Trace Your Case

Author: TYC

Categories
Excessive Legislation

D.N. Ghosh and Others v. Additional Sessions Judge and Others AIR 1959 Cal 208

D.N GHOSH AND OTHERS V. ADDITIONAL SESSION JUDGE AND OTHERS

D.N. Ghosh and Others v. Additional Sessions Judge and Others AIR 1959 Cal 208

ISSUE:

  • Whether the delegation of power by the Legislature to a non-legislative body to make rules and regulations is an unconstitutional exercise of delegated power?

RULE:

  • Exclusion of evidence crucial to a defendant’s case can be challenged if its exclusion lacks a valid legal basis, as this undermines the right to a fair trial.

FACTS:

  • Petitioners are owners of coal fields (“Diguli Colliery”) Burdwan. Due to non-profitability, the petitioners entered into an agreement with Sri A.K. Goswami.
  • The agreement was aimed at more efficient operation of the property. Goswami was responsible for the operations of the colliery.
  • Clause 7 of the Agreement laid down that Goswami was to pay 66-2/3% of the net profits every six months to the petitioners.
  • Additionally, if profits exceeded Rs. 1000 per month, Goswami would be entitled to a further 10% of the profits.
  • Thereafter, the Coal Mines Provident Fund & Bonus Schemes Act 1948 (“Act”) came into operation.
  • Section 3 of the Act empowers the Central Government to create a Coal Mines Provident Fund Scheme for employees.
  • Pursuant this, the Indian Government framed the Scheme which specified employer contributions, the rate and manner of contributions and how they could be recovered. Clause 70 prescribes the circumstances under which a person may be punishable.
  • A complaint was lodged against the petitioners for violation of the provisions of the Act and the Scheme.
  • The Magistrate convicted the petitioners under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the petition was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge.
  • The petitioners contend that the power to impose penalty for violation of the provisions constitutes improper delegation and is therefore void.

HELD:

  • The Calcutta High Court held that Section 9 is not ultra vires and Section 70 of the Scheme does not constitute an unconstitutional exercise of a delegated power.
  • The Court noted that while the power to prescribe penalties and enforce them was delegated to the Government, the Legislature had fixed the limits for the penalties and laid down the standards to be followed.
  • The Court emphasized that the Legislature maintained sufficient control over the delegation, ensuring it did not exceed the permissible limits of delegation.
  • Consequently, the appeal failed and was dismissed.
Categories
Excessive Legislation

Devi Das Gopal Krishnan and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1895

DEVI DAS GOPAL KRISHNAN AND ORS V. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

Devi Das Gopal Krishnan and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1895

ISSUE:

  • Whether Section 5 of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, as originally enacted, was void?
  • Whether the imposition of purchase tax under the amended Act violates Article 14 of the Indian Constitution?
  • Whether Section 5 of the Act is void for conferring legislative power on the provincial Government, thereby constituting excessive delegation?

RULE:

  • A delegated legislation must provide clear legislative guidance and cannot confer unfettered discretion on the executive to levy taxes.
  • Taxes imposed on goods must not amount to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g).

FACTS:

  • The Supreme Court’s decision addressed multiple civil appeals arising under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (“Act”), relating to oil seeds, iron and cotton.
  • The amendment to the Act imposed a purchase tax of 2% for the use in the manufacture of goods for sale.
  • Assessees in Civil Appeals Nos. 526, 527 and 529 of 1964 owned oil mills in Punjab. They purchased oil seeds, crushed them in their oil mills, and sold the oil and the residual oil-cake. The assessees were served notice for the failure to pay purchase tax for the purchase of oil seeds.
  • Assessees in Civil Appeals Nos. 39 to 43 of 1965 were rolling steel manufacturers who purchased steel scrap and ingots to produce rolled steel sections for sale. The assessing officer imposed a 2% purchase tax on their purchases.
  • Assessees in Civil Appeals Nos. 81 and 540 of 1965 were engaged in cotton-based manufacturing operations including yarn and textile production. They were assessed for purchase tax on cotton.
  • All the appellants filed petitions before the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. The High Court heard and dismissed the petitions. As a result, the assessees appealed to the Supreme Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Act, prior to its amendment, was void because it conferred uncontrolled power on the provincial Government to levy tax without providing any legislative guidance.
  • The Court rejected the contention of excessive delegation stating that the conferment of reasonable discretion for fixing tax rates in fiscal statutes is permissible.
  • Section 5 of the Act specified a maximum rate of 2 pieces in a rupee. The discretion to fix the rate between 1 piece and 2 pieces in a rupee is so minimal and insignificant that it does not exceed the permissible limits. Therefore, the amendment to Section 5 was deemed valid.
  • The Court further held that Article 14 of the Constitution was not violated as the Legislature imposes purchase tax on goods before they lose their identity and are transformed into a different product. Where no manufacturing process occurs, and the goods retain their original form, the taxable event is the sale, not the purchase.
  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the validity of the purchase tax provisions, affirming the judgments of the High Court.
Categories
Excessive Legislation

