in statutes with penal consequences, especially those restricting trade, are mandatory and must be strictly adhered to, as they protect the rights of affected parties by ensuring proper notice and opportunity for objections.
  • The term “shall” is presumptively mandatory, especially where it governs actions that significantly impact legal rights, unless there is compelling evidence of legislative intent to treat it as directory.

FACTS:

  • The appellant, Gvindlal Chhaggan Lal Patel, was prosecuted under the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1964, for purchasing ginger in January and February 1969 without obtaining a license, as required under Section 8 of the Act.
  • The case arose when an Inspector of the Godhra Agricultural Produce Market Committee filed a complaint alleging a violation of the Act, which mandates licensing for trade in regulated agricultural produce within designated market areas.
  • The inclusion of ginger as a regulated item in the Godhra market area was based on a notification issued under Section 6(5) of the Act. This section requires notifications to be published in the Official Gazette and in Gujarati in a local newspaper to ensure adequate publicity.
  • The appellant contested the prosecution, arguing that the notification was invalid as it was not published in a Gujarati newspaper as required by the Act.
  • The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Godhra, acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove that the notification was validly published or promulgated.
  • On appeal, the Gujarat High Court reversed the acquittal, presuming the validity of the notification and convicting the appellant under Section 36 of the Act, imposing a fine of ₹10.
  • The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court erred by:
  • Ignoring the mandatory publication requirements under Section 6(5).
  • Relying on a precedent under the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, which had different procedural standards.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that Section 6(5) of the Gujarat Act mandates compliance with the procedural requirements in Section 5, including publication in Gujarati in a local newspaper.
  • The use of “shall” in Section 6 denotes that these requirements are mandatory, ensuring transparency, public awareness, and the protection of traders’ and agriculturists’ rights.
  • The Court found the notification, issued on February 16, 1968, invalid as it was not published in a Gujarati newspaper, rendering the inclusion of ginger in the list of regulated produce legally unenforceable.
  • The High Court erred by relying on a precedent under the Bombay Act and by assuming the notification’s validity without considering the stricter procedural requirements of the Gujarat Act.
  • The Supreme Court reinstated the acquittal by the Judicial Magistrate and held that no prosecution could be sustained based on the invalid notification.
  • The appellant’s fine of ₹10 was ordered to be refunded, emphasizing the importance of strict adherence to procedural safeguards in regulatory statutes with penal consequences.
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Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Administrative Discretion

Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji 1952 AIR 16

ISSUE:

Whether the Government of Bombay had the authority to cancel the cinema construction license issued by the Commissioner of Police?

Whether the Commissioner of Police exercised his independent discretion when granting and subsequently canceling the license?

Whether Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, could compel the Commissioner of Police to reconsider and exercise his discretion regarding the cancellation of the license?

RULE:

The authority to cancel a license granted for public amusement under the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902, lies solely with the Commissioner of Police, not the Government. The Commissioner must exercise his discretion independently and cannot act as a mere agent of the government.

Public officials are required to exercise their discretionary powers independently when authorized by law, and failure to do so constitutes a failure of duty that may be corrected through legal remedies such as mandamus under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act.

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Ultra Vires

V. Sudeer v. Bar Council of India AIR 1999 SC 1167

V. SUDEER V. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

V. Sudeer v. Bar Council of India AIR 1999 SC 1167

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Bar Council of India had the authority under the Advocates Act, 1961, to enact the Training Rules, 1995, requiring pre-enrolment training as a condition for enrollment?
  • Whether the Training Rules, 1995, violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India by being arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory?

RULE:

  • Rule-making authorities cannot impose additional conditions for enrollment beyond those explicitly permitted by statutory provisions.
  • Any rule prescribing pre-enrollment training or similar requirements must derive clear authority from the enabling legislation; otherwise, such rules are ultra vires and invalid.

