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Category: Testimony

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Testimony

Laxmipat Choraria and Ors v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 938

LAXMIPAT CHORARIA V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Laxmipat Choraria and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 938

ISSUE:

  • Whether the testimony of an accomplice, who was not prosecuted or tendered a pardon, was admissible as evidence?
  • Whether photostatic copies of documents could be used as evidence when the originals were unavailable?
  • Whether prior exposure of a witness to suspects’ photographs invalidated the witness’s identification?
  • Whether selective prosecution and the use of an accomplice as a witness violated constitutional protections under Articles 14 and 20?

RULE:

  • Accomplice testimony is admissible if it is corroborated, regardless of whether the accomplice is prosecuted or tendered a pardon.
  • Photostatic copies are admissible as secondary evidence if originals are unavailable and there is no suggestion of fabrication.
  • Witness identification remains valid if corroborated by independent evidence, even if the witness has prior exposure to suspects’ photographs.
  • Selective prosecution of an accomplice as a witness does not violate constitutional protections, provided it is a legitimate prosecutorial strategy.

FACTS:

  • The appellants, Laxmipat Choraria and others, were convicted under Section 120B IPC and Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act for criminal conspiracy and smuggling by a Magistrate in Bombay.
  • The trial was initiated based on a complaint filed by the Assistant Collector of Customs under the authority of the Chief Customs Officer, Bombay.
  • On appeal, the Bombay High Court upheld the convictions on January 17 and 24, 1964. It also enhanced the sentences of two appellants, citing the severity of the offense.
  • The case was brought before the Supreme Court of India under its appellate jurisdiction via certificate from the High Court.
  • The appellants, in collaboration with a Hong Kong-based Chinese citizen, Yau Mockchi, conspired to smuggle gold into India using air stewardesses, including Ethyl Wong. Gold was concealed in suitcases with false linings.
  • The smuggling operation was discovered when Yau Mockchi approached Sophia Wong, another stewardess, who reported the plan to her superiors. A trap was laid, and Yau was arrested with a gold-laden suitcase.
  • Raids in India and Hong Kong resulted in the seizure of incriminating materials, including visiting cards, letters, account books, and photographs. Photostats of the documents were used as evidence after the originals were returned to Hong Kong under court orders.
  • Ethyl Wong, a self-confessed accomplice, admitted her involvement in smuggling gold and provided testimony against the appellants. Her evidence was corroborated by earlier statements, passenger manifests, hotel records, and other seized materials.
  • The appellants challenged the admissibility of Wong’s testimony, arguing she should have been prosecuted or tendered a pardon. They also contested the reliability of her identification and the use of photostatic evidence in place of originals.

HELD:

  • Ethyl Wong’s testimony was deemed admissible under Sections 118 and 132 of the Evidence Act. She was a competent witness, and there was no legal obligation to prosecute her or tender her a pardon for the trial’s validity.
  • The photostats of the documents were admissible as secondary evidence since the originals were suppressed by the accused. The court found no indication of fabrication or fraud in the photostatic copies.
  • Wong’s identification of the appellants, while influenced by prior exposure to photographs, was corroborated by independent evidence, making it reliable and valid.
  • The prosecution’s decision not to prosecute Wong and instead use her testimony did not violate Articles 14 or 20 of the Constitution. It was a lawful prosecutorial strategy under Section 494 CrPC.
  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the convictions and sentences. The court emphasized the severe economic impact of gold smuggling and supported the stringent sentences imposed by the High Court.
Categories
Testimony

Israr v. State of U.P. AIR 2005 SC 249

ISRAR V. STATE OF U.P.

Israr v. State of U.P. AIR 2005 SC 249

ISSUE:

  • Is the testimony of interested witness admissible under Indian Evidence Act?

RULE:

  • An interested witness, being a friend or relative of the deceased does not automatically make a witness unreliable.

FACTS:

  • In the present case, the deceased had a grocery shop and was threatened by the accused(Israr) over money. On the night of the incident, the accused intercepted the deceased and attacked him with a knife, causing injuries.
  • The injured Zamil Ahmad was taken to the hospital, where a report was filed with the police. His condition worsened, and he was transferred to All India Institute of Medical Sciences, where he died. The postmortem report confirmed the cause of death as peritonitis and bronchopneumonia due to injuries sustained in the attack.
  • The accused was found guilty by the trial court.
  • The appeal was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court, affirming their conviction and sentence.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court, in its judgment, emphasized the importance of carefully evaluating the testimony of interested witnesses.
  • While acknowledging that interested witnesses can provide valuable evidence, the court cautioned that their testimony should be subjected to thorough scrutiny.
  • In this particular case, the court assessed the reliability of the interested witnesses testimony in light of other evidence presented.
  • After a detailed examination, the court concluded that the interested witnesses testimony was credible and corroborated by other evidence, leading to Israr’s conviction for the offense of murder.
Categories
Testimony

Bhagwan Singh & Ors v. State of M.P. AIR 2003 SC 1098

BHAGWAN SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF M.P.

Bhagwan Singh & Ors v. State of M.P. [AIR 2003 SC 1098]

ISSUE:

  • Whether sole testimony of child witness admissible under the Indian Evidence Act?

