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ISSUE:

Whether an Inspecting/Administrative Judge has the authority to grant bail during a jail inspection and direct the Sessions Judge to grant bail?

Whether the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution permits High Court Judges to interfere in the judicial functions of subordinate courts?

RULE:

The power of superintendence under Article 227 is supervisory in nature and does not extend to interference in the judicial functions of subordinate courts. It is to ensure that courts function within their jurisdiction and does not authorize a High Court Judge to grant bail or direct a subordinate court to do so.

Judicial independence requires that subordinate courts decide matters without administrative influence. The High Court’s administrative authority does not include the power to interfere with the judicial discretion of lower courts.

Orders affecting rights of litigants, including bail, must be passed strictly in accordance with established legal procedure. A bail order passed outside the statutory framework lacks legal validity.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent, while in judicial custody, misused the production warrant to leave jail and address a political meeting?

Whether the respondent’s repeated violations of jail rules and continued influence over prison authorities warranted his transfer to a jail outside Bihar?

Whether the Supreme Court, in the absence of a specific statutory provision, could direct the transfer of the respondent to another jail under Article 142 of the Constitution?

RULE:

Judicial custody is not meant to be exploited for personal or political purposes. If an undertrial prisoner misuses a production warrant to engage in activities beyond its scope, it constitutes an abuse of the legal system.

A prisoner’s fundamental rights under Article 21 are subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by jail regulations. No individual, including a Member of Parliament, is entitled to special privileges that undermine prison discipline.

When a prisoner repeatedly violates legal and prison regulations, and jail authorities fail to enforce discipline, judicial intervention is necessary. Transferring such a prisoner to another jurisdiction is justified to uphold the rule of law and prevent further misuse of custody.

Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to do complete justice in a given case, and in the absence of a specific statutory provision, it can order the transfer of a prisoner when required to maintain judicial integrity and ensure the fair administration of justice.

ISSUE:

Whether the sureties remain liable under the bail bond when the accused absconds?

Whether the modification of bail conditions without notice to the sureties affects their liability?

RULE:

The obligation of the surety is to ensure the attendance of the accused in court, and this core requirement remains unchanged despite any modification in bail conditions. A surety remains bound by the bond unless formally discharged by the court under Section 444(1) CrPC.

A modification of bail conditions does not automatically discharge the surety’s liability. If the surety does not agree with the modification, they must seek discharge from the court. Otherwise, their liability continues under the original terms.

ISSUE:

Whether a Magistrate has the power to remand an accused to custody beyond the period prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, during the investigation stage?

Whether an accused must be released on bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) if the investigation is not completed within the statutory period of 60 days?

Whether pending investigations that commenced under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, should be governed by the old Code or the new Code?

RULE:

A Magistrate has no inherent power to remand an accused to custody unless such power is conferred by law. Section 344 of the old Code permitted remand only when sufficient evidence had been collected to raise a suspicion and further evidence was likely to be obtained through continued detention. There is no general power of remand outside statutory provisions.

An accused must be released on bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) if the investigation is not completed within 60 days. The provision is mandatory and does not confer any discretion on the court. Detention beyond the statutory period is not permissible even if the investigation remains incomplete.

Pending investigations initiated before the new Code came into force must continue under the old Code. Section 484(2)(a) mandates that any investigation pending before the commencement of the new Code must be conducted under the provisions of the old Code, including rules on remand and bail.

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant, having been discharged under Section 67 of the IT Act, could still be prosecuted under Section 292 of the IPC?

Whether the IT Act, being a special legislation, overrides the IPC in matters related to electronic records and offenses committed in electronic form?

RULE:

Section 67 of the IT Act specifically governs punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form. The presence of a special provision dealing with the same subject matter as Section 292 IPC excludes the application of the latter.

Section 81 of the IT Act provides an overriding effect over any inconsistent provisions of other laws. If an offense is covered under the IT Act, recourse to IPC provisions is not permissible.

The principle of strict interpretation in criminal law mandates that special provisions enacted for a particular category of offenses must be applied in place of general penal provisions, ensuring that no person is punished under two separate laws for the same act when one law exclusively governs the field.