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute [1980] 448 U.S. 607

INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute [1980] 448 U.S. 607

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) exceeded its authority by implementing a benzene exposure standard without adequate proof of a significant risk to workers?

RULE:

  • Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, OSHA can only impose workplace safety standards if it identifies a “significant risk” of material health impairment and supports the standard with substantial evidence.

FACTS:

  • The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) implemented a new benzene exposure limit for workers, setting a significantly lower threshold from 10 per million parts of air (ppm) to 1 ppm.
  • However, OSHA did not present clear data proving that exposure at the prior threshold posed a substantial health risk.
  • The defendant American Petroleum Institute (“API”) challenged OSHA’s new standard, arguing that it was too stringent and lacked scientific backing.
  • API further contended that OSHA’s action exceeded its regulatory powers by failing to prove the existence of a significant risk requiring such a reduction.
  • The Court of Appeals held the standard invalid as it was based on findings that were unsupported by the administration.

HELD:

  • The U.S. Supreme Court held that OSHA had overstepped its authority by setting a standard without adequately demonstrating a significant risk, ruling that regulatory actions should be based on substantiated evidence of necessity.
  • The Court further noted that OSHA had not shown the 1 ppm exposure limit was “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe and healthful employment” as required by Section 3(8) of the Act. The Court emphasized that Congress had not delegated unbridled discretion to OSHA to regulate without demonstrating a direct link between exposure levels and significant risk.
  • The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Categories
Excessive Legislation

Khemka and Company (Agencies) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors, AIR 1975 SSC 1549

KHEMKA & CO. (AGENCIES) PVT. LTD. AND ORS V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

Khemka and Company (Agencies) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors, AIR 1975 SSC 1549

ISSUE:

  • Whether assessees under the Central Sales Tax Act 1956 (“Central Act”) could be made liable for penalty under the provisions of the State Sales Tax Act (“State Act”)?

RULE:

  • The doctrine of ejusdem generis states that where general words follow specific words, the general words are to be construed as limited and apply only to the same kind/class as mentioned. Courts have to find genus – the common strand of characteristics.

FACTS:

  • Two civil appeals arising from the imposition of penalties under the State Sales Tax Act were brought before the Supreme Court.
  • The assessees were governed by the provisions of the Central Act. However, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax levied penalties under the State Sales Tax Act due to default in payment of taxes within the prescribed time.
  • The petitioners argued that the Central Act did not contain any provisions for the imposition of penalty for delay or default in tax payment rendering the imposition of penalty under the State Act illegal.
  • The Department of Revenue countered that Section 9(2) of the Central Act encompassed penalties imposed under both the Central and State Acts.
  • The Bombay Sales Tax Tribunal and the Bombay High Court ruled in favour of the Department of Revenue, while the Mysore High Court decided the case in favour of the petitioners.
  • Both the appeals from Bombay and Mysore were consolidated and brought before the Supreme Court via special leave.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the penalty provision in the State Act cannot be applied to impose a penalty for tax payable under the Central Act.
  • The Court applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis to decipher that liability for tax and penalty under the State Act cannot be extended to the provisions of the Central Act.
  • Only the penalty provisions contained in the Central Act are applicable to transactions governed by the Central Act. The mere existence of similar provisions in the State Act does not permit the application of such provisions to dealers under the Central Act.
  • The Court accepted the Appellant’s appeal and held that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the penalty could be levied under the State Act.
Categories
Judicial Control of Subordinate Legislation

Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 911

KHODAY DISTELLERIES LTD V. STATE KARNATKA

Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 911

ISSUE:

  • Whether the amendments to the Karnataka Excise Rules mandating that licensees engaged in the manufacture or sale of liquor can sell only to a distributor license holder owned or controlled by the State Government, violate the appellant’s fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution?
  • Whether the amendment to the Karnataka Excise Rules is beyond the scope of the delegated authority given to the State?

RULE:

  • The state has the authority to impose reasonable restrictions on trade, business, and commerce under Article 19(1)(g), as long as such restrictions serve a public purpose and are not arbitrary or discriminatory.

