Trace Your Case

Author: TYC

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Code on Wages

Standard Vacuum Refining Co. of India v. Their Workmen AIR 1961 SC 895

STANDARD VACUUM REFINING CO. OF INDIA V. THEIR WORKMEN

Standard Vacuum Refining Co. of India v. Their Workmen AIR 1961 SC 895

ISSUE:

  • Whether the workers were paid a ‘living wage’ which would disqualify them from claiming a bonus?

RULE:

  • Constructing a wage structure involves ethical and social considerations, addressing workers’ needs in a progressive society.
  • The impact of award of bonus in an industrial dispute on other establishments in the region must be given due importance while fixing the amount.
  • The distribution of available surplus in the form of bonus depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
  • The concept of living wage is not a static concept – it expands with the growth of the national economy.

FACTS:

  • The dispute between Standard Vacuum Refining Co. of India, Ltd. (the Appellant), and its employees (the Respondents) concerns a claim for bonus for the year 1956.
  • The Respondents claimed they were entitled to a bonus equal to nine months’ total earnings, including allowances, overtime, and extra-time earnings.
  • The Appellant argued that it was already paying the employees a living wage, which, in its view, eliminated any obligation to pay additional bonus.
  • A conciliation officer attempted to mediate the dispute, but these efforts failed.
  • The Industrial Tribunal observed that while the wages were fair, there was still a gap between the actual wages paid and the living wage for many employees.
  • Based on this gap, the tribunal awarded the respondents a bonus equivalent to five months’ basic earnings, excluding allowances and overtime, for the year 1956.
  • Dissatisfied with the tribunal’s award, both parties filed cross-appeals to the Supreme Court.
  • The Appellant contested the award, arguing it should not be required to pay any bonus given that the employees are being paid a living wage.
  • The Respondents, on the other hand, sought a higher bonus than the five months awarded, arguing that it was inadequate.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court rejected the Appellant’s request to remand the case to allow the company to lead further evidence, stating that the company should have produced more satisfactory evidence at an earlier stage.
  • The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal’s award of five months’ bonus as just in the circumstances of the case.
  • The apex Court held that the workmen were not being paid a living wage.
  • While dismissing both appeals, the Supreme Court noted that the payment of bonus is intended to fill the gap between actual wages and the living wage.
Categories
Code on Wages

State of Andhra Pradesh v. G. Sreenivasa Rao 1989 SCR (1) 1000

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. G. SREENIVASA RAO

State of Andhra Pradesh v. G. Sreenivasa Rao 1989 SCR (1) 1000

ISSUE:

  • Whether payment of lesser salary to a senior than his junior in the same cadre is violative of the principle of equal pay for equal work enshrined in the Constitution under Articles 39(d), 14 and 16?

RULE:

  • Equal pay for equal work” does not require identical pay for all in a cadre.
  • Variations in pay, based on seniority, recruitment source, qualifications, or performance criteria, are justified if they follow valid rules and align with fair objectives.

FACTS:

  • Several employees who were promoted on a later date were being paid a higher salary than those who had been promoted earlier i.e. juniors were being paid more than seniors in the same cadre, in various offices.
  • The pay-fixation of the juniors were done in accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Fundamental Rules.
  • The Respondents, seniors who were being paid lower, approached the High Court or Tribunal and obtained orders in their favour, that the same was violative of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ enshrined in the Constitution.
  • The High Court or Tribunal in each case ordered for the payment of equal salaries to the seniors as was being drawn by the juniors.
  • Aggrieved by the same, the Appellant employers approached the Supreme Court under its civil appellate jurisdiction.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” enshrined in the Constitution under Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) is not violated.
  • The apex Court further stated that higher pay for juniors does not violate this principle if supported by valid rules, promotions, or incentives, provided criteria are reasonable and serve organizational goals.
  • Allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court overruled the decisions of the High Court and the Tribunals.
  • However, sympathizing with the plight of the Respondents as white-collared workmen, the Supreme Court directed that the additional salary, paid to them as part of the decisions of the High Court or Tribunal, shall not be recovered from them.
Categories
Code on Wages

State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi (2007) 11 SCC 681

STATE OF KARNATAKA V. AMEERBI

State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi (2007) 11 SCC 681

ISSUE:

  • Whether Anganwadi workers considered as holders of a “civil post” under the State, thus entitling them to certain employment rights and benefits?
  • Whether the State is liable to pay minimum wages to those working under a project such as Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS)?