RULE:

  • Sole testimony of a child witness is unreliable if there is a delay in its presentation, increasing the likelihood of coaching or tutoring.

FACTS:

  • On the night of 28th-29th February 1984, the three appellants allegedly entered Mata Prasad’s house and killed him and his daughter Munni Devi.
  • The prosecution’s main evidence was the testimony of Arvind Kumar, a 6-year-old child at the time of the incident.
  • Arvind did not disclose the incident to his maternal uncle or father immediately after it occurred.
  • The trial judge noted Arvind’s hesitance, faltering answers, and failure to understand some questions, raising doubts about his testimony.
  • The trial court acquitted the accused, but the Madhya Pradesh High Court later convicted them based on the child’s testimony.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s conviction and upheld the trial court’s acquittal.
  • It held that mere dock identification by a child is insufficient without corroborative evidence. No test identification parade under Section 161 CrPC was conducted.
  • The court emphasized that while children are competent witnesses, a 6-year-old may lack the maturity to provide reliable testimony without corroboration.
  • The judicial confession of the accused was deemed involuntary due to the custody preceding the confession, rendering it unreliable.
  • The court agreed with the trial judge that neither the child’s testimony nor the confession conclusively proved the accused’s guilt.
Categories
Testimony

Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54

RAMESHWAR V. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54

ISSUE:

  • Whether when a statement made at or around the time of the crime occurred is admissible as evidence, does corroboration have to be provided when the child is under the age of 12 years?

RULE:

  • The main test as to whether a previous statement was made “at or about the time when the fact took place”, within the meaning of sec. 157, Evidence Act, is whether the statement was made as early as can reasonably be expected in the circumstances of the case and before there was an opportunity for tutoring or concoction.

FACTS:

  • The alleged victim of the rape committed by the appellant Rameshwar was an eight-year-old girl.
  • He was brought before the Assistant Sessions Judge, who found him guilty and sentenced him to a year of strict incarceration as well as a fine.
  • Following an appeal, the learned Sessions Judge determined that the evidence was adequate for moral conviction but fell short of legal proof because the law requires corroboration of the story in such cases as a matter of precaution, and the corroborative evidence, which attempted to link the appellant with the crime, was legally insufficient though morally sufficient.
  • Nevertheless, the learned Sessions Judge was satisfied that the girl had been raped by someone. In doing so, he gave the accused the benefit of the doubt and exonerated him.
  • The learned High Court Judges stated that the girl’s statement to her mother was legally admissible as corroboration and that they considered that sufficient, despite the fact that the law requires corroboration in such cases.
  • As a result, they set aside the acquittal and reinstated the conviction and sentence. Following that, the High Court granted permission to appeal under Article 134 (1)(c) of the Constitution because the case presented important legal issues.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court had rejected the appeal and ordered the petitioner to appear for his scheduled bail hearing in line with the conditions of the bond, complete the required jail time, and make the required fine payment.
  • The judge ruled that a victim of rape is not an accomplice. As far as the crime of rape is concerned, a girl’s permission will not matter if she is underage; yet, if she was, her testimony would be just as questionable as that of an accomplice.
  • The rule, which has become more rigid as cases have gone by, is not that corroboration is required before a conviction can stand, but rather that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of caution, must be on the judge’s mind and, in jury cases, must be included in the charge before a conviction without corroboration can be upheld, except when the circumstances make it safe to do so.
  • The young age of the child may make corroboration unnecessary, but that is a matter of fact in every case. Other factors that may come into play include the child’s behavior, the likelihood of tutoring, and other factors.
  • The only requirement of the law is that the judge or jury, depending on the circumstances, must be aware of and understand this rule of prudence. It is not standard procedure to require corroboration in every instance before a conviction can stand.
  • In addition to supporting the allegation that the crime was done, independent evidence must also properly link or tend to link the accused to it by correlating the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that the accused committed the crime. This does not imply that all of the circumstances required to link the accused to the crime must be included in the confirmation of identity.
  • It is only necessary that there be independent proof that supports the witness’s account that the accused committed the crime, or was at least one of those responsible.
  • The supreme court ruled that independent sources must be used for corroboration, thus typically one accomplice’s evidence would not be enough to support that of another. However, under some unique conditions, it may be permissible to do away with the need for corroboration, and in those instances, a conviction based on such evidence would not be unlawful. This is because it was argued that the mother in this case was not an independent source.
  • According to Section 157, any prior statements a witness made about the same fact at or around the time the fact occurred or before any authority legally qualified to investigate the fact may be proven in order to corroborate the witness’ testimony.
  • There can be no doubt that such a statement is legally admissible in India as corroboration provided the requirement stipulated, namely, “at or about the time etc.,” are fulfilled. The provision offers no exceptions. Corroboration evidence must be weighed as it is presented, and in some circumstances, even though it is legally admissible for the relevant purpose, its weight may be zero.
  • The key question is whether the statement was made as soon as was practically possible given the facts of the situation and before there was a chance for instruction or concoction. The child could have complained to some women who worked in the area, but that would not be natural for a child because she would be terrified and her first instinct would be to run home to her mother, according to the court. As a result, the matter is covered by section 157 read with section 8, Illustration (j).