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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

A.S. Sulochana v. C. Dharmalingam AIR 1987 SC 242

ISSUE:

Whether the tenant can be evicted for a sub-tenancy created by his predecessor (father) under Section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960?

RULE:

A tenant cannot be held liable for actions of their predecessor, such as sub-letting, unless it is proven that the tenant personally engaged in the act and violated the terms of the lease.

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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

Fisher v. Bell (1960) 3 ALL ER 731

ISSUE:

Whether the display of a flick knife in a shop window constituted an offer for sale under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959?

RULE:

An offer is a specific proposal made by one party to another to enter into a legally binding agreement.

An invitation to offeris a statement or action by one party that signals a willingness to enter into negotiations about a potential agreement. An invitation to offer is an invitation for the other party to make an offer.

In statutory interpretation of criminal law, any statute must be read considering the general law and interpreted strictly.

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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi AIR 1957 SC 832

ISSUE:

Whether the term “individual” in Section 16(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, includes a female, thereby permitting the inclusion of a mother's minor children’s income from a partnership in her total income?

RULE:

The Mischief rule laid down in Heydon’s Case examines the law's state before the statute was passed, the mischief or gap the statute addresses, Parliament’s remedy to cure the mischief, and the intended purpose behind the remedy.

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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

Corporation Of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema AIR 1965 SC 661

ISSUE:

Whether the levy of a licence fee by the Corporation of Calcutta under Section 548(2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, is a tax or a fee?

Whether the delegation of power to fix the fee violates the principles of excessive delegation or violates Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution?

RULE:

A statute has to be read so as it make it valid and any interpretation leading to a contrary position should be avoided by Courts.

A tax is a compulsory contribution to government revenue, imposed without specific services or benefits in return.

A fee is charged for specific services rendered to the payer, and there should be a correlation between the fee and the cost of the service.

The legislature may delegate authority to a subordinate body to fix taxes or fees, but the delegation must be accompanied by clear guidance or principles to prevent arbitrary or excessive delegation of legislative functions.

Articles 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution guarantee the right to practice any profession or carry on any trade, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest.

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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

Danial Latifi v. Union Of India AIR 2001 SC 3958

ISSUE:

Whether Section 3(1) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is consistent with Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution?

Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is constitutionally valid?

RULE:

When interpreting courts should prefer a construction that upholds a statute’s validity and avoids rendering it ultra vires or unconstitutional. This principle is grounded in the presumption that the Legislature does not intend to enact laws that violate constitutional provisions.

Section 125 of the CrPC provides for maintenance for women (including divorced women), ensuring they are not left without financial support. Maintenance can be granted beyond the iddat period if necessary.

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 limits the maintenance obligation of the husband to the iddat period, during which the wife is entitled to maintenance from her husband.

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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

State of Punjab v. Jullunder Vegetables Syndicate AIR 1966 SC 1295

ISSUE:

Whether a firm is a separate assessable entity for the purpose of the Indian Partnership Act or whether it is only a compendious term used to denote a group of partners?

Whether a firm can be assessed for sales tax after its dissolution?

RULE:

Courts while interpreting a fiscal statute cannot proceed to make good if there are any the deficiencies in the statute. In a case of doubt, it should interpret it in a manner favourable to the taxpayer.

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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

R. v. Oakes (1959) 2 ALL ER 92

ISSUE:

Whether a preparatory act constitutes an offence under Section 7 of the Official Secrets Act, 1920, relating to offences against the government and the public?

Whether the word "and" in the phrase "and does any act preparatory to" should be interpreted as "or" for the provision to have intelligible meaning?

RULE:

A statute that is capable of two interpretations should be interpreted in a way that avoids absurdity. In cases where the statute has both criminal and penal implications, its interpretation must align with the intent of the legislature, ensuring that the application of the law is reasonable and just.

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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

The Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Company, Limited, The Empress Mills, Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, Wardha AIR 1985 SC 341

ISSUE:

Whether goods passing through the limits of Wardha Municipality by road despatched from Yeotmal to their destination at Nagpur without being unloaded or reloaded at Wardha are liable for an export terminal tax?

Whether the respondent Municipal Committee is not liable to refund the export terminal tax collected on such goods?

RULE:

If in construing a taxing statute, there are two possible interpretations , then Courts should give to the one that favours the citizen and not the one that imposes a burden on him.

General words and phrases however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense must usually be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act.

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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

P.C. Gulati v. Lajya Ram Kapur AIR 1967 Punj. 79

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant can seek a transfer of the case to a competent Magistrate under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code?

Whether the High Court have the power to transfer or recall a case from the Additional Sessions Judge based on a potential jurisdictional error in the initial order?

RULE:

The penal Statutes must be construed in such a manner as to carefully guard the rights of the accused and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the Legislature, but whenever there exists an ambiguity, it must be resolved in favor of protection of rights and safeguards rather than their destruction.

The High Court has the authority to transfer case across the subordinate criminal courts for just and efficient adjudication, despite procedural nuances in commitment and cognizance requirements U/S 193 and 526 of CrPC.

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Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169

ISSUE:

Whether the Ashok Vihar house qualifies to be a “shared household” under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,2005?

Whether the Ashok Vihar house can be considered the matrimonial house of Smt. Taruna Batra after her husband’s relocation to Ghaziabad?

Whether the respondent have the right to reside in the Ashok Vihar property, owned solely by her mother-in-law?

Whether respondent is entitled to alternate accommodation under Section 19(1)(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and if so, whether this obligation is limited to her husband alone?

RULE:

It is only the legislature which can create a law and not the Court. The courts do not legislate, and whatever may be the personal view of a Judge, he cannot create or amend the law and must maintain judicial restraint.

Interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted.

The wife’s right to reside in a “shared household” is limited to her husband’s property or joint family property in which the husband has a stake, excluding in-law’s properties.

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