Dr. Writer’s Food Products v. Cosmos Co-operative Bank [Bombay HC, 20 September]

DR. WRITER'S FOOD PRODUCTS V. COSMOS CO-OPERATIVE

Whether the respondent’s motion for correction of the arbitral award, filed on December 29, 2016, was maintainable under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act after the 30-day limitation period from the date of service of the arbitral judgement?
Whether it is possible that the respondent’s late application under Section 33, which was not maintainable, could prolong the time limit for the petitioners to file an arbitration petition under Section 34 challenging the initial arbitral judgement of June 4, 2015?

In India, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 oversees the resolution of arbitration issues. Section 34 of the Act addresses the setting aside of an arbitral award, while Section 33 addresses award revision and interpretation.

On June 4, 2015, an arbitral award was rendered, and a copy was immediately served on the petitioners.
The respondent submitted an application for correction of the arbitral award on December 29, 2016, well after the 30-day limitation period stipulated by Section 33(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act.
The petitioners challenged this application and also requested that the respondent’s application be excused for the delay.
The arbitrator repaired the typographical errors pointed out by the respondent and excused the delay in filing the application on February 16, 2017.
On March 2, 2017, the petitioners obtained a copy of this order, and on May 5, 2017, they filed an arbitration petition under Section 34, appealing the original award.

The respondent’s application under Section 33 for correction of the arbitral award, filed on December 29, 2016, was not maintainable since it was filed much after the 30-day limitation period from the date of service of the arbitral judgement.
The respondent’s motion for correction was not maintainable in law because there was no power to excuse the delay in filing an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act.
Because the respondent’s Section 33 motion was denied, there was no new term of limitation for contesting the original award under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.
As, the period for making an application under Section 34 had already expired when the respondent filed its application under Section 33, the petitioners were not compelled to wait for the respondent’s untimely application under Section 33 to be disposed of.
The petitioners’ referenced case, Ved Prakash Mithal & Sons, was distinguished because the facts were different, and the application under Section 33 in that case was filed within the necessary limitation time.
Invoking Section 33(1) within the limitation period did not have any effect because the limitation period for contesting the original arbitral award had already elapsed. As a result, the arbitration petition appealing the initial award was denied.