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Nature ad functions of criminal procedure

Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578

ISSUE:

Whether the courts can prescribe mandatory time limits for concluding criminal trials, beyond which proceedings must be terminated?

Whether the directions in Common Cause (I), Common Cause (II), Raj Deo Sharma (I), and Raj Deo Sharma (II), which laid down outer time limits for trials, are contrary to the Constitution Bench ruling in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak?

Whether the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 necessitates the imposition of fixed statutory time limits on criminal trials?

RULE:

It is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time-limit for the conclusion of all criminal proceedings.

The right to a speedy trial is not violated merely by the passage of time but must be determined by considering factors such as the nature of the offense, number of accused and witnesses, work-load of the court, and systemic delays.

Fixing mandatory time limits for criminal trials is an impermissible judicial function and amounts to legislation, which is beyond the court’s authority.

The decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak remains binding precedent, and the directions in Common Cause and Raj Deo Sharma cases prescribing time limits are not good law.

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Nature ad functions of criminal procedure

Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 1973 (2) SCC 793

ISSUE:

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal by the Sessions Court and convicting the accused?

Whether exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt leads to injustice to the victim and undermines public faith in criminal justice?

Whether the prosecution evidence sufficiently proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?

RULE:

The appellate court has plenary power and a duty to re-assess and scrutinize the entire evidence independently. However, this power must be exercised with caution, keeping in view that the accused’s innocence is strengthened by acquittal, and only “very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration” can justify reversal.

"Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused." Exaggerated or imaginary doubts cannot justify acquittals. Overly strict adherence to benefit-of-doubt principles, ignoring pragmatic considerations of justice, ultimately erodes the credibility and effectiveness of criminal justice.

The quality of witnesses matters more than quantity; thus, even the testimony of a single eyewitness can sustain a conviction if it is clear, cogent, and credible, though prudence dictates seeking corroboration.

Motive strengthens the likelihood of guilt but its absence only demands deeper scrutiny of evidence, and credible evidence can independently prove guilt notwithstanding absence or uncertainty of motive.

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Judgement And Sentencing

Sangeet and Anr. v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0989/2012

ISSUE:

Whether the death penalty awarded to the appellants falls within the "rarest of rare" category, justifying the ultimate punishment?

Whether sentencing discretion should focus solely on the nature of the crime or also consider the circumstances of the criminal?

Whether the balance-sheet approach of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors is legally valid under Bachan Singh?

Whether life imprisonment means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s life or a fixed term subject to remission?

RULE:

The death penalty must only be imposed when life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. The sentencing court must consider both the crime and the criminal before deciding on capital punishment. If there is any possibility of reformation, the death penalty is not justified.

Sentencing must not be based solely on the brutality of the crime but must also consider the individual circumstances of the accused. The shift from Jagmohan Singh to Bachan Singh requires an individualized sentencing approach that includes factors like the criminal’s background, psychological state, and likelihood of rehabilitation.

The balance-sheet approach to aggravating and mitigating factors is flawed. Aggravating circumstances relate to the crime, while mitigating circumstances pertain to the criminal; they cannot be mechanically compared. Sentencing must be principle-based rather than a mathematical exercise.

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Commencement Of Judicial Proceedings

Satyajit Banerjee and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.2005 (1) SCC 115

ISSUE:

Whether the High Court, in exercising its revisional jurisdiction, was justified in setting aside the acquittal and directing a de novo trial?

Whether the High Court’s directions to invoke Section 311 Cr.P.C. to summon additional witnesses and fill gaps left by the prosecution were legally sustainable?

Whether the High Court’s observations could improperly influence the trial court’s decision on retrial?

Whether a retrial could be ordered in the absence of a fundamental defect in the trial process?

RULE:

Revisional jurisdiction must be exercised only in exceptional cases where there is a manifest miscarriage of justice. Mere possibility of a different view on evidence does not justify interference.

An order of retrial cannot be used to indirectly overturn an acquittal. Section 401(3) Cr.P.C. prohibits converting an acquittal into a conviction in revision.

A trial court has discretion under Section 311 Cr.P.C. to summon witnesses, but this power cannot be used to cure defects in the prosecution’s case. The prosecution’s failure to present evidence does not automatically justify judicial intervention.

Observations made by a revisional court should not create an impression of a predetermined outcome. If a retrial is ordered, the trial court must evaluate the case independently without being influenced by any implied directions.

A retrial does not erase evidence already recorded. If remanded, the trial court must consider both existing and additional evidence.

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Framing of Charge and Elements of Fair Trial

Senior Intelligence Officer v. Jugal Kishore Samra 2011 (12) SCC 362

ISSUE:

Whether a person summoned for interrogation is entitled to have a lawyer present during questioning?

Whether the respondent, who was not formally accused, could claim the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution?

Whether the High Court’s direction mandating interrogation only in the presence of an advocate was legally sustainable.

