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Category: Evidentiary Presumptions

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Evidentiary Presumptions

Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1316

KUNDAN LAL RALLARAM v. CUSTODIAN

Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1316

ISSUE:

  • Whether the presumption of consideration under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was rebutted in this case?
  • Whether the endorsement of the promissory note by Abdul Satar Ahmedbhoy to Kundan Lal Rallaram was supported by bona fide consideration?

RULE:

  • Under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a negotiable instrument is presumed to be made or endorsed for consideration unless evidence to the contrary is provided.
  • The burden of rebutting this presumption lies on the party challenging the validity of the instrument, which can be done through direct, circumstantial, or presumptive evidence under the Evidence Act, 1872.

FACTS:

  • Abdul Satar Ahmedbhoy, owner of Empire Tin Factory in Bombay, migrated to Pakistan during the partition. He entered an exchange agreement with Nathuram Ramaldas of Karachi for their properties, valuing Empire Tin Factory at ₹1,48,000 and the Indian Electric and Trading Company at ₹1,00,000. Nathuram issued a promissory note for ₹37,000 to cover the ₹48,000 balance after paying ₹11,000 in cash.
  • On March 22, 1948, Abdul Satar endorsed the promissory note in favor of Kundan Lal Rallaram in exchange for the latter’s stock-in-trade of radios and gramophones in Karachi.
  • On November 13, 1948, Kundan demanded payment from Nathuram, who denied liability, leading Kundan to approach Abdul Satar. Abdul also repudiated any liability.
  • Subsequently, Kundan filed Suit No. 411 of 1950 in the Bombay High Court against Abdul Satar and Nathuram for recovery under the promissory note.
  • In 1950, the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property declared Abdul Satar an evacuee and the promissory note evacuee property under Section 2 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
  • Kundan filed a petition under Section 40 of the Act, seeking confirmation of the endorsement. In July 1951, the Deputy Custodian rejected the petition, citing the endorsement as lacking bona fide consideration.
  • Appeals to the Custodian of Evacuee Property (August 1951) and the Custodian-General in revision (December 1955) were initially dismissed, with the Custodian-General later remanding the matter for further evidence on the authenticity of the endorsement.
  • Upon remand, the Custodian found the transaction between Abdul Satar and Nathuram lacked consideration, although the endorsement was proved genuine. In a final revision, the Custodian-General upheld the lack of consideration and dismissed Kundan’s claim.
  • The case reached the Supreme Court under its appellate jurisdiction via special leave granted to Kundan Lal Rallaram.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Custodian-General’s decision that the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act favoring consideration was successfully rebutted by circumstantial evidence.
  • It held that although negotiable instruments are presumed to be supported by consideration, the lack of documentary and oral evidence from Kundan, combined with the circumstances of the case, negated this presumption.
  • The Court emphasized the duty of parties to produce relevant evidence and upheld the Custodian-General’s reliance on the available evidence to conclude the absence of consideration for the endorsement.
Categories
Evidentiary Presumptions

S. N. Bose v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1292

S. N. BOSE V. STATE OF BIHAR

S. N. Bose v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1292

ISSUE:

  • Whether the investigation was conducted without the authority of law?
  • Whether the presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that the Appellant had accepted the sum as a motive or reward should not be drawn unless the prosecution proved that the amount was paid as a bribe?
  • Whether the presumption was rebutted by the Appellant’s explanation that what was paid to him was the return of a loan?

RULE:

  • Section 114 of the Evidence Act states that the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the ordinary course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.

FACTS:

  • S.N. Bose, an Assistant Medical Officer at Gaya Railway Hospital in 1964, was a non-gazetted Class III officer.
  • On March 2, 1964, Doman Ram, a railway worker, visited the appellant for treatment. The appellant allegedly demanded and accepted ₹2 as a bribe for providing treatment.
  • By March 12, 1964, Doman Ram recovered and requested a fitness certificate to resume duty. The appellant allegedly demanded ₹5 for issuing the certificate and threatened to remove Ram’s name from the sick list if the payment was not made.
  • Doman Ram reported the demand to Inspector A.C. Das (PW 17) of the Special Police Establishment on March 14, 1964. PW 17 recorded the complaint and obtained permission under Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act from a First-Class Magistrate to lay a trap.
  • A marked ₹5 currency note was prepared for the operation and given to Doman Ram. Witnesses observed the appellant accepting the marked note from Doman Ram.
  • Upon receiving a signal, PW 17 confronted the appellant, who produced the marked note and claimed it was repayment of a loan. The appellant was subsequently charged under Section 161 IPC and Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
  • The trial court convicted the appellant, which was upheld by the Patna High Court in appeal.
  • The case came before the Supreme Court under its criminal appellate jurisdiction after the appellant obtained special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

HELD:

  • The investigation under Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act was deemed valid. The permission obtained by the inspector to lay the trap also extended to the full investigation, and a second permission was unnecessary.
  • The trial and High Court correctly upheld the presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act that the ₹5 was accepted as a bribe. The appellant’s claim of loan repayment was unsubstantiated.
  • The sanction for prosecution was invalid because the Chief Medical Officer, who granted the sanction, lacked the authority to remove the appellant from service as required under Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, holding that the lack of valid sanction rendered the prosecution unsustainable.
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Evidentiary Presumptions

Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik AIR 2014 SC 932

NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK V. LATA NANDLAL BADWAIK

Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik AIR 2014 SC 932

ISSUE:

  • Whether the DNA test results could rebut the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
  • Whether the appellant could be absolved of the liability to pay maintenance for a child scientifically proven not to be his biological offspring?
  • To what extent modern scientific evidence, such as DNA testing, should override the conclusive presumption of legitimacy established under law?