FACTS:

  • Rule 3(11) of the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968, provides that a distributor license shall be granted by the Excise Commissioner for the purpose of distribution or sale of liquor within the State.
  • The Rule further specifies that such a distributor license shall only be issued to such a company that is owned or controlled by the State Government.
  • The State Government specified Mysore Sales International Ltd. (“MSIL”) to be such a company and granted MSIL the distributor license.
  • Amendments to other Rules under the Karnataka Excise Act 1965 (“Act”) mandated that the licensees under those Rules could sell liquor only to a holder of a distributor license.
  • As a result of the amendments, licensees engaged in the manufacture or sale of liquor were restricted to selling their liquor solely to a distributor license holder, which could only be a State Government owned or controlled company.
  • The appellants challenged the validity of these amendments claiming a violation of the fundamental right to carry on trade or business under Article 19(1)(g).
  • The appellants further argue that there is no legislative policy prescribed for a distributor license hence the amendments to the Rules are beyond the scope of the Act and the delegated authority.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the Act and the Rules are within the legislative competence of the State Legislature and that the Rules have been framed under a validly delegated authority and are within the scope of that authority.
  • The Court examined the scheme of the Act, referencing the Preamble and Sections 13, 15, 17, and 71, and determined that these provisions clearly contemplate the creation of licenses to regulate the manufacture and sale of liquor.
  • The Court noted that a distributor license that deals with the sale and purchase of liquor is explicitly contemplated under the Act. The creation of a monopoly for distributor licenses does not take the license outside the ambit of the Act.
  • The Court reiterated that the right to carry on any occupation, trade or business does not extend to such activities that are inherently pernicious or injurious to the health, safety and welfare.
  • The Court concluded that no citizen has a fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicating liquor. Therefore, trade and business in liquor can be completely prohibited.
  • The Court upheld the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s decision and dismissed the special leave petitions.
Categories
Excessive Legislation

Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India AIR 2022 SC 2713

MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT ADVOCATES BAR ASSOCIATION V. UNION OF INDIA

Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India AIR 2022 SC 2713

ISSUE:

  • Whether the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (“Act”) infringes upon the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India?
  • Whether the provision of a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the National Green Tribunal (NGT) is constitutionally valid?
  • Whether Section 3 of the Act is ultra vires to the Constitution due to excessive delegation of legislative power?

RULE:

  • The delegation of legislative power is permissible if it is necessary to fulfil the objectives of a statute, but the delegation must not result in excessive delegation or a transfer of core legislative functions to the executive.
  • The jurisdiction of High Courts can be restricted in matters where specialized tribunals have been created for adjudication of complex subject matters. However, the jurisdiction of High Courts cannot be completely ousted by the creation of such tribunals.

FACTS:

  • The Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association filed a petition challenging the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (“Act”), arguing that Sections 14 and 22 of the Act undermine the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227.
  • The petitioners contend that by excluding the jurisdiction of the High Courts in environmental matters, the Act limits access to justice and violates constitutional principles.
  • The petitioners also contested the provision under Section 22 of the NGT Act as it bypasses the High Courts, and in the absence of an appeal mechanism, there is a limitation of the judicial review process.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that Sections 14 and 22 of the NGT Act did not oust the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 as they have the power to issue writs.
  • The Court upheld the provision for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 22 of the Act. It clarified that although the statute provides for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the remedies under Articles 226 and 227 before the High Court remain intact and are not extinguished. In light of such choices being available to a litigant, there is no rational justification to strike down the Section. The Court ruled that Section 3 of the NGT Act did not amount to excessive delegation.
  • It found that the delegation of power to the Union Government for the establishment of NGT benches was within permissible limits. The delegation was guided by the framework set by the Parliament, objectives of the Act and the Supreme Court’s directions.
  • The petition was dismissed and the Act was upheld.
Categories
Judicial Control of Subordinate Legislation

State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone AIR 1981 SC 711

STATE OF TAMIL NADU V. HIND STONE AND ORS.

State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone AIR 1981 SC 711

ISSUE:

  • Whether Rule 8-C, which reserves the exploitation of black granite for the State or State-owned corporations, is valid under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, and whether it improperly limits competition in violation of constitutional principles?
  • Whether the imposition of a royalty on granite stone extracted from quarries in Tamil Nadu by the State violates the constitutional provisions regarding freedom of trade and commerce under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution?