FACTS:

  • The dispute arose when V. Sudeer, a law graduate, sought enrollment as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961. He challenged the Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995, which introduced pre-enrolment training and apprenticeship as a mandatory condition for enrollment.
  • The Bar Council of India framed the Training Rules under Section 24(3)(d) and Section 49(1) of the Advocates Act, claiming these provisions granted it the authority to set additional conditions for enrollment to uphold professional standards.
  • The petitioner contended that the Advocates Act only required a recognized law degree for enrollment, and the imposition of training was an unjustified barrier not authorized by the statute.
  • The petitioner argued that the Rules violated fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice a profession) and Article 14 (equality before law) of the Constitution of India.
  • Procedurally, the Training Rules were challenged in two High Courts, leading to conflicting decisions:
  • The Bombay High Court upheld the Rules, dismissing a petition filed by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, which had argued the Rules exceeded the Bar Council of India’s powers.
  • The Punjab & Haryana High Court ruled the Training Rules could not apply retrospectively to candidates who had obtained law degrees before the Rules were notified.
  • This conflicting procedural history, along with writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, brought the matter to the Supreme Court for final resolution.
  • The Bar Council of India defended the Rules, asserting they were a necessary mechanism to ensure quality in the legal profession and fell within its regulatory powers under the Advocates Act.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the Bar Council of India lacked the statutory authority to impose pre-enrolment training as a condition for enrollment. It ruled that the Advocates Act, 1961, as amended in 1974, had deliberately removed the requirement for pre-enrolment training.
  • The Court observed that Parliament’s omission of pre-enrolment training from the Act signified legislative intent to do away with such a requirement, and the Bar Council of India could not reintroduce it indirectly through subordinate legislation.
  • The Court emphasized that the power under Section 24(3)(d) of the Advocates Act was limited to making eligible certain categories of persons not covered under Section 24(1). It could not be used to impose additional conditions for persons who already satisfied the statutory requirements for enrollment.
  • The Supreme Court ruled that the Training Rules were ultra vires the Advocates Act, as they imposed conditions not expressly authorized by the statute. It affirmed that rule-making bodies could not exceed the powers granted by their enabling legislation.
  • The Court further held that the Rules violated Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution by imposing unreasonable restrictions on the right to practice law. The pre-enrolment training requirement created an unjustified hurdle without a legal basis.
  • The Court declared the Rules arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as they discriminated against law graduates by imposing conditions that were neither rational nor necessary.
  • The Supreme Court struck down the Training Rules, allowing the appeal filed by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa and resolving the conflicting High Court decisions. The Court reinforced that enrollment as an advocate must strictly adhere to the statutory framework laid out in the Advocates Act, 1961.
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Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Administrative Discretion

Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Others (1966 AIR 740)

ISSUE:

Whether the detention order issued under Rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules was valid, given that it cited “law and order” instead of “public order” as the basis for detention?

Whether the President’s order under Article 359(1) completely barred judicial review of detention orders issued during an emergency?

RULE:

The terms “public order” and “law and order” are distinct; detention under a provision requiring “public order” must address severe disruptions affecting society at large, not minor or localized disturbances.

Courts retain the authority to review whether detention orders comply with legal provisions, even during an emergency when certain fundamental rights are suspended.

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Ultra Vires

Banwarilal Agarwalla v. The State of Bihar 1961 AIR 849

BANWARILAL AGARWALLA v. THE STATE OF BIHAR

Banwarilal Agarwalla v. The State of Bihar 1961 AIR 849

ISSUE:

  • Whether Section 76 of the Mines Act, 1952, which allows for the prosecution of shareholders and directors of a private company owning a mine, violates Article 14 of the Constitution?
  • Whether regulations framed without adherence to mandatory procedural safeguards, such as consultation with prescribed authorities, can be deemed valid?

RULE:

  • A statutory provision ensuring equal liability among individuals similarly situated does not violate the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution, provided it serves a legitimate objective and avoids arbitrary discrimination.
  • Compliance with mandatory procedural safeguards is a prerequisite for the validity of regulations. Non-adherence renders the regulations invalid unless a specific exception is provided by the legislature.

