Trace Your Case

Author: TYC

Categories
Workmen

HR Adhyantaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994) 5 SCC 737

ISSUE:

Whether medical representatives are considered workmen according to the definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

Whether the modified "workman" definition in the Industrial Disputes Act impact medical representatives' status as workmen?

Whether the medical representatives' responsibilities were primarily promotional sales activities or other forms of labour?

RULE:

The definition of "workman" includes individuals employed in manual, clerical, supervisory, or technical work and for an employee to be considered a workman, they must fall within one of these specified categories.

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Categories
Trade Unionism

Lohia Machines Limited v. Registrar, Trade Unions Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.13658of 2008

ISSUE:

Whether the IDA is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution of India?

Whether the IDA violates the fundamental right to freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India?

Whether the IDA violates the fundamental right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

Whether laid-off workers are considered as employees for the purpose of trade union registration under the Trade Unions Act, 1926?

RULE:

A union must have a certain percentage or minimum number of active employees from the establishment as members to be registered.

A lay-off leads to temporary unemployment, but it does not end the employer-employee relationship.

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Categories
Workmen

Hussain Bhai v. Alath Factory Employees Union (1978) 4 SCC 257

ISSUE:

Whether intermediaries in labor arrangements affect employment status under labor laws?

Whether labor laws should prioritize social justice over contract law concepts for contract workers and independent contractors?

Whether the petitioner can be held liable for the denial of employment to the 29 workmen, despite claiming that they were not his employees?

Whether the term 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 includes independent contractors engaged to work in an employer's plant?

RULE:

An employer-employee relationship exists when workers, despite being hired through contractors, perform work that is integral to the business and for the benefit of the business owner, who exercises control over the work and the conditions of employment.

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Categories
Trade Unionism

Rangaswami v. Registrar of Trade Unions, 1960 SCC OnLine Mad 243.

ISSUE:

Whether the employees of the Madras Raj Bhavan are employed in an "industry" within the meaning of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, and thus entitled to register their union as a trade union under the Act?

Whether the Industrial Disputes Act and Trade Unions Act can be read together as forming one whole system?

Whether the Test of Cooperation between employers and employees has been satisfied in the present dispute?

Whether sale of unserviceable material and surplus garden produce amounts to a trade or business activity?

RULE:

The term "industry" includes any trade, business, manufacture, or undertaking which is broader than the common conception of trade or business and implies cooperation between the employer and employees for achieving a particular result.

To register a union under the Trade Unions Act, the employees must be engaged in an activity that qualifies as a trade or business.

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Categories
Industry

Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma, (1997) 4 SCC 257

ISSUE:

Whether the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL) is considered an "industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act (I.D. Act), and whether it is subject to the provisions of the Act, including the recognition of employees as "workmen"?

RULE:

An activity qualifies as "industry" if it involves collaboration between an employer and employees with the goal of producing or distributing goods or services that satisfy the needs of consumers.

Sovereign functions (such as legislative, judicial, or law enforcement activities) are exempt from being classified as "industry."

The "dominant nature test" is applied when an organization carries out a mix of activities, some of which may be exempt, but the overall nature of the activities determines whether it qualifies as an industry.

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Categories
Evidentiary Presumptions

Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik AIR 2014 SC 932

NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK V. LATA NANDLAL BADWAIK

Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik AIR 2014 SC 932

ISSUE:

  • Whether the DNA test results could rebut the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
  • Whether the appellant could be absolved of the liability to pay maintenance for a child scientifically proven not to be his biological offspring?
  • To what extent modern scientific evidence, such as DNA testing, should override the conclusive presumption of legitimacy established under law?

RULE:

  • Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act provides a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for a child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage, which can only be rebutted if it is proven that the husband had no access to the wife during the period of conception.
  • DNA test results, being scientifically accurate, can serve as credible evidence to rebut the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 if they conclusively establish the absence of biological paternity.
  • When there is a conflict between legal presumptions and scientifically proven facts, scientific truth prevails in the interest of justice.

