Category: Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant can seek a transfer of the case to a competent Magistrate under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code?

Whether the High Court have the power to transfer or recall a case from the Additional Sessions Judge based on a potential jurisdictional error in the initial order?

RULE:

The penal Statutes must be construed in such a manner as to carefully guard the rights of the accused and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the Legislature, but whenever there exists an ambiguity, it must be resolved in favor of protection of rights and safeguards rather than their destruction.

The High Court has the authority to transfer case across the subordinate criminal courts for just and efficient adjudication, despite procedural nuances in commitment and cognizance requirements U/S 193 and 526 of CrPC.

ISSUE:

Whether the Ashok Vihar house qualifies to be a “shared household” under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,2005?

Whether the Ashok Vihar house can be considered the matrimonial house of Smt. Taruna Batra after her husband’s relocation to Ghaziabad?

Whether the respondent have the right to reside in the Ashok Vihar property, owned solely by her mother-in-law?

Whether respondent is entitled to alternate accommodation under Section 19(1)(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and if so, whether this obligation is limited to her husband alone?

RULE:

It is only the legislature which can create a law and not the Court. The courts do not legislate, and whatever may be the personal view of a Judge, he cannot create or amend the law and must maintain judicial restraint.

Interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted.

The wife’s right to reside in a “shared household” is limited to her husband’s property or joint family property in which the husband has a stake, excluding in-law’s properties.

ISSUE:

Whether the contract of the petitioner with the Government stands rescinded from the date of notification issued to enforce the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981?

RULE:

General words and phrases, however wide and comprehensive they may be in literal sense, must be usually construed as being limited to actual objects of the Act.

ISSUE:

Whether the 8th November, 2016 notification was properly implemented under Section 26(2) of the RBI Act,1934 by the Central government, and whether its continuation meets the test of proportionality?

Whether the word “any” in section 26(2) of RBI Act 1934 should be given a narrow or a wider interpretation?

Whether excessive delegation of legislative power has been made under section 26(2) of the RBI Act,1934?

Whether the notification’s implementation suffers from procedural or substantive unreasonableness, and what is the scope of judicial review in fiscal and economic policies like demonetization?

RULE:

An interpretation that advances the purpose of the Act and ensures its smooth and harmonious working should be adopted. Any interpretation leading to absurdity, confusion, contradiction or undermining the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment, must be avoided.

The primary task of the Court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, both actual and imputed.

ISSUE:

Whether the exemption notification dated 29th August 1995 apply only to drugs manufactured by 31st October 1999, or does it also cover drugs sold after that date?

Whether the manufacturer could be held responsible for the sale price of drugs sold after 31st October 1999, despite the fact that they were manufactured within the exemption period?

RULE:

Doctrine of Purposive Construction: Laws and notifications must be interpreted to fulfill their practical purpose and achieve reasonable objectives. Interpretation should avoid outcomes that are impractical or absurd.

Legislative Intent: The interpreter must assume that the legislature acted in good faith, seeking to achieve reasonable goals. The focus should be on the intent the legislature would have had, had they acted reasonably rather than on their subjective intent.