FACTS:

  • On February 20, 1958, a tragic accident occurred at the Central Bhowra Colliery in Dhanbad, Bihar, which resulted in the deaths of 23 workers. An inquiry under Section 24 of the Mines Act, 1952, was conducted to investigate the causes of the accident.
  • Based on the findings of the inquiry, a complaint was filed by the Regional Inspector of Mines, Dhanbad, against Banwarilal Agarwalla, who was a shareholder and director of the private company owning the colliery. The charges included violations under Section 74 of the Mines Act for contravention of Regulations 107 and 127 of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957.
  • The Sub-Divisional Officer, Dhanbad, took cognizance of the complaint, and criminal processes were issued against Agarwalla, who was subsequently summoned to face prosecution.
  • Agarwalla filed a writ petition before the Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking to quash the criminal proceedings against him.
  • The Patna High Court dismissed the writ petition summarily, upholding the continuation of the criminal proceedings against Agarwalla.
  • Agarwalla then approached the Supreme Court, seeking special leave to appeal against the Patna High Court’s order.
  • The Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal and examined the constitutionality of Section 76 and the legality of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957, with regard to the mandatory consultation requirement under Section 59(3) of the Mines Act, 1952.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that Section 76 of the Mines Act, 1952, which allows for the prosecution of shareholders or directors of a private mining company, did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • The term “any one” was interpreted to mean “every one,” making all shareholders and directors liable to prosecution. This provision was intended to ensure accountability without discrimination, applying equally to all involved in the ownership and management of the mine.
  • The Court also held that the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957, were invalid because they were framed without consultation with the Mining Board, as required under Section 59(3) of the Mines Act, 1952.
  • The consultation with the Mining Board under the 1952 Act was mandatory, and the absence of such consultation rendered the regulations invalid.
  • The issue of whether consultation with the Mining Boards under the 1923 Act could suffice was left for the lower court to determine.
  • The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to assess whether the mandatory consultation took place. If the consultation was found to be absent, the regulations would be invalid, and Agarwalla would be entitled to acquittal. Otherwise, the case should proceed accordingly.
Categories
Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Administrative Discretion

Ashadevi v. K Shiveraj, Addl. Chief Secretary to the Govt of Gujarat, (1979) 1 SCC 222

ISSUE:

Whether the detaining authority’s failure to consider vital facts, such as the denial of legal counsel during interrogation, render the detention order invalid?

Whether the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is vitiated when material facts that could influence its decision are not placed before it?

Whether the procedural safeguards, such as the right to legal representation during interrogation, were violated, and whether such violations affect the legality of the detention order?

RULE:

The detaining authority must consider all material facts that could influence its decision to issue a detention order. Failure to do so vitiates its subjective satisfaction and renders the order illegal.

Procedural safeguards, including the right to legal representation during interrogation, must be strictly adhered to. Violations of these safeguards undermine the fairness of the detention process and can invalidate the detention order.

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Union of India v. Ganesh Das Bhojraj (AIR 2000 SC 1102)

UNION OF INDIA V. GANESH DAS BHOJRAJ

Union of India v. Ganesh Das Bhojraj (AIR 2000 SC 1102)

ISSUE:

  • Whether an exemption notification under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962, becomes enforceable solely upon its publication in the Official Gazette?
  • Whether the publication of a notification must be accompanied by its availability to the public for it to be legally operative?

RULE:

  • Operative Effect of Publication: A notification becomes legally effective upon publication in the Official Gazette, provided the governing statute prescribes this mode of notification, without requiring additional measures such as public availability unless explicitly stated.
  • Standard for Legislative Promulgation: Delegated legislation or subordinate notifications are deemed enforceable if published in accordance with the prescribed statutory mode, which typically requires gazette publication as a sufficient and customary method of notifying concerned parties.