RULE:

The right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) applies only when a person is an accused. A person summoned for questioning under statutory powers is not entitled to this protection at the investigation stage.

Article 22(1) guarantees the right to consult a lawyer but does not extend to having legal counsel present during interrogation. Permitting such presence would impede the investigative process and is not a recognized right under Indian law.

Judicial discretion may be exercised in exceptional circumstances, such as medical vulnerability or allegations of coercion. In such cases, procedural safeguards can be imposed to ensure fairness without obstructing the investigation.

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Framing of Charge and Elements of Fair Trial

Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh 1986 (2) SCC 401

ISSUE:

Whether the failure to provide free legal aid to an indigent accused vitiates the trial?

Whether it is the duty of the court to inform an accused of their right to free legal aid, even if no request is made?

RULE:

A fair trial mandates legal representation for an accused who cannot afford a lawyer, as it is an essential component of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The requirement of a "fair, just, and reasonable procedure" encompasses the duty of the State to provide a lawyer where the accused lacks means. This principle is absolute in cases where imprisonment is a possible outcome.

Legal aid cannot be conditioned upon an accused making a request. A majority of the population is illiterate and unaware of their legal rights, making it unreasonable to expect them to demand free legal aid. Without explicit information from the court, the right becomes meaningless.

A trial conducted without informing an indigent accused of their right to legal aid is inherently unfair and unconstitutional. The adversarial system places an unrepresented accused at a significant disadvantage. The failure to ensure legal representation compromises the defense, leading to an unfair trial.

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Framing of Charge and Elements of Fair Trial

Zahira Habibulla Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2004) 4 SCC 158

ISSUE:

Whether the trial in Gujarat was free and fair, or whether it was vitiated by intimidation, threats, and coercion of witnesses, particularly Zahira Habibullah Sheikh?

Whether Zahira Habibullah Sheikh’s shifting testimonies constituted an attempt to subvert the justice delivery system?

Whether the trial should be transferred outside Gujarat to ensure fairness and prevent miscarriage of justice?

Whether Zahira’s conduct amounted to contempt of court by misleading the judicial process?

Whether an inquiry into financial inducements and unexplained assets of Zahira was warranted to ascertain the source of influence?

RULE:

A trial ceases to be fair if witnesses are intimidated, coerced, or induced to testify falsely. The fundamental principle of criminal justice requires that trials be conducted in an atmosphere free from fear or external influence.

When a witness frequently changes testimony, contradicting sworn statements and prior affidavits, it undermines the very foundation of a fair trial and creates strong grounds for judicial intervention.

If the judicial process is subverted through witness tampering, financial inducements, or political influence, the court must step in to restore fairness, including transferring the trial to a jurisdiction free from such pressures.

Courts have an inherent duty to protect the integrity of proceedings. Any deliberate attempt to mislead the court, particularly through false testimony under oath, constitutes contempt and warrants punitive action.

Unexplained financial transactions linked to a key witness in a compromised trial raise a strong presumption of corruption, justifying a deeper inquiry to ensure that justice is not sold to the highest bidder.

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Succession and Inheritance

Vilas Shivmurti Munde v. Somnath Santram Kumbhar & Ors (2018) Bombay High Court

ISSUE:

Whether the suit was maintainable in light of the provisions of Section 36A of the Fragmentation Act?

Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit?

RULE:

When a claim involves matters that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent authority under the Fragmentation Act, the civil court is barred from entertaining such a suit under Section 36A of the Act.

Any dispute regarding land fragmentation must be addressed through a competent authority under the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (Fragmentation Act) and not through a Civil Court.

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Joint Hindu Family and Coparcenary System

Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement (2005) 4 SCC 530

ISSUE:

Whether a company or a corporate body could be prosecuted for offences under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) for which the sentence of imprisonment is a mandatory punishment and fine, even though a company cannot be subjected to imprisonment.

RULE:

A company is liable to be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences.

When the custodial sentence and fine are the prescribed mode of punishment, the court can impose the sentence of fine on a company which is found guilty as the sentence of imprisonment is impossible to be carried out.

Section 56 of the Act provides for imposition of minimum prescribed sentence of imprisonment wherever possible and also fine. Such a construction of the provisions of Section 56 of the Act to make it workable cannot be said to be a construction impermissible only because the statute under construction is a penal statute.

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Joint Hindu Family and Coparcenary System

Sheela Devi v. Lal Chand (2006) 8 SCC 581

ISSUE:

Whether the suit property’s devolution be governed by the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and whether the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 would apply to the facts of the present case or would the law as applicable before the enforcement of the 1956 Act apply?

RULE:

If the date of succession is before the insertion of the Amendment Act, then the said Act cannot be made applicable retrospectively

As long as a property remains in the hands of a single person, the same was to be treated as a separate property, and thus such a person would be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as the same were his separate property, but, if a son is subsequently born to him or adopted by him, the alienation whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations so made by his father before he was born or begotten. But once a son is born, it becomes a coparcenary property and he would acquire an interest therein.

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