FACTS:

  • Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik (appellant) married Lata Nandlal Badwaik (respondent no. 1) on June 30, 1990, in Chandrapur and later on they separated due to strained relationship.
  • Lata filed an application for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, which the Magistrate dismissed on December 10, 1993.
  • Lata subsequently filed a fresh application under Section 125 CrPC, seeking maintenance for herself and her daughter, Netra alias Neha (respondent no. 2), alleging cohabitation with Nandlal from June 20, 1996, for two years, during which she became pregnant.
  • Nandlal denied the claims, asserting no physical relationship with Lata after 1991 and disputing the paternity of Netra.
  • The Magistrate ruled in favor of Lata, granting maintenance of ₹900 per month to Lata and ₹500 per month to Netra.
  • Nandlal’s challenge to the Magistrate’s order failed in revision before the Sessions Court and in a petition under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court of Bombay.
  • Nandlal then approached the Supreme Court via a Special Leave Petition, challenging the maintenance order and seeking a DNA test to establish paternity.
  • The Supreme Court initially allowed the DNA test, directing it to be conducted at the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Nagpur. The DNA test report excluded Nandlal as the biological father of Netra.
  • On the respondents’ request, a second DNA test was ordered by the Supreme Court at the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Hyderabad. The second test confirmed the earlier result, excluding Nandlal as the biological father.
  • Lata contested the validity of the DNA tests, arguing that the statutory presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, should prevail, as she claimed Nandlal had access to her during the relevant period.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court emphasized that while Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act provides conclusive proof of legitimacy for a child born during a valid marriage, this presumption is rebuttable if it can be shown that the husband had no access to the wife during the time of conception.
  • The DNA test reports, being scientifically accurate, demonstrated conclusively that Nandlal was not the biological father of Netra.
  • The Court held that scientific truth must prevail over legal presumptions when evidence is clear and reliable, as in this case.
  • The Court set aside the earlier orders directing Nandlal to pay maintenance for Netra, stating that the presumption under Section 112 had been rebutted by the DNA evidence.
  • However, the Court directed that no recovery of previously paid maintenance amounts be sought from the respondents.
Categories
Evidentiary Presumptions

Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257

HANS RAJ V. STATE OF HARYANA

Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257

ISSUE:

  • Whether the husband failure to disclose the conversation preceding his wife’s suicide, combined with allegations of cruelty against him, is sufficient to presume that he abetted the suicide under Section 113 A of Indian Evidence Act, of 1872?

RULE:

  • Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act permits the court to presume that a woman’s suicide within seven years of marriage was abetted by her husband or his relatives if it is proven that she was subjected to cruelty by them. This presumption, however, is discretionary and not mandatory.
  • The court must evaluate whether the proven cruelty was of a nature likely to drive the woman to suicide, considering the totality of the circumstances.
  • Mere proof of cruelty and suicide within seven years is insufficient to establish abetment without a causal link between the two.

FACTS:

  • In 1982, Hans Raj married Jeeto Rani, daughter of Munshi Ram. They resided in village Kheri Sahidan, while Jeeto’s brother Fateh Chand was married to Hans Raj’s sister Naro.
  • Hans Raj was addicted to ‘Bhang’ and neglected his domestic duties, leading to frequent quarrels with Jeeto, who opposed his addiction. These disputes sometimes escalated to physical abuse.
  • Shortly before the incident, Hans Raj and Jeeto visited Munshi Ram’s house. Hans Raj expressed his unwillingness to continue living with Jeeto and threatened revenge against Jeeto’s brother, alleging mistreatment of his sister Naro. Munshi Ram persuaded Jeeto to return with Hans Raj, despite her fears.
  • On August 24, 1986, Jeeto consumed poison at Hans Raj’s residence and passed away. Medical evidence confirmed poisoning as the cause of death. Efforts by Dr. Ram Gopal Sharma and Dr. Kaushal to save her life were unsuccessful.
  • Munshi Ram lodged an FIR on the same day, alleging that Jeeto had faced harassment and beatings from Hans Raj due to her objections to his addiction. He also accused Hans Raj of threatening revenge over Naro’s alleged mistreatment.
  • During the trial, the prosecution alleged that Hans Raj belittled Jeeto for her appearance, expressed intentions to remarry, and subjected her to cruelty. However, many of these allegations were not mentioned during the initial investigation and appeared as new claims during the trial.
  • The trial court convicted Hans Raj under Section 306 IPC for abetment of suicide, relying on circumstantial evidence and invoking the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Hans Raj appealed to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which affirmed the conviction under Section 306 IPC, reiterating the findings of the trial court without conducting an independent analysis of the evidence.
  • Hans Raj then appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave, challenging the High Court’s judgment and alleging errors in its reasoning and assessment of evidence.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court found procedural lapses and inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. It noted that several allegations were introduced for the first time during the trial and lacked corroboration.
  • The court held that the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act is discretionary and must be based on evidence showing cruelty severe enough to drive the victim to suicide. In this case, such evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under Section 306 IPC.
  • The court acquitted Hans Raj of the charge under Section 306 IPC, setting aside his conviction for abetment of suicide.
  • However, the court found credible evidence of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC, including Hans Raj’s addiction to ‘Bhang’ and the frequent quarrels and occasional assaults it caused.
  • Hans Raj was convicted under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment. His bail was revoked, and he was ordered to surrender to serve the sentence.
Categories
Electronic Evidence

Marwari Kumhar v. B.G. Ganeshpuri AIR 2000 SC 2629

MARWARI KUMHAR V. B.G. GANESHPURI

Marwari Kumhar v. B.G. Ganeshpuri AIR 2000 SC 2629

ISSUE:

  • Whether the uncertified copy of the 1948 judgment could be admitted as evidence, considering that the original judgment was lost?
  • Whether the earlier judgment, which affirmed the appellants’ title to the property, is binding on the respondents, preventing them from challenging the appellants’ title in the current suit?
  • Whether the respondents could claim ownership of the property by adverse possession, despite the prior judgment that established the appellants’ title?

RULE:

  • Admissibility of Secondary Evidence: Under Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act, an uncertified copy of a public document is admissible as secondary evidence if the original is lost or destroyed.
  • Res Judicata: A final judgment is binding on the parties under the principle of res judicata, preventing them from re-litigating the same issue.
  • Adverse Possession: To claim ownership by adverse possession, the party must show that their possession was hostile and adverse after the relevant judgment.

FACTS:

  • The appellants, representing the Marwari Kumhar community of Dewas, used a temple and Dharamshala on the disputed property for religious functions and had engaged Ganeshpuri as a pujari.
  • After Ganeshpuri’s death on February 11, 1945, his son (Respondent No. 1) and wife (Respondent No. 2) claimed ownership of the property.
  • In December 1945, the appellants filed a representative suit in the Dewas Trial Court seeking a declaration of their title and rights to continue religious activities on the property. Respondent No. 1, a minor at the time, was represented by his mother.
  • The Dewas Trial Court decreed in favor of the appellants, holding that the respondents and their predecessor, Ganeshpuri, were merely pujaris without ownership rights.
  • The respondents appealed, and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment in their favor.
  • On May 7, 1948, the Dewas High Court reinstated the trial court’s decree, affirming the appellants’ title to the property.
  • Despite the finality of the 1948 judgment, the respondents resumed claiming ownership. The appellants filed the present suit on December 7, 1960, in the Dewas Trial Court, seeking possession of the property. They also claimed that Respondent No. 1 had executed a “Nokarnama” (acknowledgment of service) on October 31, 1948, but original documents, including the earlier judgment and the Nokarnama, were lost.
  • The respondents contested the suit, asserting ownership by adverse possession and claiming that the suit was barred under limitation and Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
  • On September 20, 1968, the Dewas Trial Court decreed in favor of the appellants, holding that their title was proven based on the earlier judgment and that the respondents’ adverse possession claim was unsubstantiated.
  • The respondents appealed, and on November 1, 1974, the first appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, ruling that the earlier judgment was inadmissible in evidence due to the absence of a certified copy and that the respondents had established ownership through adverse possession.
  • The appellants filed a second appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which dismissed their case on October 3, 1985, upholding the appellate court’s findings.
  • The appellants then moved the Supreme Court by way of a civil appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, challenging the judgments of the appellate court and the High Court.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the first appellate court (November 1, 1974) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court (October 3, 1985), restoring the Dewas Trial Court’s decree dated September 20, 1968.
  • The Court held that the uncertified copy of the 1948 judgment was admissible under Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act as secondary evidence, given that the original had been lost.
  • The earlier judgment conclusively affirmed the appellants’ title and was binding on the respondents under the doctrine of res judicata.
  • It was emphasized that the respondents had to prove when and how their possession became adverse after May 7, 1948. The respondents failed to provide any evidence to substantiate such a claim.
  • The Court dismissed the adverse possession argument, holding that the respondents’ possession remained that of pujaris and lacked the open, hostile, and adverse elements necessary to claim adverse possession.
  • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, confirming the appellants’ title and granting them possession of the disputed property.
Categories
Burden of Proof

Collector of Customs, Madras and Ors. v. D. Bhoormul, 1974 AIR 859

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS MADRAS V. D. BHOORMUL

Collector of Customs, Madras and Ors. v. D. Bhoormul, 1974 AIR 859

ISSUE:

  • Whether the Customs Department adequately discharged its burden to prove the goods were smuggled?
  • Can the confiscation of goods be justified solely based on circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the alleged owner?

RULE:

  • The onus of proof does not demand perfect or absolute certainty; it often relies on a prudent person’s reasonable assessment of the case’s probabilities.
  • The prosecution is not required to prove facts that lie exclusively within the accused’s knowledge, as this would impose an unreasonably high burden.
  • Instead, the burden shifts to the accused to provide a satisfactory explanation for such facts, particularly when the prosecution has presented circumstantial evidence supporting its claims.

FACTS:

  • On June 4, 1962, Customs Preventive Officers seized ten packages of imported goods worth ₹12,255 from Baboothmull’s shop in Madras.
  • The packages containing items such as fountain pens, hair clippers, and razor sets were sealed and appeared to be freshly delivered or prepared for shipment.
  • Baboothmull denied ownership and knowledge of the packages, initially claiming they had been left outside his shop by an unknown broker and later stating they belonged to D. Bhoormul.
  • Despite repeated requests, Bhoormul failed to provide evidence of lawful acquisition, such as bills or purchase documents, or sufficient details about the brokers involved.
  • Bhoormul received two show-cause notices but refused to provide further information or appear in person before the Customs Department.
  • The Collector of Customs concluded, based on the foreign origin of the goods, their suspicious circumstances of seizure, and the implausible explanations provided, that the goods were smuggled and ordered their confiscation under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878.
  • Bhoormul’s appeal to the Central Board of Revenue was dismissed on September 7, 1964, and his revision petition to the Central Government was rejected on September 7, 1965.
  • A Single Judge of the Madras High Court dismissed Bhoormul’s writ petition, but the Division Bench allowed his Letters Patent Appeal, ruling that the Customs Department had failed to prove the goods were smuggled.
  • The Customs Department appealed to the Supreme Court of India via special leave, challenging the Division Bench’s judgment.

HELD:

  • The Supreme Court granted the appeal and held that, according to section 106 of the Evidence Act, establishing the facts within a person’s special knowledge rests on that person.
  • If that person fails to establish or explain those facts, an adverse inference of facts may be drawn against him, which, combined with the presumptive evidence introduced by the other party, may result in a finding against that person.
  • Because the order acts in rem and is only implemented against the goods, the first half of the entry in the third column of clause 8 of section 167 of the Sea Customs Act relating the punishment of confiscation of the goods places a less onerous burden on the prosecution.
  • The fact that the goods were of foreign origin and the inference drawn from the dubious behavior of Baboothmull and Bhoormul could reasonably lead to the conclusion drawn by the Collector that the goods were smuggled goods, even though the Department did not present any direct evidence of the illicit importation of goods.
Categories
Testimony

Laxmipat Choraria and Ors v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 938

LAXMIPAT CHORARIA V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Laxmipat Choraria and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 938

ISSUE:

  • Whether the testimony of an accomplice, who was not prosecuted or tendered a pardon, was admissible as evidence?
  • Whether photostatic copies of documents could be used as evidence when the originals were unavailable?
  • Whether prior exposure of a witness to suspects’ photographs invalidated the witness’s identification?
  • Whether selective prosecution and the use of an accomplice as a witness violated constitutional protections under Articles 14 and 20?

RULE:

  • Accomplice testimony is admissible if it is corroborated, regardless of whether the accomplice is prosecuted or tendered a pardon.
  • Photostatic copies are admissible as secondary evidence if originals are unavailable and there is no suggestion of fabrication.
  • Witness identification remains valid if corroborated by independent evidence, even if the witness has prior exposure to suspects’ photographs.
  • Selective prosecution of an accomplice as a witness does not violate constitutional protections, provided it is a legitimate prosecutorial strategy.

FACTS:

  • The appellants, Laxmipat Choraria and others, were convicted under Section 120B IPC and Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act for criminal conspiracy and smuggling by a Magistrate in Bombay.
  • The trial was initiated based on a complaint filed by the Assistant Collector of Customs under the authority of the Chief Customs Officer, Bombay.
  • On appeal, the Bombay High Court upheld the convictions on January 17 and 24, 1964. It also enhanced the sentences of two appellants, citing the severity of the offense.
  • The case was brought before the Supreme Court of India under its appellate jurisdiction via certificate from the High Court.
  • The appellants, in collaboration with a Hong Kong-based Chinese citizen, Yau Mockchi, conspired to smuggle gold into India using air stewardesses, including Ethyl Wong. Gold was concealed in suitcases with false linings.
  • The smuggling operation was discovered when Yau Mockchi approached Sophia Wong, another stewardess, who reported the plan to her superiors. A trap was laid, and Yau was arrested with a gold-laden suitcase.
  • Raids in India and Hong Kong resulted in the seizure of incriminating materials, including visiting cards, letters, account books, and photographs. Photostats of the documents were used as evidence after the originals were returned to Hong Kong under court orders.
  • Ethyl Wong, a self-confessed accomplice, admitted her involvement in smuggling gold and provided testimony against the appellants. Her evidence was corroborated by earlier statements, passenger manifests, hotel records, and other seized materials.
  • The appellants challenged the admissibility of Wong’s testimony, arguing she should have been prosecuted or tendered a pardon. They also contested the reliability of her identification and the use of photostatic evidence in place of originals.

HELD:

  • Ethyl Wong’s testimony was deemed admissible under Sections 118 and 132 of the Evidence Act. She was a competent witness, and there was no legal obligation to prosecute her or tender her a pardon for the trial’s validity.
  • The photostats of the documents were admissible as secondary evidence since the originals were suppressed by the accused. The court found no indication of fabrication or fraud in the photostatic copies.
  • Wong’s identification of the appellants, while influenced by prior exposure to photographs, was corroborated by independent evidence, making it reliable and valid.
  • The prosecution’s decision not to prosecute Wong and instead use her testimony did not violate Articles 14 or 20 of the Constitution. It was a lawful prosecutorial strategy under Section 494 CrPC.
  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the convictions and sentences. The court emphasized the severe economic impact of gold smuggling and supported the stringent sentences imposed by the High Court.