FACTS:

  • M/s Ganesh Das Bhojraj (the respondent) imported a consignment of Green Beans (Pulses) weighing 505.505 metric tons under an invoice dated December 31, 1986.
  • On February 5, 1987, the respondent filed a bill of entry seeking clearance of the imported goods without payment of customs duty, relying on Exemption Notification No. 129/76-Cus, dated August 2, 1976, which exempted such goods from duty.
  • However, the exemption notification had been amended the previous day, February 4, 1987, through Notification No. 40/87-Cus, which imposed a 25% basic customs duty on the goods.
  • The respondent contended that the amended notification was not enforceable as it had not been duly published or made available to the public on February 4, 1987, the day it was issued.
  • The Customs Department, acting under the amended notification, demanded payment of 25% duty before clearing the goods.
  • The respondent filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court, challenging the enforceability of Notification No. 40/87-Cus. The respondent argued that the notification did not come into effect until it was made accessible to the public.
  • The Bombay High Court relied on its Full Bench decision in Apar (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, which held that a notification under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962, is not enforceable unless it is made available to the public. Based on this reasoning, the court allowed the respondent’s petition and quashed the duty demand.
  • Aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, the Union of India (the appellant) appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave petition, arguing that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to make a notification enforceable, as required under Section 25 of the Customs Act.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that a notification under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962, becomes effective upon its publication in the Official Gazette, and there is no requirement for additional steps, such as making the notification available to the public.
  • The Court ruled that publication in the Official Gazette constitutes adequate notice to the public, as the Gazette is the recognized official medium for disseminating government notifications.
  • It was clarified that the legislative framework does not require affected individuals to have personal knowledge of a notification for it to be legally enforceable.
  • The Court overruled the Bombay High Court’s reliance on Apar (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, stating that the earlier judgment in Pankaj Jain Agencies v. Union of India represents the correct exposition of law.
  • In Pankaj Jain Agencies, the Court had emphasized that knowledge of a notification is not a prerequisite for its legal validity once it is published in the Gazette.
  • The Court further rejected the respondent’s argument that the notification was not published on February 4, 1987, noting that the original Gazette copy produced before the Court confirmed its publication on the same date.
  • Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the Bombay High Court’s decision, and held the respondent liable to pay customs duty at the rate of 25% as per Notification No. 40/87-Cus.
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Retrospective Application

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Tikam Das AIR 1975 SC 1429

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH V. TIKAM DAS

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Tikam Das AIR 1975 SC 1429

ISSUE:

  • Whether the State Government has the authority to retrospectively apply enhanced license fees on the balance stock of intoxicants held by a licensee after the expiry of the license period?
  • Whether the balance stock of liquor, already subjected to the license fee at the time of its initial purchase, can be subjected to an enhanced fee retrospectively?

RULE:

  • Subordinate legislation, such as rules made by a delegate, can be given retrospective effect if explicitly or implicitly authorized by the parent statute.
  • The principles of equity and consistency in taxation justify applying enhanced fees to surplus stock retained by the licensee, ensuring parity with other vendors operating under the revised fee structure?

FACTS:

  • The respondent, Tikamdas, operated a bar in Indore under a license issued in Form F.L. 3 under the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915. This license was valid from April 1, 1963, to March 31, 1964.
  • On the expiration of the license period, the respondent had a significant quantity of surplus liquor stock that remained unsold in his licensed premises.
  • The respondent applied for and obtained a fresh license for the subsequent year starting April 1, 1964, to continue his bar operations.
  • Meanwhile, the State Government amended the Foreign Liquor Rules on April 25, 1964, increasing the scale of license fees. The amendment was given retrospective effect from April 1, 1964.
  • A new provision in the amended rules required licensees to pay the difference in fees for balance stocks if the scale of fees was enhanced during or after the license period.
  • The State Government demanded that the respondent pay the enhanced license fees for the liquor stock that remained in his possession as of March 31, 1964, under the retrospectively applicable amended rules.
  • The respondent contested the demand, arguing that the surplus stock had already been subjected to license fees at the earlier rate and could not be retrospectively charged at the enhanced rate.
  • The respondent filed a writ petition in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, asserting that the demand for enhanced fees violated his rights and lacked legal basis.
  • The High Court ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that the retrospective levy of enhanced fees on the surplus stock was unlawful.
  • The State of Madhya Pradesh, as the appellant, challenged this ruling in the Supreme Court by special leave petition, arguing that the amended rules allowed for retrospective application and justified the demand for enhanced fees.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that subordinate legislation, such as rules framed under the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915, can have retrospective effect if explicitly or implicitly authorized by the parent statute.
  • The Court ruled that Sections 62 and 63 of the Excise Act empowered the State Government to promulgate rules and implement them retroactively. The amended Foreign Liquor Rules were validly applied from April 1, 1964.
  • The Court observed that the rule mandating the payment of enhanced fees on balance stock upon amendment was clear and enforceable. The surplus liquor stock held by the respondent as of March 31, 1964, fell within the scope of the retrospective rules.
  • The Supreme Court rejected the respondent’s argument that surplus stock could not be subjected to enhanced fees, reasoning that such an exemption would result in an unequal burden on vendors. New licensees beginning with fresh stock would be charged higher fees, creating inconsistency.
  • The Court emphasized that the respondent was permitted to retain the surplus stock under specific conditions, including the liability to pay any fee differences arising from subsequent enhancements.
  • The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s ruling, holding that the State was within its rights to levy the enhanced license fees on the respondent’s surplus stock.
  • The appeal was allowed, but the Court directed both parties to bear their own costs, considering the relatively minor financial implications of the dispute.
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Retrospective Application

Miss Raj Soni v. Air Officer In-Charge AIR 1990 SC 1305

MISS RAJ SONI V. AIR OFFICER IN-CHARGE

Miss Raj Soni v. Air Officer In-Charge AIR 1990 SC 1305

ISSUE:

  • Whether the petitioner, as an existing employee prior to the enforcement of the Delhi Education Act, 1973, and Rules, was entitled to retire at the age of 60 years instead of 58 years as determined by the school management?
  • Whether the respondent school, despite being a private and unaided institution, was legally bound to uniformly apply statutory provisions under the Delhi Education Act and Rules to its employees?

RULE:

  • Statutory provisions governing service conditions, including retirement age, are binding on recognized private schools, regardless of whether they are aided or unaided, and such provisions must be applied uniformly.
  • Existing employees are entitled to retain the more favorable service conditions, such as a higher retirement age, provided under prior applicable frameworks, and any deviation is impermissible under the statutory framework.

FACTS:

  • The petitioner, Miss Raj Soni, was appointed as a teacher in the Air Force Central School, New Delhi, in 1956.
  • Initially employed on a five-year contract, her service was renewed for another five years in 1961, after which she continued as a regular employee.
  • The Delhi Education Code, 1965, which governed the conditions of service for school teachers, prescribed 60 years as the age of superannuation.
  • In 1973, the Delhi Education Act and Delhi Education Rules came into force, fixing the retirement age at 58 years for teachers in recognized private schools. However, existing employees were entitled to retain the higher retirement age of 60 years if previously applicable.
  • The petitioner was made to retire on October 31, 1981, upon attaining the age of 58 years, contrary to her claim of entitlement to retire at 60 years under the provisions of the Code and Act.
  • The school management, while denying her claim, stated that it followed the practice of retiring teachers at 58 years, with certain exceptions.
  • The petitioner filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, asserting that her retirement violated her statutory rights under the Delhi Education Act and the rules, and that she was discriminated against compared to similarly situated employees.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to retire at the age of 60 years as per the Delhi Education Code, which was accepted and followed by the school before the enactment of the Delhi Education Act and Rules.
  • The provisions of the Act and Rules mandated uniform application, and the school management, being under a statutory obligation, could not defy these provisions or selectively retire employees at different ages.
  • The Court rejected the argument that the school’s management was not bound by the statutory rules as it was not a “State” or “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution.
  • The Court found that the school had retired other similarly situated teachers at 60 years but arbitrarily and discriminatorily retired the petitioner at 58 years.
  • The Court directed the respondents to pay the petitioner her salary and allowances for the additional two years of service, along with recalculating her post-retirement benefits as if she had retired at 60 years.
  • The writ petition was allowed, and the petitioner was awarded relief, with costs borne individually by the parties.