RULE:

  • The State government has the power to make rules and regulations under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, and such power includes the authority to regulate mining activities, even to the extent of creating monopolies for government-run corporations when done in the public interest.
  • The delegated power must be exercised in alignment with the public interest and within the framework established by the primary legislation.
  • Rule 8-C of the Tamil Nadu government regulations allows the State to exclusively control the mining of black granite, asserting that public interest justifies such an arrangement.

FACTS:

  • The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 grants the government authority to regulate the prospecting and mining of minerals, including the ability to reserve certain minerals for exploitation by government-owned entities.
  • The State of Tamil Nadu introduced Rule 8-C which prohibited private individuals from applying for quarrying rights for black granite, effectively reserving such rights for government-controlled corporations.
  • The respondents, Hind Stone along with other private parties, who held mining leases for quarrying black granite, challenged the validity of Rule 8-C, arguing that it created an unconstitutional monopoly and was contrary to the Mines and Minerals Act.
  • The petitioners contended that the State’s actions were in line with the regulatory framework under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, which allows the reservation of resources for government exploitation if deemed in the public interest.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the State, under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, could reserve the mining of black granite for itself or its corporations.
  • The Court upheld the validity of Rule 8-C, finding it was made in bona fide exercise of the State’s regulatory powers and was not unconstitutional.
  • It reasoned that, as per the statutory framework, the creation of a monopoly for public purposes, such as regulating a natural resource, was permissible within the powers vested in the State.
  • The Court clarified that while creating monopolies was typically a legislative function, the legislature had delegated this power to the State through the Mines and Minerals Act, thus the creation of a monopoly in this case was within the permissible limits of legislative delegation.
  • The Court upheld the delegation of legislative power to the State Government as there was clear guidance to the subordinate authority to make rules.
Categories
Works Committee

North Brook Jute Co. Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1960 SC 879

NORTH BROOK JUTE CO. LTD. V. WORKMEN AIR 1960 SC 879

North Brook Jute Co. Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1960 SC 879

ISSUE:

  • Whether the workmen were entitled to the payment of wages for the period during which the mills were closed?
  • Whether the functions of the Works Committee under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, envisage collective bargaining?

RULE:

  • The Works Committee’s role is limited to promoting good relations between the employer and the workmen and resolving minor disputes, not deciding significant changes in employment conditions.
  • The Works Committee cannot supersede the Unions for the purpose of collective bargaining.

FACTS:

  • A rationalisation scheme in the mills of the Appellant companies was agreed to by the Works Committee and a notice under Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was given to the Unions of their workmen.
  • The workmen objected to the introduction of the scheme and the dispute was referred to the Tribunal by the government.
  • During the pendency of the dispute, the management of the mills put the rationalisation scheme into operation.
  • When the workmen refused to do the additional work placed upon them under the scheme, the mills declared a lockout.
  • After a few days, work was resumed due to settlement between the Unions and the management.
  • Thereby, another dispute arose with respect to the payment of wages for the period of lockout, which the workmen contended was an illegal one, which was referred to the Tribunal.
  • The Tribunal held that the workmen were entitled to wages for the period of lockout.
  • The Tribunal held that the management’s decision to implement the rationalisation scheme was in violation of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and hence the subsequent closure of mills amounted to illegal lockout.
  • The management appealed against the award of the Tribunal before the Supreme Court by Special Leave Petition.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the Tribunal that Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, had been contravened by the Appellants.
  • The Supreme Court affirmed that the closure of mills amounted to illegal lockout, and that the workmen were entitled to pay for the period of lockout.
  • The apex Court held that the Works Committee’s agreement to the rationalization scheme was not binding on the workmen or their union.
  • The Supreme Court observed that collective bargaining was outside the functions of the Works Committee under Section 3(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  • The Supreme Court found that the rationalisation scheme altered the workmen’s conditions of service to their prejudice by increasing the workload and reducing the number of workers.
  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the award of the Tribunal.
Categories
Code on Wages

Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore (1969) 3 SCC 84

CHANDRA BHAVAN BOARDING AND LODGING V. STATE OF MYSORE

Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore (1969) 3 SCC 84

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (“the Act”), which allows the government to fix minimum wages, violates the fundamental rights of employers under Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business) and Article 14 (right to equality) of the Indian Constitution?
  • Whether the Act constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade and business?
  • Whether the principle of natural justice is applicable in this case?