RULE:

  • Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act provides a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for a child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage, which can only be rebutted if it is proven that the husband had no access to the wife during the period of conception.
  • DNA test results, being scientifically accurate, can serve as credible evidence to rebut the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 if they conclusively establish the absence of biological paternity.
  • When there is a conflict between legal presumptions and scientifically proven facts, scientific truth prevails in the interest of justice.

FACTS:

  • Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik (appellant) married Lata Nandlal Badwaik (respondent no. 1) on June 30, 1990, in Chandrapur and later on they separated due to strained relationship.
  • Lata filed an application for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, which the Magistrate dismissed on December 10, 1993.
  • Lata subsequently filed a fresh application under Section 125 CrPC, seeking maintenance for herself and her daughter, Netra alias Neha (respondent no. 2), alleging cohabitation with Nandlal from June 20, 1996, for two years, during which she became pregnant.
  • Nandlal denied the claims, asserting no physical relationship with Lata after 1991 and disputing the paternity of Netra.
  • The Magistrate ruled in favor of Lata, granting maintenance of ₹900 per month to Lata and ₹500 per month to Netra.
  • Nandlal’s challenge to the Magistrate’s order failed in revision before the Sessions Court and in a petition under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court of Bombay.
  • Nandlal then approached the Supreme Court via a Special Leave Petition, challenging the maintenance order and seeking a DNA test to establish paternity.
  • The Supreme Court initially allowed the DNA test, directing it to be conducted at the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Nagpur. The DNA test report excluded Nandlal as the biological father of Netra.
  • On the respondents’ request, a second DNA test was ordered by the Supreme Court at the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Hyderabad. The second test confirmed the earlier result, excluding Nandlal as the biological father.
  • Lata contested the validity of the DNA tests, arguing that the statutory presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, should prevail, as she claimed Nandlal had access to her during the relevant period.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court emphasized that while Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act provides conclusive proof of legitimacy for a child born during a valid marriage, this presumption is rebuttable if it can be shown that the husband had no access to the wife during the time of conception.
  • The DNA test reports, being scientifically accurate, demonstrated conclusively that Nandlal was not the biological father of Netra.
  • The Court held that scientific truth must prevail over legal presumptions when evidence is clear and reliable, as in this case.
  • The Court set aside the earlier orders directing Nandlal to pay maintenance for Netra, stating that the presumption under Section 112 had been rebutted by the DNA evidence.
  • However, the Court directed that no recovery of previously paid maintenance amounts be sought from the respondents.
Categories
Evidentiary Presumptions

Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257

HANS RAJ V. STATE OF HARYANA

Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257

ISSUE:

  • Whether the husband failure to disclose the conversation preceding his wife’s suicide, combined with allegations of cruelty against him, is sufficient to presume that he abetted the suicide under Section 113 A of Indian Evidence Act, of 1872?

RULE:

  • Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act permits the court to presume that a woman’s suicide within seven years of marriage was abetted by her husband or his relatives if it is proven that she was subjected to cruelty by them. This presumption, however, is discretionary and not mandatory.
  • The court must evaluate whether the proven cruelty was of a nature likely to drive the woman to suicide, considering the totality of the circumstances.
  • Mere proof of cruelty and suicide within seven years is insufficient to establish abetment without a causal link between the two.

FACTS:

  • In 1982, Hans Raj married Jeeto Rani, daughter of Munshi Ram. They resided in village Kheri Sahidan, while Jeeto’s brother Fateh Chand was married to Hans Raj’s sister Naro.
  • Hans Raj was addicted to ‘Bhang’ and neglected his domestic duties, leading to frequent quarrels with Jeeto, who opposed his addiction. These disputes sometimes escalated to physical abuse.
  • Shortly before the incident, Hans Raj and Jeeto visited Munshi Ram’s house. Hans Raj expressed his unwillingness to continue living with Jeeto and threatened revenge against Jeeto’s brother, alleging mistreatment of his sister Naro. Munshi Ram persuaded Jeeto to return with Hans Raj, despite her fears.
  • On August 24, 1986, Jeeto consumed poison at Hans Raj’s residence and passed away. Medical evidence confirmed poisoning as the cause of death. Efforts by Dr. Ram Gopal Sharma and Dr. Kaushal to save her life were unsuccessful.
  • Munshi Ram lodged an FIR on the same day, alleging that Jeeto had faced harassment and beatings from Hans Raj due to her objections to his addiction. He also accused Hans Raj of threatening revenge over Naro’s alleged mistreatment.
  • During the trial, the prosecution alleged that Hans Raj belittled Jeeto for her appearance, expressed intentions to remarry, and subjected her to cruelty. However, many of these allegations were not mentioned during the initial investigation and appeared as new claims during the trial.
  • The trial court convicted Hans Raj under Section 306 IPC for abetment of suicide, relying on circumstantial evidence and invoking the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Hans Raj appealed to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which affirmed the conviction under Section 306 IPC, reiterating the findings of the trial court without conducting an independent analysis of the evidence.
  • Hans Raj then appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave, challenging the High Court’s judgment and alleging errors in its reasoning and assessment of evidence.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court found procedural lapses and inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. It noted that several allegations were introduced for the first time during the trial and lacked corroboration.
  • The court held that the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act is discretionary and must be based on evidence showing cruelty severe enough to drive the victim to suicide. In this case, such evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under Section 306 IPC.
  • The court acquitted Hans Raj of the charge under Section 306 IPC, setting aside his conviction for abetment of suicide.
  • However, the court found credible evidence of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC, including Hans Raj’s addiction to ‘Bhang’ and the frequent quarrels and occasional assaults it caused.
  • Hans Raj was convicted under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment. His bail was revoked, and he was ordered to surrender to serve the sentence.