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Category: Industrial Disputes

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Industrial Disputes

Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Ashok Harikuni (2000) 8 SCC 61

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE V. ASHOK HARIKUNI

Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Ashok Harikuni (2000) 8 SCC 61

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Committee (APMC) created under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, qualifies as an “industry” as defined by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA)?
  • Whether the Karnataka Act, having acquired the President’s assent, supersedes the IDA relevant to the employees controlled by the State Act?

RULE:

  • A statutory body like the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) can be classified as an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 if its functions are not sovereign in nature.
  • Regulatory functions that serve the public interest and involve systematic, organized activities (such as market regulation), even if non-profit, do not qualify as sovereign functions and thus fall within the scope of the IDA.

FACTS:

  • Seven employees of APMC were terminated.
  • The employees challenged their terminations in the Labour Court.
  • The Labour Court ruled in their favor, overturning their dismissals and ordering reinstatement.
  • The APMC filed a writ petition challenging the Labour Court’s ruling, claiming that because the APMC is not an “industry,” the Labour Court lacked authority to consider the cases.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that APMC’s functions, though for public benefit, do not qualify as sovereign functions.
  • The APMC regulates the marketing of agricultural produce and is engaged in organized, systematic activity with a predominant focus on providing services to the community. These are not inherently sovereign functions.
  • The Court ruled that the APMC qualifies as an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, the employees fall under the definition of “workmen” as per the Central Act, and the Labour Court has jurisdiction. The Karnataka Act does not exclude APMC employees from the IDA’s application, and the dismissal of the employees was rightly set aside.
  • The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s judgment that APMC is an industry, and confirmed the employees’ reinstatement.
Categories
Industrial Disputes

All India Radio v. Santosh Kumar, (1998) 3 SCC 237

ALL INDIA RADIO V. SANTOSH KUMAR

All India Radio v. Santosh Kumar, (1998) 3 SCC 237

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Appellants are “industries” as defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947(“the Act”)?
  • Whether the Appellants discharge sovereign functions?

RULE:

  • All activities of an employer, except those strictly related to sovereign functions, are considered to fall within the definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  • If an organization, even if run by the government, engages in commercial activities or generates revenue through services like advertisements, it is classified as an industry under the Act.

FACTS:

  • The Respondents (clerks/watchmen) employed at the Appellant (All India Radio) office, set forth and challenged orders of termination and non-regularization before the authorities constituted under the Act.
  • The Respondent’s terminations were set aside, and they were granted regularization, and the Appellants filed writ petitions against the same in the High Court, which were duly dismissed, and the Appellants then set forth the appeals before the Supreme Court.

HELD:

  • The Appellants would come under Section 2(j) and be considered “industries,” and held that the functions discharged by the Appellants could not be considered sovereign state functions since they were carrying out commercial activities and gaining profit through their business.
  • The Supreme Court held that the termination orders were violative of Section 25-F of the Act.
  • The reinstatement will be on the same post in which the respondents were working prior to the impugned termination orders.
Categories
Industrial Disputes

Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213

BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND SEWAGE BOARD V. RAJAPPA

Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213

ISSUE:

  • Whether a statutory body engaged in activities essential for the provision of basic amenities to citizens can be classified as an “industry” under the definition in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947?

RULE:

  • Dominant nature test, which applies when an entity performs both industrial and non-industrial functions. The dominant or predominant nature of the entity’s activities determines whether the organization qualifies as an industry. Only strictly sovereign functions, such as defense and law enforcement, are excluded from the definition of “industry.”

Triple test to determine whether an entity qualifies as an industry:

a) Systematic Activity: The entity must engage in an organized and systematic activity.

b) Employer-Employee Cooperation: The activity should involve the cooperation of employers and employees.

c) Production of Goods or Services for Human Needs: The activity must produce goods or services intended for human consumption or use, whether or not for profit.

FACTS:

  • The employees of the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board challenged penalties imposed on them by the Board, leading to a claim under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • The Board argued it was not an industry under Section 2(j), as it was a statutory body performing “regal” functions (sovereign in nature).
  • Both the Karnataka High Court and Supreme Court rejected this argument, ruling that the Board was an industry under the Act.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court held that the Bangalore water supply and sewage board would fall under the ambit of the definition of section 2(j) under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and that the organization, whether it was profit-oriented or not, was to be considered an industry.
  • The Court also held that the word “industry” is required to be given a broad and clear interpretation under section 2(j), and every factor, especially the Triple Test, must be applied in order to do the same. The Court held that even though the term must be interpreted broadly, it must not overstep the bounds.
Categories
Industrial Disputes

Coir Board, Ernakulam v. Indira Devi P.S., (1998) 3 SCC 259

COIR BOARD, ERNAKULAM V. INDIRA DEVI

Coir Board, Ernakulam v. Indira Devi P.S., (1998) 3 SCC 259

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Appellant can be classified as an industry under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947?

RULE:

  • An ‘industry’ under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 refers to any systematic activity involving cooperation between employers and employees for the production of goods or services, regardless of whether the activity is profit-oriented.
  • The presence of an employer-employee relationship and organized functioning are the key determinants of an ‘industry’ under the Act.

FACTS:

  • The Appellants (Coir Board) had been set up in 1953 under the Choir Industry Act, and employed clerks as well as typists, who were suddenly discharged. The employees stated that their termination would only be valid if done so under provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947.
  • The Kerala High Court considered the question and ruled that the Appellants were an industry as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, and thus the termination was applicable. The matter was then appealed before the Supreme Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court upheld the Kerala High Court’s decision, concluding that the Coir Board does qualify as an ‘industry’ under the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • The court reasoned that under the expansive interpretation of the term ‘industry’ as established in the Bangalore Water Supply case, the Coir Board, despite being a statutory body for promoting the coir industry, employs workers and performs organized activities akin to an industry.
  • The court suggested that the broad interpretation of ‘industry’ should be reconsidered by a larger bench in the future but applied the existing law to hold that the Coir Board is subject to the Industrial Disputes Act.