Category: Nature ad functions of criminal procedure

ISSUE:

Whether the Magistrate had the jurisdiction to discharge the accused in an offence triable exclusively by the Sessions Court?

Whether a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. without police production was legally valid and could be relied upon?

Whether the Magistrate could refuse to take cognizance based solely on the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. when the charge sheet disclosed an offence triable by the Sessions Court?

RULE:

A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to discharge an accused in a Sessions triable case. Once an offence triable exclusively by the Sessions Court is disclosed, the Magistrate must commit the case without evaluating evidence.

A statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. must be recorded only when the person is produced by the police. Voluntary appearance before the Magistrate does not grant legal sanctity to such a statement.

The Magistrate cannot refuse to take cognizance based on a Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement when a charge sheet discloses a Sessions triable offence. The evaluation of evidence and discharge of the accused falls within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the High Court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, could direct a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to take over an ongoing police investigation?

Whether an anonymous and unverified petition, lacking prima facie evidence of a cognizable offence, could be treated as a valid basis for initiating a suo motu criminal investigation?

Whether the High Court’s interference in the police investigation was justified when there was no allegation of bias against the Investigating Officer or procedural lapse in the investigation?

RULE:

The inherent power under Section 482 CrPC does not confer unlimited authority on the High Court to interfere with an ongoing police investigation. The police have exclusive jurisdiction to investigate cognizable offences, and judicial interference is warranted only in cases of abuse of power or non-compliance with statutory provisions.

Criminal law cannot be set in motion based on vague, unverified, and anonymous allegations. Courts must not direct an investigation unless prima facie material indicating a cognizable offence exists.

The judiciary and the police operate in separate spheres. The power to investigate a crime is statutorily vested in the police, and courts should not usurp this function by appointing a different investigative agency without legal justification.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners’ fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution has been violated due to the prolonged delay of 37 years in the trial?

Whether the delay in the trial is attributable to the prosecution, systemic inefficiencies, or the accused themselves?

Whether the prolonged delay justifies quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused?

RULE:

Right to a speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 and extends to all stages of the criminal process, including investigation, trial, appeal, and revision. The delay must be assessed in the context of all attendant circumstances rather than through a fixed timeframe.

Delay alone is not conclusive; it must be weighed against the nature of the offense, the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties, and the justification for the delay.

Systemic delays do not automatically violate the right to a speedy trial, unless they cause oppression, undue prejudice, or render a fair trial impossible.

An accused cannot claim the benefit of delay if they contributed to it, whether through adjournments, procedural tactics, or legal maneuvers.

ISSUE:

Whether the courts can prescribe mandatory time limits for concluding criminal trials, beyond which proceedings must be terminated?

Whether the directions in Common Cause (I), Common Cause (II), Raj Deo Sharma (I), and Raj Deo Sharma (II), which laid down outer time limits for trials, are contrary to the Constitution Bench ruling in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak?

Whether the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 necessitates the imposition of fixed statutory time limits on criminal trials?

RULE:

It is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time-limit for the conclusion of all criminal proceedings.

The right to a speedy trial is not violated merely by the passage of time but must be determined by considering factors such as the nature of the offense, number of accused and witnesses, work-load of the court, and systemic delays.

Fixing mandatory time limits for criminal trials is an impermissible judicial function and amounts to legislation, which is beyond the court’s authority.

The decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak remains binding precedent, and the directions in Common Cause and Raj Deo Sharma cases prescribing time limits are not good law.

ISSUE:

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal by the Sessions Court and convicting the accused?

Whether exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt leads to injustice to the victim and undermines public faith in criminal justice?

Whether the prosecution evidence sufficiently proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?

RULE:

The appellate court has plenary power and a duty to re-assess and scrutinize the entire evidence independently. However, this power must be exercised with caution, keeping in view that the accused’s innocence is strengthened by acquittal, and only “very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration” can justify reversal.

"Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused." Exaggerated or imaginary doubts cannot justify acquittals. Overly strict adherence to benefit-of-doubt principles, ignoring pragmatic considerations of justice, ultimately erodes the credibility and effectiveness of criminal justice.

The quality of witnesses matters more than quantity; thus, even the testimony of a single eyewitness can sustain a conviction if it is clear, cogent, and credible, though prudence dictates seeking corroboration.

Motive strengthens the likelihood of guilt but its absence only demands deeper scrutiny of evidence, and credible evidence can independently prove guilt notwithstanding absence or uncertainty of motive.

ISSUE:

Whether the order passed by the Learned Special Judge suffers from manifest error of law?

Whether the learned Special Judge had jurisdiction to drop the proceedings?

RULE:

Sections 228 and 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that once a Sessions Judge frames charges against an accused, he has to either acquit or convict the accused and has no power to drop the proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether delayed appointment of amicus curiae (court-appointed counsel) by itself amounts to denial of fair trial to an indigent accused?

RULE:

Indigence should not deny fair trial or justice. Competent advocates must be appointed, given sufficient time and complete papers, ensuring they can effectively handle complex cases.

The delay in appointment of amicus curiae, though disturbing, does not by itself result in denying fair trial. The same can be rectified by providing adequate time and material to the counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether the Supreme Court can go into a detailed inquiry into the facts and evidence of a case during the revision of a consent order under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Code”)?

Whether a consent order under Section 321 of the Code can be appealed against?

RULE:

Appeal against a consent order under Section 321 of the Code, which deals with withdrawal from prosecution, is not possible.

While revision of a consent order is possible under Section 397 of the Code, the court cannot go into a detailed inquiry into the facts and evidence of the case.

During revision, the court considers the materials only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings in the order or judgement.