Whether the sums in dispute represent taxable income of the assessee under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922?
Sections 2 (15), 3, 6,12, 55, 56 and 58 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922?
Whether the company was an alien company and that payment of the debt would be trading with the enemy?
Whether lifting the corporate veil can be used in emergencies?
Companies Act, 1905, Trading with the Enemy Act 1914.
Whether Mr Macaura has an insurance interest?
The corporator even if he holds all the shares is not the corporation, neither he nor any creditor of the company has any property legal or equitable in the assets of the corporation.
How to ensure that, particularly in cases of divorcing spouses and in single-man companies, company law could not be used as a tool to conceal assets or avoid liability in relation to those assets, whilst maintaining the integrity of the Salomon principle?
Whether the court could pierce the corporate veil?
Piercing of corporate veil cases should be true exceptions to the case of Salomon v. Salomon such that where a person who owns and controls a company is said in certain circumstances to be identified with it in law by virtue of that ownership and control.
Whether the Indian revenue authorities had the jurisdiction to tax an offshore transaction of transfer of shares between two non-resident companies whereby the controlling interest of an Indian resident company is acquired by virtue of this transaction?
Indian revenue authorities do not have jurisdiction to impose tax on an offshore transaction between two non-residents companies where in controlling interest in a (Indian) resident company is acquired by the non-resident company in the transaction.
Whether an illegal transfer of mining lease was involved?
Whether transformation of partnership into company and transfer of lease rights to such company has to be seen with the next transaction of transfer of the entire shareholding to a third company for a price?
Whether on this basis the State is justified in cancelling the lease which the High Court has quashed?
The Court opined that the partnership firm holding leasehold rights has successfully transferred the said rights to a third party for consideration in the form of share price which is nothing but the price for the sale of mining lease which is not allowed and for which no permission has been granted and which is patently illegal.
Whether Hindalco and Renusagar should be treated as one concern and the consumption of energy by Hindalco must be regarded as consumption by Hindalco from its own source of generation?
The principle of lifting the corporate veil was applied and it was examined if the person generating and consuming energy were the same and the corporate veil should be lifted or not. In this case, Hindalco and Renusagar were inextricably linked up together. Renusagar had, in reality, no separate and independent existence apart from and independent of Hindalco. Consumption of energy of Hindalco was consumption of Hindalco from its own source of generation.
Does the plaintiff prove that Defendant 2 mortgaged the suit field with Defendant 1 for Rs. 1500 on 24-3-1971 ?
Does the plaintiff prove that the suit field was purchased by him from Defendant 2 for Rs. 5000 on 19-6-1973 ?
Is the plaintiff entitled to redeem the mortgage executed by Defendant 2 in favour of Defendant 1?
Was Defendant 2 ready and willing to purchase the suit field prior to 15-3-1971 ?
Is the plaintiff entitled to claim retransfer of the suit field from Defendant 1 ?
A person in his capacity as a defendant can raise any legitimate plea available to him under law to defeat the suit of the plaintiff. This would also include the plea that the sale deed by which the title to the property was intended to be conveyed to the plaintiff was void or fictitious or, for that matter, collusive and not intended to be acted upon.
Whether a mortgagee is entitled to treat interest due under a mortgage as a charge upon the mortgaged property in the absence of any contract to the contrary?
Section 58(a) and 60 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Whether a term period in a mortgage instrument, so far as it precludes the right to redeem from accumulating for a time, a clog on the equity of redemption?
The court perceives that the rule in contradiction of clogs on the equity of redemption exemplified in Section 60 of the Act authorises the Court not only to dismiss a mortgagor of a bargain whereby in some conditions his right to redeem the mortgage is absolutely taken away, but also where that particular right is constrained.