RULE:

  • The right to carry on business is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of social justice and the welfare of workers, and the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, is a legitimate exercise of this principle.
  • The question of whether a particular principle of natural justice applies in a case depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

FACTS:

  • The case revolves around the validity of a notification issued by the State government of Mysore under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
  • The notification aimed to fix the minimum wages for different classes of employees in residential hotels and eating houses within the state.
  • The State government has the authority to determine minimum wages after collecting relevant data and consulting with advisory committees.
  • The Appellants challenged the notification on grounds of alleged violation of Articles 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution before the High Court of Mysore, which rejected the petition.
  • The Appellant preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court of Mysore, giving rise to the instant case.
  • The Appellants argued that the government’s failure to appoint a committee under Section 5(1)(a) of the Act for advice rendered the fixation of minimum wages arbitrary, violating the principles of natural justice.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, does not violate the fundamental rights of employers under Article 19(1)(g). The Act was deemed to be a reasonable restriction in the interest of the public.
  • The Supreme Court held that the government’s discretion to choose procedure under the Act is not arbitrary or violative of Article 14.
  • Further, the Supreme Court upheld the government’s power to fix minimum wages as it aims to ensure that workers receive fair wages and are not exploited by employers.
  • The constitutional validity of the notification fixing minimum wages for employees in residential hotels and eating houses was upheld by the Supreme Court.
  • The Supreme Court held that the notification is not rendered invalid by reason of non-constitution of committee under Section 5 of the Act.
  • In the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court found that the procedure adopted by the government in issuing the notification was adequate and effective. As such, there is no violation of the principles of natural justice.
  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, while granting a six-month extension to the owners of residential hotels and eating houses for payment of arrears of minimum wages accrued with 6% interest per annum.
Categories
Code on Wages

People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235

PEOPLE’S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS V. UNION OF INDIA

People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235

ISSUE:

  • Whether this petition is maintainable against Union of India, Delhi Administration and Delhi Development Authority when in actual the offending parties are private contractors?
  • Whether this petition is maintainable as there is no breach of fundamental rights of labourers but of ordinary rights under labour laws?

RULE:

  • A principal employer’s duty to uphold labour laws is non-transferable, making them accountable for any contractor violations.
  • Under Articles 14, 21, 23, and 24 of the Constitution, all workers have the right to dignity, fair wages, and humane working conditions.
  • Violations of these protections breach workers’ fundamental rights, placing sole responsibility on the principal employer to ensure compliance and safeguard worker welfare.

FACTS:

  • People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) filed a public interest litigation before the Supreme Court based on the findings of a fact-finding team that investigated the working conditions of labourers engaged in construction projects for the 1982 Asian Games in Delhi.
  • The construction was overseen by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC), and Delhi Administration, which hired contractors to employ labourers.
  • These contractors, in turn, engaged intermediaries, known as Jamadars, to hire workers from different regions of India.
  • The workers, including children under 14, were paid below the minimum wage, worked under hazardous conditions, and lacked adequate amenities.
  • PUDR argued that these practices violated multiple labour laws and fundamental rights, including Articles 14, 21, 23, and 24 of the Indian Constitution.
  • The findings were presented to Justice Bhagwati in a letter, which he treated as a writ petition, prompting the Supreme Court to issue notices to the Union of India, the DDA, and Delhi Administration.
  • On November 16, 1981, the Supreme Court formally took up the case, recognizing the urgency of addressing the labourer’s woes considering that the Asian Games were nigh around the corner.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the Respondent authorities, namely the DDA, NDMC, and the Delhi Administration, bear the ultimate responsibility for ensuring compliance with labour laws governing the construction projects for the 1982 Asian Games.
  • The Supreme Court held that despite delegating the hiring and management of labourers to contractors, the Respondent authorities remain “principal employers” and are thus accountable for any statutory violations affecting workers’ rights.
  • Under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, specifically Section 20, and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act, 1979, particularly Sections 17 and 18, the Supreme Court held that the Respondent authorities must ensure adequate amenities, safety, and compliance with legal standards for labourers hired for these projects.
  • The Supreme Court further determined that the actions and omissions of the Respondent authorities violated the workers’ fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
  • The fundamental rights infringed by the Respondent authorities included Article 24, which prohibits child labour in hazardous employment, Article 23, which prohibited forced labour without adequate remuneration, and Article 14, which necessitated equal pay for equal work.
  • On the basis of these findings, the apex Court directed the Respondent authorities to ensure immediate compliance with the labour laws as a matter of fundamental rights.
  • The Supreme Court mandated that the Respondent authorities take necessary measures to uphold the rights of workers to fair wages, equal pay, and safe working conditions, emphasizing the constitutional protections afforded to labourers.
  • The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition.