Author: TYC

ISSUE:

Whether the mass termination of 853 workmen was a bona fide exercise of managerial power under Standing Orders or a punitive discharge in the guise of termination simpliciter?

Whether the Arbitrator, in the absence of an explicit statutory mandate, had jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act to reappraise the proportionality of the punishment?

Whether the High Court, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226/227, transgressed its limits by interfering with the Arbitrator’s award?

RULE:

Termination vs. Punitive Dismissal: The substance of the order, not its nomenclature, determines its true character. If the foundation of termination is misconduct, it ceases to be discharge simpliciter and attracts the procedural safeguards of punitive action. The employer’s right to terminate must be exercised in good faith and not as a device to circumvent due process. Where misconduct is the causa causans, the order must withstand judicial scrutiny, and the Court will lift the veil to discern its real nature.

Scope of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act: Section 11A vests adjudicatory bodies with the authority to assess not only the legality but also the fairness of disciplinary action. The power to interfere arises when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct or imposed without a fair inquiry. The Tribunal is not bound by the employer’s discretion but must exercise its own judgment in determining whether the punishment meets the test of reasonableness.

ISSUE:

Whether the dismissal of Respondent No.3 (Venkappa Gowda) for assaulting the Principal was justified?

Whether the Tribunal and High Court erred in modifying the punishment of dismissal to withholding three increments?

Whether the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act extends to interfering with the quantum of punishment imposed for proven misconduct?

RULE:

Assaulting a superior at the workplace amounts to gross indiscipline. Even under provocation, a teacher is not expected to engage in physical assault. Maintenance of institutional discipline is paramount.

The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to interfere with punishment is limited. It can substitute punishment only if it is “wholly disproportionate” or “shocks one’s conscience.” A reasonable employer could justifiably impose dismissal for such misconduct.

The principle of proportionality does not shield grave misconduct. While punishment must not be arbitrary, assault in a professional setting warrants serious consequences, and dismissal is neither excessive nor unheard of.

Selective disciplinary action against one party does not invalidate action against another. The failure to proceed against the Principal does not mitigate the Respondent’s proven misconduct.

ISSUE:

Whether the Labour Court had the power under Section 6(6) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act to modify its award by granting back wages when the original award was silent on the issue?

Whether an employee, whose dismissal is substituted with a lesser punishment, is entitled to back wages for the period of unemployment?

Whether the Labour Court was justified in interfering with the punishment of dismissal when a charge of serious misconduct was found to be proved?

RULE:

The power under Section 6(6) is limited to correcting clerical or arithmetical errors or omissions due to accidental slips. It does not permit a review or substantive modification of an award, nor can it be used to grant reliefs that were not originally awarded.

Back wages do not automatically follow reinstatement when dismissal is substituted with a lesser punishment. The grant of back wages requires judicial determination based on factors like the nature of misconduct, gainful employment during the period, and whether the punishment was set aside on merits or only modified.

Interference with punishment requires a finding that it is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct. Where serious misconduct is established, mere length of service or past clean record is not a sufficient ground to reduce the penalty. The discretion under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act must be exercised judiciously, not on compassionate grounds.