Whether the imposition of punitive taxes on agricultural land without corresponding benefits violates Article 14 (equality before law) of the Indian Constitution?
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution guarantees equality before the law, however, the government can classify citizens for taxation purposes, but the classification must be reasonable and based on intelligible differences.
Whether the Orissa State Estates Abolition Act, 1952 is a piece of colourable legislation?
Whether the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1952, is Constitutionally Valid?
The doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of the competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular law. If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives that impelled it to act are really irrelevant.
Whether the word “industry,” as used in Section 2(g) of the Trade Unions Act, carries the same meaning as the word “industry” as defined in Section 2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act?
Whether employees of a research and development organization are entitled to form a trade union under the Trade Unions Act, even if the organization claims to have no profit motive.
Whether the definition of the word “Industry” contained in the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, which is a later enactment, can be read into the provisions of the Trade Unions Act?
Whether the absence of a profit motive affects the classification of an establishment as an “industry” under labor laws.
When two statutes are in pari materia (covering the same subject matter), the definition of an ambiguous term in one statute can be interpreted using the definition from the other statute.
The profit motive is not necessary for an organization to be classified as an “industry” if it involves organized activity providing material services, regardless of its commercial intent.
Whether the Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Committee (APMC) created under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, qualifies as an “industry” as defined by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA).
Whether the Karnataka Act, having acquired the President's assent, supersedes the IDA relevant to the employees controlled by the State Act.
A statutory body like the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) can be classified as an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 if its functions are not sovereign in nature.
Regulatory functions that serve the public interest and involve systematic, organized activities (such as market regulation), even if non-profit, do not qualify as sovereign functions and thus fall within the scope of the IDA.
Whether the Appellants are “industries” as defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947(“the Act”)?
Whether the Appellants discharge sovereign functions?
All activities of an employer, except those strictly related to sovereign functions, are considered to fall within the definition of "industry" under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
If an organization, even if run by the government, engages in commercial activities or generates revenue through services like advertisements, it is classified as an industry under the Act.
Whether a statutory body engaged in activities essential for the provision of basic amenities to citizens can be classified as an “industry” under the definition in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947?
Dominant nature test, which applies when an entity performs both industrial and non-industrial functions. The dominant or predominant nature of the entity's activities determines whether the organization qualifies as an industry. Only strictly sovereign functions, such as defense and law enforcement, are excluded from the definition of "industry."
Triple test to determine whether an entity qualifies as an industry:
Systematic Activity: The entity must engage in an organized and systematic activity.
Employer-Employee Cooperation: The activity should involve the cooperation of employers and employees.
Production of Goods or Services for Human Needs: The activity must produce goods or services intended for human consumption or use, whether or not for profit.
Whether the termination of the driver’s services amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
Whether the termination was in compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act?
Even if an illness does not affect general health or capacity but hampers the efficient working of the assigned duties, it falls under the purview of “ill health.”
Whether a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award can give notice to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
A notice to terminate an award can be issued by a group of workmen acting collectively, even if that group represents a minority of the workmen bound by the award.
Whether the erstwhile workmen were entitled to claim compensation under clause (b) of Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947?
Whether the workmen had been retrenched within the meaning of the expression 'retrenchment' in the Industrial Dispute Act of 1947?
Retrenchment refers to the discharge of surplus labor in a continuing business and does not include termination due to a bona fide closure or transfer of ownership.
Whether the Appellant can be classified as an industry under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947?
An 'industry' under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 refers to any systematic activity involving cooperation between employers and employees for the production of goods or services, regardless of whether the activity is profit-oriented.
The presence of an employer-employee relationship and organized functioning are the key determinants of an 'industry' under the Act.