Category: State Prescriptions and Standards

Anand Bihari and others v. RSRTC and another 1991 Lab IC 494

Anand Bihari and others v. RSRTC and another 1991 Lab IC 494

Whether the termination of the driver’s services amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
Whether the termination was in compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act?

Even if an illness does not affect general health or capacity but hampers the efficient working of the assigned duties, it falls under the purview of “ill health.”

Drivers of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation developed sub-normal or defective eyesight due to prolonged exposure to harsh driving conditions, including bright sunlight and blinding vehicle lights.
Upon being found medically unfit to drive, their services were terminated.
The drivers challenged this termination, arguing that it amounted to retrenchment without compliance with Section 25-F and that they should have been provided alternative employment.

The court held that the termination of services due to defective eyesight falls under “ill-health” and, therefore, does not amount to retrenchment. Hence, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 do not apply.
The court found the termination unjustified due to the occupational hazards involved. It directed the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation to offer alternative jobs to the affected drivers where possible or provide them with compensation proportional to their length of service if no alternative jobs were available.
The court also ruled that the termination of a driver who had been reassigned as a helper was unjustified and illegal, entitling him to reinstatement and back wages.

Associated Cement Companies v. Their Workmen AIR 1960 SC 777

Whether a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award can give notice to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

A notice to terminate an award can be issued by a group of workmen acting collectively, even if that group represents a minority of the workmen bound by the award.

The appellant’s workmen were initially represented by the Kamdar Mandal Cement Works union, which was later deregistered.
Following the cancellation of this union’s registration, two new unions emerged: the Cement Kamdar Mandal and the Cement Employees Union.
The Cement Kamdar Mandal issued two notices to the appellant, intending to terminate two awards previously established under the defunct union.
Subsequently, the Cement Kamdar Mandal presented fresh demands, leading to the dispute being referred to the Tribunal.
The Cement Employees Union, representing the majority of workmen at Porbandar, was included in the proceedings.
The Tribunal issued an interlocutory judgment against the appellant, prompting a legal examination of who is authorized to issue a notice terminating an award on behalf of workmen bound by it under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Supreme Court held that it is open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate the award.
The court observed that on a fair and reasonable reading of s. 19(6) of Industrial Disputes Act, the true position is that, though the expression “any party bound by the award” refers to all workmen bound by the award and the notice to terminate the said award can be given not by an individual workman but by a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise.
The court also observed that it is not necessary that such a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise, should represent the majority of workmen bound by the award.

Hariprasad Shiv Shankar Shukla v. A.D. Divelkar AIR 1957 SC 121

Whether the erstwhile workmen were entitled to claim compensation under clause (b) of Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947?
Whether the workmen had been retrenched within the meaning of the expression ‘retrenchment’ in the Industrial Dispute Act of 1947?

Retrenchment refers to the discharge of surplus labor in a continuing business and does not include termination due to a bona fide closure or transfer of ownership.

Two appeals were filed regarding retrenchment compensation.
Barsi Light Railway Company built and operated a railway under an agreement allowing the government to take over after twelve months’ notice.
In 1952, the government gave notice and took over in 1953, leading to the termination of all workmen. Some were re-employed, while others sought retrenchment compensation. Initially dismissed, the High Court later ruled in favor of the workers.
Dinesh Mills Ltd., facing financial losses, closed its woollen mill in 1953, terminating 450 workmen and 20 clerks. The workers sought retrenchment compensation.
Initially dismissed, the High Court ruled that the authority had jurisdiction to hear the claim. Both employers appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the Bombay High Court and held that the appellants were not liable to pay any compensation under section 25F.
The court considered whether termination of service due to the closure of a business constitutes retrenchment under the Act and noted that while certain sections of the Act apply to a running or continuing business, they do not definitively determine what is included in the definition of retrenchment.
The court highlighted that the Act primarily focuses on existing or continuing industries, not on closed or dead industries.
The court clarified that retrenchment refers to the discharge of surplus workers in an existing or continuing business, and does not include discharge due to bona fide closure of business.
The court found that its construction of the definition clause and section 25F, which excludes closure of a business from the scope of retrenchment, negates the need to rule on the constitutional question.
The court held that since section 25F does not apply to closed or dead industries, and the cases in question involved genuine closures, the court held that no compensation was payable to the former employees.