RULE:

  • Anganwadi workers do not hold a “civil post” under the State and hence, their application under Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, is not maintainable.
  • The State is not liable to pay minimum wages to those working under a project, unless the same is specified within the schedule of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
  • Not all employees who fall under the purview of Article 12 (defines the state, including state governments and state legislatures) are government employees.
  • Employees working under a programme controlled by the State cannot take advantage of Article 311 (safeguards for civil servants against arbitrarily dismissal, removal, etc.) by that reason alone.

FACTS:

  • The Central Government floated a Scheme known as Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS) programme in the year 1975.
  • Its implementation, however, is at the hands of the respective States.
  • Anganwadi workers are appointed from amongst the local inhabitants by a committee.
  • Under the programme, about one hundred Anganwadi workers are required to be recruited from each of the urban and rural projects and 50 for the tribal projects.
  • Certain Anganwadi workers filed an application under Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which was held as not maintainable by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal.
  • Upon referral to a larger bench of the Tribunal, it was held that the application was maintainable, as Anganwadi workers hold a “civil post”.
  • Susbequently, the State of Karnataka appealed against the decision of the larger bench of the Tribunal before the Supreme Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that Anganwadi workers do not hold a “civil post”, as they are not statutory posts.
  • As such, Anganwadi workers cannot file an application under Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
  • The Supreme Court held that Anganwadi workers are not entitled to any minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, as they have not been specified in the schedule.
  • The court acknowledged the valuable role played by Anganwadi workers for the welfare of society.
  • However, the Supreme Court ruled that they are not entitled to the same benefits as government employees.
  • Their role remains that of community volunteers paid an honorarium, and they are not entitled to the legal protections and employment benefits afforded to civil servants.
  • Unlike persons holding civil posts, Anganwadi workers are entitled to contest in an election.
Categories
Code on Wages

The Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen AIR 1960 SC 692

THE BIJAY COTTON MILLS LTD. V. THEIR WORKMEN

The Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen AIR 1960 SC 692

ISSUE:

  • Whether in ascertaining minimum wages, statutory notification under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, takes precedence over agreement for lower wages between employer and employed?
  • Whether dearness allowance should be considered while fixing minimum wages in accordance with industry standards?

RULE:

  • When determining minimum wages, reliance on statutory notifications under the Minimum Wages Act is advisable, as they offer valuable guidance. Furthermore, assessments of basic wages should include comparisons with industry standards, factoring in both the basic wage and the dearness allowance to ensure comprehensive consideration of workers’ overall earnings.

FACTS:

  • The industrial dispute in question arose between Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. (“the Appellant”) and their workmen (“the Respondents”).
  • The Respondents claimed that minimum wages should be fixed for them because the payments made by the Appellant were below subsistence level.
  • Initially, the Industrial Tribunal declined to set wages due to regional economic concerns.
  • The Respondents challenged the award of the Industrial Tribunal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Labour Appellate Tribunal remanded the matter back to the Industrial Tribunal, directing it to decide and fix appropriate wages.
  • After the case was sent back for reconsideration, the Industrial Tribunal fixed the basic wage as Rs. 25 per month and the dearness allowance as Rs. 10 per month, relying on industry standards in the nearby areas.
  • The Respondents once again challenged the award of the Industrial Tribunal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
  • The Labour Appellate Tribunal set the basic wage as Rs. 30 per month and dearness allowance as Rs. 10 per month, relying solely on the minimum wages specified in a statutory notification under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
  • The Appellant challenged the increase of basic wage to Rs. 30 before the Supreme Court, in light of prevailing industry standards and an agreement the parties to fix minimum wages at Rs. 27 per month.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the statutory notification under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, can be relied upon for fixing basic wages, despite any agreements to contrary between the parties.
  • The Supreme Court held the dearness allowance being paid to employees should be considered while fixing minimum wages in accordance with industry standards. The Industrial Tribunal had omitted to consider the same.
  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Appellate Tribunal to set basic wages at Rs. 30 per month and dearness allowance at Rs. 10 per month.
Categories
Code on Wages

Workmen v. Reptakos Brett. & Co. Ltd. (1992) 1 SCC 290

WORKMEN V. REPTAKOS BRETT. & CO. LTD.

Workmen v. Reptakos Brett. & Co. Ltd. (1992) 1 SCC 290

ISSUE:

  • Whether the management could alter the dearness allowance scheme to prejudice of workmen, based on the claim that the existing system over-compensated them relative to industry standards?

RULE:

  • Management may revise wages to workers’ disadvantage only if it proves financial inability to sustain current wages, which are above the level of minimum wage.
  • Minimum wages, covering basic needs and welfare, are a protected right; employers unable to meet them should cease operations.
  • Dearness allowance must be determined on the basis of current money value of the components of minimum wage, rather than an outdated wage structure, in order to account for inflation.
  • Wage or dearness allowance restructuring requires proof that current wages exceed minimum living standards and are financially unsustainable.

FACTS:

  • In 1959, the Respondent company, The Reptakos Brett & Co. Ltd., implemented a “double-linked” dearness allowance (DA) system.
  • This system connected DA to both the cost of living index and employees’ basic pay.
  • It became a standard component of the company’s wage structure, confirmed through multiple settlements with employees, and was in effect for nearly 30 years.
  • In 1983, a dispute arose between the company and its workmen concerning the DA structure, leading the matter to the Industrial Tribunal.
  • The management sought to revise the DA scheme, requesting a new structure.
  • The Tribunal ultimately abolished the existing slab-based DA structure, mandating instead a link to the cost of living index alone at 33 paise per point over 100 points of the 1936 Madras cost of living index.
  • Both parties filed separate writ petitions before the High Court of Madras challenging the award of Tribunal.
  • The two parties agreed by way of joint memorandum before the High Court to focus only on the DA restructuring issue in their respective writ petitions.
  • The High Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, and the intra-court appeal filed by the workmen was also dismissed.
  • Dissatisfied, the workmen appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave against the decision of the High Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in abolishing the slab system of DA.
  • The Supreme Court stated that it had been a long-standing component of the wage structure confirmed through numerous settlements between the company and its workmen.
  • The apex Court found that the Tribunal and the High Court erred in failing to consider whether the existing DA structure met the minimum wage requirements necessary for a decent standard of life.
  • Moreover, neither the company nor the Tribunal presented evidence that the company’s financial position was so strained that it could not sustain the existing DA scheme.
  • The Supreme Court emphasized that wages should not be revised to the disadvantage of workers unless it can be shown that the company is financially incapable of maintaining the existing structure and that the current pay levels are above the minimum wage.
Categories
Subsidiary Rules

Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi and Ors. AIR 1965 SC 414

ANAND NIVAS (P) LTD V. ANANDJI KALYANJI PEDHI

Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi and Ors. AIR 1965 SC 414

ISSUE:

  • Whether a statutory tenant, who remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of a lease, has the legal authority to sub-let a portion of that premise?

RULE:

  • A statutory tenant has no interest in the premises occupied by him and has no estate to assign or transfer.
  • Bombay Rents and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, defines “tenant” to include statutory tenants, who remain in possession after the lease expiration.
  • Protection is given to tenants from eviction as long as they pay rent and comply with tenancy conditions, even after the lease has ended.

FACTS:

  • Maneklal Mafatlal was granted a lease for five years starting March 5, 1950.
  • After the lease expired, Mafatlal continued to occupy the premises under the protection of the Bombay Rent Control Act.
  • After the expiry of the lease period, the landlords filed for eviction and sought arrears of rent, obtaining a decree in June 1960. During the eviction proceedings, Mafatlal sub-let part of the premises to the appellant.
  • The landlords sought to evict both Mafatlal and the appellant.
  • The appellant claimed that upon Mafatlal’s lease termination, it became a direct tenant of the sub-let portion under Section 14 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act of 1947 (“Act”).
  • The appellant filed an injunction suit in the Court of Small Causes to restrain the landlords from enforcing the decree. The Court dismissed this. The Gujarat High Court also ruled against the appellant, stating that after the expiration of the lease, Mafatlal had no authority to sub-let as he had lost all interest in the premises.
  • The case was appealed to the Supreme Court via special leave.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the Act does not allow for a statutory tenant to sublet the premises.
  • The Act does not confer upon a statutory tenant the right to enforce the benefits of the terms and conditions of the original tenancy.
  • A statutory tenant has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. When there is no right in the premises, there can be no subletting. Hence, Maneklal as a statutory tenant had no right to sublet the premises.
  • The Court clarified that the appellant acquired no right of a tenant on the determination of the tenant’s right by virtue of Section 14 of the Act.
  • The appeal failed and was dismissed.
Categories
Ultra Vires

Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur AIR 1965 SC 895

RAZA BULAND SUGAR CO. LTD. V. MUNICIPAL BAORD, RAMPUR

Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur AIR 1965 SC 895

ISSUE:

  • Whether the publication of tax proposals and draft rules under Section 131(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act mandatory or directory and was the process validly followed in this case?
  • Whether Section 135(3) conclusively validates the imposition of a tax despite procedural defects under Sections 131 and 94(3)?

RULE:

  • Mandatory vs. Directory Compliance: Provisions requiring public objections for taxation (Section 131(3), first part) are mandatory as they ensure taxpayer participation, while the manner of publication (Section 94(3)) is directory, requiring substantial rather than strict compliance.
  • Conclusive Proof Doctrine: Section 135(3) establishes that a notification in the Government Gazette serves as conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the Act, provided there is at least substantial compliance with the mandatory procedural requirements.

FACTS:

  • Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. (appellant) is a public limited company operating two sugar factories in Rampur, Uttar Pradesh, with several buildings, including residential ones.
  • The Municipal Board, Rampur (respondent), sought to impose a water tax on lands and buildings under Section 128(1)(x) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916.
  • As required by Section 131(3) of the Act, the Board published its tax proposals and draft rules for public objections. However, the publication occurred in an Urdu newspaper widely circulated in Rampur, though the notice itself was in Hindi.
  • Section 94(3) of the Act mandates that tax-related publications be made in a local Hindi newspaper or, if unavailable, in a manner prescribed by the State Government. The Board did not seek State Government approval for an alternative publication mode.
  • The tax was imposed from April 1, 1957, at a rate of 10% of the annual value of lands and buildings. Subsequently, demand notices for the years 1957–58 and 1958–59 were issued to the appellant on October 7, 1958.
  • The appellant objected to the imposition, arguing:
  • Non-compliance with the mandatory publication process under Section 131(3) and Section 94(3).
  • Exemption under Section 129(a) as most of their buildings were beyond 600 feet from the nearest standpipe or water source provided by the Board.
  • Upon rejection of their objections by the Municipal Board, the appellant approached the Allahabad High Court in December 1958 by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the water tax and the procedural irregularities.
  • The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that:
  • The procedural requirements under Section 131(3) and Section 94(3) had been substantially complied with.
  • The publication in an Urdu newspaper with wide circulation, despite being technically non-compliant, fulfilled the purpose of public notification.
  • Section 135(3) of the Act validated the imposition through notification in the Government Gazette.
  • The High Court granted the appellant a certificate of appeal under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, allowing the case to be brought before the Supreme Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that Section 131(3) could be divided into two parts:
  • The first part, mandating publication of proposals and draft rules for public objections, is essential and mandatory to ensure taxpayer participation in the democratic process.
  • The second part, specifying the manner of publication under Section 94(3), is directory and allows substantial compliance.
  • The Court ruled that while the publication did not adhere strictly to Section 94(3), the notice in Hindi, published in an Urdu newspaper with wide circulation, constituted substantial compliance.
  • The Supreme Court held that Section 135(3) of the Act establishes conclusive proof of compliance with procedural requirements, provided the mandatory provisions are substantially fulfilled. In this case, the notification in the Government Gazette validated the tax.
  • Regarding the appellant’s exemption claim under Section 129(a), the Court agreed that water-tax liability requires a building to be within 600 feet of a standpipe or public water source. However, due to insufficient evidence, the Court left this issue unresolved, allowing the appellant to pursue it through appropriate legal remedies.
  • The appeal was dismissed, and the imposition of the water tax was upheld.
Categories
Ultra Vires

M/S. Pankaj Jain Agencies v. Union of India (1995 AIR 360)

M/S. PANKAJ JAIN AGENCIES V. UNION OF INDIA

M/S. Pankaj Jain Agencies v. Union of India (1995 AIR 360)

ISSUE:

  • Whether the impugned notification (No. 142/86-Cus.) was validly promulgated and enforceable, given the alleged delay in making it known to the affected parties?
  • Whether the notification violated the conditions prescribed under Section 25(3) of the Customs Act, 1962, by effectively imposing a new duty not provided for under the statutory provisions?
  • Whether the enhanced duty constituted an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution?

RULE:

  • A notification or subordinate legislation acquires enforceability upon its publication in the Official Gazette, which is deemed sufficient for making the law known within the territory it operates.
  • Taxes or duties, including customs duties, are not per se violative of Article 19(1)(g) unless they destroy the right to carry on trade or business, with excessiveness alone not constituting a violation.

FACTS:

  • M/s Pankaj Jain Agencies, the petitioner, was engaged in importing components of ball and roller bearings, specifically “cups,” which were categorized as parts of ball bearings under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
  • The petitioner acquired replenishment licenses from M/s Geo Millers & Co. Pvt. Ltd., which were subsequently transferred to M/s Ashoka Enterprises and later assigned to the petitioner. These licenses were used to import goods under concessional duty rates.
  • An agreement was entered into with M/s Business Birds, Singapore, for the supply of “cups” of Chinese origin. The goods were shipped in three consignments to Bombay Port in early 1986.
  • The first consignment of 8,600 pieces arrived on January 15, 1986, and was cleared by the customs authorities under the existing Notification No. 70/85-Cus., dated March 17, 1985, which granted reduced duty rates. The controversy for this consignment was limited to its assessable value.
  • The second and third consignments, consisting of 5,000 and 13,000 pieces, arrived on February 10, 1986. The Bills of Entry for home consumption were filed on February 19, 1986.
  • On February 13, 1986, the Central Government issued Notification No. 142/86-Cus., amending the earlier notification and substantially increasing the duty on parts and components of ball bearings.
  • The petitioner argued that the increased duty was inapplicable to the two consignments as the notification was not made known in Bombay until February 19, 1986, when the Bills of Entry were filed.
  • The petitioner further claimed that the notification exceeded the powers under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, as it effectively imposed a new duty, which was not statutorily contemplated for parts of ball bearings under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
  • Additionally, the petitioner contended that the significant increase in duty, which raised their liability from ₹1,84,341 to ₹6,42,065, was an unreasonable restriction on their fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
  • Challenging the vires and applicability of the notification, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, making the Union of India and other concerned authorities the respondents.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the impugned notification became enforceable upon its publication in the Official Gazette on February 13, 1986, as per the requirements of Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. It ruled that the notification was validly promulgated and enforceable from that date.
  • The Court ruled that physical availability or knowledge of the notification in Bombay was not a prerequisite for its enforceability. Publication in the Official Gazette was deemed sufficient to bring the notification into effect within the country.
  • The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the notification imposed a new duty, clarifying that it merely modified the scope of the exemption under an existing framework, without exceeding the statutory duty rates provided under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
  • Addressing the contention under Article 19(1)(g), the Court held that duties of customs, even if high, do not per se constitute an unreasonable restriction on the right to trade or business. Excessiveness alone does not violate constitutional rights unless it destroys the right to carry on trade, which was not demonstrated in this case.
  • The Court concluded that the petitioner failed to establish any procedural or substantive infirmities in the notification. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed, and the increased duty was upheld as valid and applicable.
Categories
Ultra Vires

Naraindas Indurkhya v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 AIR 1232)

NARAINDAS INDURKHYA V. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Naraindas Indurkhya v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 AIR 1232)

ISSUE:

  • Does the State Government possess the authority under its executive power to prescribe textbooks for use in schools prior to the enactment of specific statutory provisions?
  • Is the prescription of textbooks by the State Government and the Board consistent with the principles of non-discrimination under Article 14 and the right to carry on trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution?

RULE:

  • Executive Power of the State (Article 162): The State Government can exercise executive power in matters where it has legislative competence, even in the absence of specific statutory provisions, provided such actions do not infringe upon the rights of individuals.
  • Principle of Ultra Vires: Statutory bodies, such as the Board of Secondary Education, can only exercise powers expressly conferred upon them by their enabling statute. Powers not explicitly granted or necessarily implied are deemed ultra vires and invalid.

FACTS:

  • Naraindas Indurkhya, the petitioner, was a publisher engaged in printing, publishing, and selling textbooks for schools in Madhya Pradesh.
  • In 1959, the Madhya Pradesh Secondary Education Act established the Board of Secondary Education. The Board was empowered to prescribe courses of instruction but not textbooks explicitly.
  • Private publishers were invited to submit textbooks for evaluation, with recommendations based on an elaborate selection process involving expert reviewers.
  • The petitioner submitted textbooks for approval under the Board’s procedure. However, none of his books were selected, as they were deemed substandard in content and printing quality. The petitioner alleged arbitrary discrimination against his publications.
  • By 1971, the State Government began prescribing “nationalized” textbooks produced by the Madhya Pradesh Textbook Corporation (a government-controlled entity), reducing reliance on private publishers, including the petitioner.
  • The Madhya Pradesh Prathmik Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pustakon Sambandhi Vyavastha) Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereafter 1973 Act) was enacted, granting the State Government express authority to prescribe textbooks under Section 4(1). Section 4(2) recognized textbooks prescribed earlier as valid until revised under the Act.
  • On 28 March 1973, the Board issued a notification recommending and prescribing textbooks for the 1976 Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination. Subsequently, the State Government issued a notification on 24 May 1973, prescribing additional textbooks, claiming compliance with the mandatory consultation requirement under Section 4(1) of the 1973 Act.
  • The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, alleging violations of his rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g).

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that under Article 162 of the Constitution, the State Government had executive power to prescribe textbooks in the absence of specific statutory provisions, provided such actions did not infringe individual rights.
  • The Court ruled that textbooks prescribed by the State Government before the 1973 Act’s enactment were validly in force under Section 4(2) of the Act. The State Government’s actions in prescribing textbooks through executive power did not infringe the petitioner’s rights, as no publisher has a guaranteed right to have their books prescribed.
  • The Court further held that the Board lacked statutory authority to prescribe textbooks on languages or make their use obligatory for schools. This power was not conferred explicitly or impliedly by the 1959 Act or the 1965 regulations. Such actions were ultra vires and without binding effect.
  • The Court clarified the distinction between recommending and prescribing textbooks. Recommended textbooks carry persuasive value but no binding obligation, while prescribed textbooks must be followed by schools.
  • The Court held that the State Government’s 24 May 1973 notification prescribing textbooks was invalid as there was no prior consultation with the Board as required by Section 4(1). Consultation with the Chairman alone did not satisfy the statutory requirement of consulting the entire Board.
  • The Supreme Court ruled that Section 4 of the 1973 Act was not unconstitutional. The discretionary power conferred on the State Government to prescribe textbooks was guided by the objective of ensuring the availability of high-quality resources for education and did not amount to arbitrary or unguided discretion.
  • The Court concluded that the petitioner’s claims under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) were unfounded. The policy of prescribing nationalized textbooks was not discriminatory, nor did it amount to a denial of equal opportunity for publishers.
Categories
Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Administrative Discretion

Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India (1976 AIR 789)

ISSUE:

Whether an "economic emergency" can be equated with a "public emergency" to justify the invocation of statutory powers under Section 5(1) of the Indian Telegraphs Act, 1885?

Whether administrative action taken without adhering to statutory procedural safeguards, such as independent satisfaction of conditions and prior notice, is valid under law?

RULE:

The term "public emergency" requires an actual and proximate connection to public safety, sovereignty, state security, or public order, and cannot be expanded to include general economic concerns.

When a statute prescribes a specific procedure for exercising discretionary or drastic powers, adherence to those procedural requirements is mandatory, and non-compliance renders the action invalid and arbitrary.

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